State v. Steed
| Citation | 391 P.3d 373 |
| Decision Date | 06 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 20141044-CA,20141044-CA |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellee and Cross-appellant, v. Joan A. STEED And Frank J. Steed, Appellants and Cross-appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
Max D. Wheeler, Rodney R. Parker, and Richard A. Van Wagoner, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellants and Cross-appellees.
Sean D. Reyes, Bridget K. Romano, and Stanford E. Purser, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-appellant.
Scott H. Sweat and Tyler J. Berg, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Wasatch County.
Opinion
¶1 Joan A. Steed and Frank J. Steed appeal the district court's order denying the refund of tax penalties and interest, as well as incarceration and probation costs after their convictions for failure to file tax returns were reversed.1 We affirm in part and reverse in part.
¶2 The Steeds were convicted of three counts of failure to file tax returns and one count of conducting a pattern of unlawful activity. Prior to sentencing, the Steeds agreed to accept the Utah State Tax Commission's determination of past-due taxes owed for purposes of calculating restitution. Mr. Steed was sentenced to zero to five years in prison on each count of the failure to file tax returns. In addition, Mr. Steed was sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison for the pattern-of-unlawful-activity conviction and fined $ 5,300. These prison sentences were stayed and the district court imposed a total of six years of probation3 and ordered him to serve 365 days in Salt Lake County jail as a term of the probation. Mr. Steed was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the tax owed for the years he did not file a tax return, a ten percent failure-to-file fee, a ten percent late-payment fee, and interest.
¶3 Mrs. Steed was also sentenced to zero to five years in prison for each of the three counts of failure to file a tax return and one to fifteen years in prison for the pattern-of-unlawful-activity conviction. She was also ordered to pay a $ 140,298 fine pursuant to the pattern-of-unlawful-activity statute.4 These sentences were stayed and Mrs. Steed was placed on probation for a total of six years and ordered to serve 180 days in the Salt Lake County jail after her husband was released.5 Like Mr. Steed, Mrs. Steed was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the taxes owed for the years she did not file a tax return, an additional twenty percent in penalties, and interest.
¶4 The court clarified that the amount of restitution it ordered for taxes due was based on "the figures that were developed by the State Tax Commission," which "both sides had agreed that they would accept." The court asked that the Steeds' accountant and the Commission's accountant work together to determine the penalties and interest portion of the restitution.
¶5 Because of Mr. Steed's poor health, the Steeds requested that they be able to serve their jail terms "where they live."6 The court ordered Mr. Steed to notify the court within two weeks whether he had "made arrangements at his own expense to serve the time in the Duchesne County jail" or report to the Salt Lake County jail in thirty days.
¶6 Mr. Steed reported to the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center but was transferred to the Wasatch County jail to "serve the remainder of his 365 day jail sentence."7 The order approving Mr. Steed's transfer to the Wasatch County jail stated, "The defendant shall sign and be bound by any such conditions contained in a contract of confinement by and between [him] and Wasatch County, including per diem costs, work release conditions and any [and] all such costs and conditions of confinement and release imposed by Wasatch County." Mrs. Steed was also transferred to the Wasatch County jail and served her sentence under the same terms.
¶7 The Steeds appealed their convictions, and our supreme court concluded "there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts" and reversed and remanded the case "with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal." State v. Steed , 2014 UT 16, ¶¶ 2, 55, 325 P.3d 87. On remand, the Steeds moved for the district court to order a refund of the tax penalties and interest, fines, and costs associated with incarceration and probation as part of its judgment of acquittal.8 The court ordered a refund of the fines for the pattern-of-unlawful-activity counts but denied a return of the tax penalties and interest and the costs of incarceration and probation. The Steeds appeal.
¶8 The Steeds contend due process "requires restoration of all funds taken from or paid by [them] as a result of the now-reversed convictions." These funds fall into three categories: money paid to the Utah State Tax Commission for penalties and interest on back taxes, money paid to Wasatch County pursuant to a private incarceration contract, and money paid to Adult Probation and Parole for probation services. The court gave different legal reasons for denying the refund of these different costs, and "[w]e review a district court's legal conclusions for correctness." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network , 2012 UT 84, ¶ 117, 299 P.3d 990.
¶9 As a threshold matter, the State argues the Steeds cannot challenge the civil tax penalties and interest imposed as part of their sentences "because they did not raise the issue in their first appeal." In the current appeal, the Steeds challenge the district court's refusal to vacate the tax penalties and interest portions of their restitution orders following acquittal. The crux of the Steeds' complaint is that, after their acquittal, the district court lacks jurisdiction to uphold part of a restitution order. This is not an issue that could have been raised before the Steeds' convictions were reversed. To argue that the court cannot impose tax penalties and interest absent conviction on the first appeal would have been unripe for adjudication. See Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins , 2009 UT 52, ¶ 29, 215 P.3d 933 ; cf. State v. Ortiz , 1999 UT 84, ¶¶ 1–5, 987 P.2d 39 (). We thus conclude that the Steeds may challenge the district court's refusal to vacate the tax penalties and interest imposed as part of their sentences.
¶10 The State also argues that to allow the Steeds to litigate a refund "exceeds the scope of the [Utah] Supreme Court's mandate" to enter a judgment of acquittal on remand. To support its contention, the State relies on Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers , 2009 UT 56, 218 P.3d 583, and J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud , 2007 UT App 88, 157 P.3d 822. These cases are inapposite.
¶11 In Ivers , a fast-food restaurant sued for loss of view due to a Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) construction project. Ivers , 2009 UT 56, ¶ 1, 218 P.3d 583. On appeal, our supreme court "addressed whether damages were awardable for [the] loss of view where the view-impairing structure was not built on the condemned property but was part of the project for which the property was condemned." Id. The case was remanded to determine whether the "condemned property was essential to the project, and if so, ... the district court [was] to award the restaurant appropriate damages." Id. On remand "UDOT argued, for the first time, that the statute granted it the right to amend its taking at any time during the course of the proceedings." Id. ¶ 7. The district court allowed UDOT to amend its complaint to "no longer [claim the taking of] the restaurant's right of view." Id. ¶¶ 1, 7. On appeal the second time, the supreme court "conclude[d] that the district court violated [its] mandate" because allowing UDOT to amend its complaint was beyond the scope of the remand. Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 20. Thus in Ivers , the remand involved a change of claim. In this case, the parties are merely arguing about the consequences of an acquittal, not changing the scope of the action.
¶12 In Pochynok , the prevailing party, the Smedsruds, successfully garnished $ 37,585 from Pochynok for attorney fees and costs. J. Pochynok Co. , 2007 UT App 88, ¶ 4, 157 P.3d 822. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's decision on the award of attorney fees and costs. Id. ¶ 5. Our supreme court granted certiorari and reversed the award, "directing this court to remand [the case] to the trial court for a factual determination of awards and offsets, followed by a ruling on who [was] the successful party ... and whether an award of attorney fees ... [was] proper." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Back in the trial court, Pochynok filed a motion to set aside the garnishment and to reinstate a mechanics' lien. Id. ¶ 6. The trial court subsequently denied the motion and determined that the Smedsruds were the prevailing party and again awarded them attorney fees and costs. Id. On appeal a second time, Pochynok asserted the trial court erred in denying its motion to reinstate the lien and set aside the garnishment. Id. ¶ 15. But this court stated that "these issues were not before the trial court on remand" and it would not address them. Id. The "original challenge to the garnishment ... was unsuccessful" on the first appeal and "not accepted for review under the Utah Supreme Court's writ of certiorari" and thus should not have been entertained by the trial court on remand. Id. ¶ 16. Thus, as the Steeds correctly point out, That is not the case here.
¶13 We...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Smith
..."the primary basis for the court’s decision," he has not adequately briefed this issue. See State v. Steed , 2017 UT App 6, ¶ 20, 391 P.3d 373 ("We will not assume a party’s burden of argument and research." (quotation simplified)). In any event, our determination that Smith was not entitle......
-
State v. Becker
...appeal because he could recover the restitution he paid if he is successful on appeal. See State v. Steed , 2017 UT App 6, ¶¶ 16–18, 25, 391 P.3d 373 (concluding that because the defendants’ convictions were reversed, the restitution order was void and the defendants were entitled to a reim......
- State v. Nay