State v. Steele
| Decision Date | 10 January 1929 |
| Docket Number | 21478. |
| Citation | 273 P. 742,150 Wash. 466 |
| Parties | STATE v. STEELE et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald, Judge.
Jack Steele and another were convicted of robbery, and they appeal. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Henry Clay Agnew, of Seattle, for appellants.
Ewing D. Colvin and Cordelia M. Thiel, both of Seattle, for the State.
On March 28, 1928, the appellants, Steele and Williams, were informed against by the prosecuting attorney of King county for the crime of robbery. The information contained three counts: The first count charged a taking of money from the person of one Otness; the second, a taking of money from the person of one Harper; and, the third, a taking of a watch and money from the person of one Hamilton. There was a trial by jury, in which a verdict was returned finding each of the defendants guilty on each of the counts.
The testimony on the part of the state, as well as that on the part of the appellants, was to the effect that the acts thought by the state to constitute the offense of robbery occurred in an apartment house in rooms therein occupied by and under the control of Otness, one of the prosecuting witnesses. Their testimony differs widely, however, as to the nature of the acts. In brief, the state's witnesses testified that Otness, Harper, Hamilton, the appellants, and an unidentified person, called by the appellants Bob, and possibly others were together in Otness' rooms, when the appellants without warning, drew revolvers, and, menacing the others with the exception of Bob, directed them to throw up their hands and line up against the wall; that they then directed Bob to search their persons, which direction Bob obeyed, taking money from Otness and Harper and money and a watch from Hamilton; that Bob, as he found the property, placed it on a table in front of the appellant Steele, who put it in his coat pocket. After completing the robbery, the appellants left the place and were soon thereafter apprehended by the police of the city of Seattle. Who Bob was, or what became of him, the evidence offers no explanation, other than that he seems to have been the first person to leave the place after the transaction.
The testimony of the appellants was that Otness conducted a place for the illicit sale of intoxicating liquors, and in which gambling games were conducted. Steele testified that he had been at Otness' place some weeks before, and had lost a considerable sum of money in a crap game, in which he suspected the other side had used 'crooked' dice; that he later met the appellant Williams, and, knowing him to be an expert in the use of dice, took him to the place for the purpose of recouping his losses; that a dice game was started, in which the money and the watch which he and Williams were accused of stealing were bet on the result of the throw; that they won the throw, and, while gathering up their gains, were interfered with by the others, and used their revolvers to protect their winnings.
The appellant Williams testified much to the same purpose. He added, however, that the other side tried to win on this particular occasion by the use of crooked dice, and that he, to win, substituted crooked dice of his own, which were more effective than the dice the others used.
The errors assigned are directed to the rulings of the court in admitting testimony, and to the giving and the refusal to give certain instructions.
At the trial of the cause, one of the appellants became a witness in his own behalf. In his cross-examination by the attorney for the state, the fact was elicited that he theretofore had been convicted of a crime. The state's attorney then questioned him as to the nature of the crime he had committed and the extent of the punishment that had been inflicted upon him. Over his objection, interposed by his counsel, he was directed to and did answer the questions propounded to him. The appellants argue at some length and with force that the action of the court is an abuse of the statutory provision (Rem. Comp. Stat. § 2290) permitting the conviction of a crime to be proved against a witness to affect the weight of his testimony. But, without following the argument, we cannot conclude that there was error committed in the ruling of the court. An examination of the statute will show that it is somewhat minute in its provisions. It permits the former convictions to be shown by the record of the conviction, by an authenticated copy thereof, by other competent evidence, or by the cross-examination of the witness, 'upon which he shall answer any proper question relevant to that inquiry,' and provides that the cross-examining party shall not be concluded by the answers of the witness. It is at once apparent, of course, that if the record of the conviction is introduced it will of necessity show the nature of the offense and the extent of the punishment, and, since cross-examination is only an alternate method of proving the conviction, we see no reason why the witness may not be examined as to any matter the record itself will show, and this we think was the purpose of that part of the statute we have above quoted. Moreover, it is the common knowledge of every one conversant with the criminal statutes that acts are denounced by them as crimes, the conviction of which would have but little if any bearing on the weight of the testimony of the person convicted given in another cause, while there are others of a nature so depraved that a conviction for their violation would be to put the perpetrator beyond the pale of consideration in the minds of all right-thinking people. It is our view that the legislative body had these distinctions in mind when it framed and enacted the statute; that it was recognized that, after a conviction had been shown, to show the nature of the crime could be as beneficial to the witness and to the party for whom he was testifying as it would be to the other party; and that its purpose was to give to each of the parties such benefit as a showing of the nature of the crime might entail. But perhaps we are unnecessarily laboring the question. The view here expressed is the view this court took of the statute in the case of State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 P. 845, and we are contented with the view there announced.
Another contention is that the trial court erroneously permitted a police officer to testify to statements made to him by persons other than the persons robbed, to the effect that they had been 'stuck up' by the appellants. If the record disclosed that such testimony had...
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State v. Phillips
...to steal is an essential element of the crime of robbery. State v. Hicks, 102 Wn.2d 182, 683 P.2d 186 (1984) ; State v. Steele, 150 Wash. 466, 273 P. 742 (1929). Therefore, a person cannot be guilty of robbery in forcibly taking property from another if he does so under the good faith belie......
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Arnold v. United States
...v. People, 78 Colo. 264, 241 P. 734; Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546, 238 P. 25; State v. Green, 167 Wash. 266, 9 P.2d 62; State v. Steele, 150 Wash. 466, 273 P. 742; 40 Cyc. 2610; Note, 103 A.L.R., Annotated, 362, and 70 C.J. As to cautioning the jury as to evidence of accomplices and proper......
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State v. Yelovich
...his property against the unlawful invasion of another by such acts of force as are necessary to so protect it. State v. Steele, 150 Wash. 466, 473, 273 P. 742 (1929).¶ 45 Secondary sources also discuss this common law rule. The Restatement (Second) of Torts permits the use of force to recov......
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State v. Coloff
...the credibility of witnesses much more than others.' The Supreme Court of Washington stated the applicable rule in State v. Steele, 150 Wash. 466, 273 P. 742, 743, as follows: 'It is at once apparent, of course, that if the record of the conviction is introduced, it will of necessity show t......