State v. Steffenhagen, 47154
| Decision Date | 24 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 47154,47154 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mark STEFFENHAGEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Henry Robertson, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.
Kristie L. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant appeals from his conviction by a jury of first degree robbery and the resultant 20 year sentence imposed on him by the court. We affirm.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of the robbery in which it was charged that "in the course thereof defendant threatened the immediate use of a dangerous instrument." Defendant entered the Centerre Bank, wrote a note on the back of a withdrawal slip and handed it to the teller. The note read: The teller then activated a silent alarm and gave defendant $1000. Defendant left the teller's window and was apprehended with the money in hand a short distance outside the bank. He was, in fact, unarmed. His defense was based upon diminished mental capacity.
The thrust of defendant's contention is that neither the note nor the ".38 special" identified therein, was a "dangerous instrument." This in turn is based upon a contention that "dangerous instrument" does not include a "deadly weapon." We find no case in Missouri directly deciding this contention. Sec. 569.020 RSMo 1978 provides that robbery in the first degree occurs when a forcible stealing is accompanied by: (1) a participant causing serious physical injury to any person, or (2) any participant being armed with a deadly weapon, or (3) any participant using or threatening the immediate use of a "dangerous instrument against any person" or (4) any participant displaying or threatening the use of "what appears to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." The state elected to charge defendant with violation of subparagraph (3) and the jury was so instructed. Secs. 556.061(8) and (9) RSMo 1978 (Cum.Supp.1982) contain the definitions respectively of "dangerous instrument" and "deadly weapon."
The former means "any instrument, article or substance, which under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury." (Emphasis supplied) The latter means "any firearm, loaded or unloaded, or any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or serious physical injury may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, dagger, billy, blackjack or metal knuckles." On the face of the statutory language, it is apparent that a ".38 special," a handgun, meets both definitions. The definitions support a conclusion that a "dangerous instrument" includes most if not all "deadly weapons" although the opposite is not true. See Whorton v Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 627 (Ky.1978) [3, 4]. rev'd. on other grounds, 441 U.S. 786, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979).
Defendant points however to the Comment to 1973 Proposed Code following Sec. 556.061 V.A.M.S., which states that the terms "dangerous instrument" and "deadly weapon" are used in the Code in reference to several crimes, including homicide and assault offenses, burglary and robbery. The comment then states "the distinction between the two is not significant in the crimes against the person but is in robbery and burglary." The comments have been recognized as having particular importance in ascertaining the legislative intent. State v. Beishir, 646 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. banc 1983) . From this defendant concludes that the terms are mutually exclusive and that the threatened .38 special was a deadly weapon not a dangerous instrument. We disagree.
The thrust of the robbery first degree statute is to encompass those situations where the victim is placed either in unusually great danger or fear of bodily injury. Comment V.A.M.S. Sec. 569.020. Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) deal with the danger element. The first obviously concerns a situation where in fact serious injury has occurred. The second, which does not require the display, use or threat of the "deadly weapon" 1 addresses the strong possibility that an armed...
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