State v. Steinbuch
| Full Citation | State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1994) |
| Decision Date | 08 April 1994 |
| Citation | 514 N.W.2d 793 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-93-274,C2-93-274 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dale Robert STEINBUCH, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Appellant was not denied a fair trial when he was indicted on the charge of murder while committing criminal sexual assault, and the trial court dismissed the charge at the close of evidence.
2. There is sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's convictions of murder in the first and second degree.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of appellant's prior convictions for fifth degree assault against his former wife to prove motive.
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in introducing appellant's wife's state of mind because the evidence was not irrelevant or overly prejudicial.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Mark F. Anderson, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Sp. Asst. State Public Defenders, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Margaret H. Chutich, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, and Roger S. Van Heel, Stearns County Atty., St. Cloud, for respondent.
Appellant Dale Robert Steinbuch was indicted on three counts of first degree murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(1), and one count of first degree murder committed while engaging in criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(2). The charges were in connection with the murders of his wife, step-daughter, and daughter, on or about July 17, 1991, in their home in St. Cloud, Minnesota. At the close of evidence, the trial court dismissed the count involving first degree murder while committing criminal sexual conduct. The jury then convicted appellant of second degree murder of his wife, and first degree murder of his step-daughter and daughter. Appellant was sentenced to two life terms for the first degree murder convictions, and 305 months for the second degree murder conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively.
Appellant appeals his convictions on the grounds that: 1) there was insufficient evidence to support indictment on the charge of first degree murder while committing sexual assault, and dismissal of the charge did not cure the prejudice created by introduction of evidence on that charge; 2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 3) introduction of evidence of prior crimes was irrelevant and overly prejudicial; and 4) introduction of evidence on his wife's state of mind was irrelevant and overly prejudicial. Appellant raises additional issues in his pro se brief. We affirm and uphold the convictions.
At trial, appellant admitted that he had killed his wife, but blamed the murder of the children on her. Trial testimony indicated that on Wednesday, July 17, 1991, at about 7:30 p.m., appellant was arrested for drunk driving in Wisconsin. The arresting officer followed appellant's car over three miles as appellant drove erratically, narrowly missing guard rails and other vehicles and swerving from lane to lane. When stopped, appellant repeatedly told the officer, "You can't prove a thing." The officer smelled alcohol on appellant's breath and saw open liquor containers on the front floor of the vehicle. When appellant was asked to exit the vehicle and to provide some identification, he took a swing at the officer and further resisted arrest.
Following appellant's arrest, St. Cloud police were asked to check with Geraldine O'Meara, appellant's wife and the registered owner of the car he was driving. St. Cloud police attempted several times to contact O'Meara beginning on Wednesday night, July 17, 1991, and continuing through Saturday, July 20, 1991. However, O'Meara's house was closed up as if the occupants were on vacation, with all windows closed and drapes tightly drawn. There was no response to officer's knocking. On July 20, 1991, in response to a call requesting that police check on the welfare of the family, police again went to the house. After knocking and receiving no answer, officers entered the house and found the body of appellant's wife lying in the downstairs bedroom in a pool of blood.
Officers also found the body of appellant's three year old daughter lying face down in her bed on the second floor, and the body of appellant's twelve year old step-daughter lying face down on the basement floor. The three year old's ankles had been bound with tape and a cord was around her neck. The twelve year old's ankles were also taped. Her hands were both taped and tied with rope behind her back. She had a dog leash knotted tightly around her neck. She was dressed in a short sleeved t-shirt over a swim suit, the top of which was down such that her breasts were exposed.
Blood was found throughout the house. Bloody fingerprints and footprints found in the kitchen were appellant's and bloody shoeprints matched the shoes appellant was wearing at the time of his arrest. A fingerprint and palmprint found on the weight bar which was apparently used to kill appellant's wife was also consistent with that of appellant. A forensic scientist testified that the blood found in the house was consistent with that of either appellant's wife or step-daughter, and that none of it could have come from appellant. Other evidence recovered included a metal bar with O'Meara's blood and hair on it, found near O'Meara's feet. Rope found in the garage was similar to that found on the wrists of the children, and a roll of tape found in the living room was consistent with the tape found on the girls' bodies. When the house was cleaned on July 29, 1991, the corpse of the family dog was discovered in a roll of carpet padding which was being removed from the basement. The dog had been asphyxiated.
O'Meara was determined to have died from multiple blunt traumatic injuries. These injuries were consistent with being caused by the metal bar and weight sleeve found near her body. A doctor testified that she could not have lived more than 5 to 10 minutes after receiving the injuries to her forehead. Both children died of asphyxia due to ligature strangulation. The decomposition of all three bodies was consistent with death occurring on Wednesday July 17, 1991.
Other evidence indicated that appellant's wife had been at her nursing job on the night of July 16, that she had gone home for supper early in the evening and that she had talked to appellant on the phone at about 10:30 p.m. Testimony of co-workers indicated that she left her place of employment shortly before midnight. Prior to her death, O'Meara spoke with several friends about her relationship with appellant. She told one of them that "she couldn't take [her relationship with appellant] anymore, it was getting real crazy" and that she was going to take the girls and leave or ask him to leave. She told two other friends separately that she planned to leave appellant.
Appellant testified that the killing of his wife occurred during a fit of anger after his discovery that she had murdered his daughter. He said that he had previously told O'Meara he planned to leave her. He testified that he had gone to bed at about 10:30 p.m. that evening but was awakened when O'Meara came home from work and wanted to talk about his leaving and taking his paycheck. He said he did not want to talk and went back to sleep. When appellant was awakened a second time by O'Meara, who he said was upset about his threat to leave, she told him that he did not have to worry about paying child support. Appellant said he became concerned about the welfare of his three year old daughter, and when he checked on her, he was horrified and enraged to find her dead. Appellant said that when he returned to the bedroom he encountered O'Meara with a weight bar in her hand; a struggle ensued and appellant began hitting his wife with the weight bar. He stated that he wanted to kill her, and that he hated her guts. He did not remember how many times he hit her but remembered blood was everywhere. After killing his wife he then ran to his step-daughter's room to check on her, but when she was not there he assumed that she had gone to stay with a friend.
Appellant testified that he was afraid and confused, but decided to leave, and that he discovered his step-daughter after he showered and went to the basement to get some clothes. Appellant testified that he did not call police because he did not know what to tell them and did not think that they would believe that he was not responsible for the deaths. However, appellant admitted that he called his wife's employer before 6:00 a.m. on the morning of the July 17th to report that she was sick and would not be coming to work. Appellant also called his workplace at about 7:45 a.m., to say that he would be late. He then drove O'Meara's car to work arriving at about 8:15 a.m. Appellant left work after receiving his payroll check, and leaving a note for his supervisor which stated "I quit, Dale." His supervisor had no idea that he intended to quit. Appellant went directly to the bank to cash his check, and was the bank's first customer that morning at 9:00 a.m. Appellant then went to a bar in Minneapolis, arriving at about 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., and did not remember going to Wisconsin or being picked up by the police.
Appellant's former wife testified at trial that in March of 1985, while they were married but after she had separated from him, appellant came to her home at around 1:00 a.m. and assaulted her. During the assault appellant stated that he would rather see her dead than with someone else. A year later, appellant broke down her door in the middle of the night, assaulted her and told her that she could not kick him out of his own home, and that he was there to stay. The state introduced certified copies of appellant's convictions for fifth degree battery in connection with this incident.
At the close of evidence, the trial court dismissed Count IV of the indictment, murder while...
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