State v. Stepansky
Decision Date | 20 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. SC93106.,SC93106. |
Citation | 761 So.2d 1027,2000 AMC 1893 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Matthew STEPANSKY, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Appellant.
Robin C. Lemonidis and Bob R. Cherry of O'Brien, Riemenschneider, Kancilia & Lemonidis, P.A., Melbourne, Florida, for Appellee.
We have on appeal Stepansky v. State, 707 So.2d 877 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal declaring section 910.006(3)(d),1 Florida Statutes (1995), to be unconstitutional as an intrusion "upon the exclusive province of [the United States] Congress and the President as delineated by Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution." Stepansky, 707 So.2d at 879. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the Fifth District and find that section 910.006(3)(d), which is part of Florida's "special maritime criminal jurisdiction" statute, is constitutional as applied in this case.
Matthew Stepansky, a United States citizen, was charged in Brevard County, Florida with burglary and attempted sexual battery of a thirteen-year-old American citizen that allegedly occurred on board a cruise ship, the M/V Atlantic. The cruise ship departed from and returned to Port Canaveral, which is located in Brevard County. At the time of the alleged crime, the cruise ship was approximately 100 nautical miles2 from the Atlantic coastline of Florida. Stepansky and the complainant are both United States citizens but neither one is a Florida resident. The M/V Atlantic is registered in Liberia but owned by Premier Cruise Lines, Ltd. of the British West Indies. Neither the federal government,3 any other state, nor the flag state4 has attempted to prosecute this crime.
Stepansky moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the State lacked jurisdiction because the crime occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of Florida and because the prosecution was precluded by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. In response, the State argued that Florida state courts have jurisdiction over this crime under section 910.006(3)(d) because the majority of the paying passengers on the cruise ship had embarked and intended to disembark in Florida. The trial court denied the motion, and Stepansky sought a writ of prohibition from the Fifth District. The Fifth District issued the writ, holding that the Florida Legislature was without constitutional authority to enact section 910.006(3)(d) because the statute intruded upon the exclusive province of Congress and the President under the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10. See Stepansky, 707 So.2d at 879.
Section 910.006(3)(d) of the special maritime criminal jurisdiction statute that is the subject of the constitutional attack in this case extends the ability of this State to prosecute crimes to criminal acts committed on cruise ships sailing outside the State's territorial waters5 if the in Florida. § 910.006(3)(d).6 In determining whether section 910.006(3)(d) is constitutional, we must "resolve all doubts as to the validity of [the] statute in favor of its constitutionality, provided the statute may be given a fair construction consistent with the federal and state constitutions as well as with the legislative intent." State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072, 1076 (Fla.1994) (quoting State v. Elder, 382 So.2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1980)) (alteration in original).
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically provides that all "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution" are reserved to the states. Indeed, United States v. Locke, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1148, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) ).
The United States Supreme Court has observed that "the States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes." Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195, 79 S.Ct. 666, 671, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Nonetheless, if federal law has preempted state law, either expressly or impliedly, the Supremacy Clause7 requires state law to yield. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978).
Thus, in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 61 S.Ct. 924, 85 L.Ed. 1193 (1941), the United States Supreme Court concluded that Florida could prosecute one of its citizens for violating state laws regulating the taking of commercial sponges, even if the crime occurred outside of Florida's territorial waters. Id. In determining that the State's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was proper, the Court examined whether any conflict with federal law existed. See id. at 74-75, 61 S.Ct. 924, 928. Because there was no conflict with federal law and the State had an interest in the proper maintenance of its sponge fishery, the Court found that the State continued to exercise its traditional police powers. See id.
With this constitutional framework in mind, we examine whether section 910.006(3)(d) conflicts with federal law and whether the prosecution is within the State's police powers. First, we examine whether the State's exercise of jurisdiction in this case conflicts with any provisions in the United States Constitution, specifically the provision granting Congress the right to define piracies and felonies on the high seas, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10, the provision granting the federal government the power to enter treaties, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the provision granting the federal courts the power to hear admiralty and maritime cases, see U.S. Const., art III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Constitution's grant of power to Congress to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on high Seas," U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10, does not preclude states from punishing an act that also violates the state's laws. The same act or omission can offend the laws of both the state and federal government. See Abbate, 359 U.S. at 194, 79 S.Ct. 666 () (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 S.Ct. 141, 142, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922)). For example, although the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to "define and punish ... offenses against the Law of Nations," U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10, both Congress and the states can prosecute a criminal for counterfeiting foreign currency. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487, 7 S.Ct. 628, 632, 30 L.Ed. 728 (1887). Therefore, the same felony on the high seas can violate the laws of both the United States and a state, and be subject to prosecution by both the state and the federal government. Accordingly, this constitutional provision is not implicated.
We next turn to the constitutional provision relied on by the Fifth District, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the United States Constitution,8 which prohibits states from entering treaties. See Stepansky, 707 So.2d at 879. According to the Fifth District, the State is unable to prosecute this crime because Florida is constitutionally prohibited from entering into a treaty with the flag state, Liberia. See id.
Stepansky asserts this prosecution is prevented by the flag-state rule set forth in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. VI, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2315, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 86.9 However, as Stepansky conceded during oral argument, criminal defendants lack standing to raise a violation of an international treaty that is not self-executing.10 See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 76, 61 S.Ct. 924; United States v. Roberts, 1 F.Supp.2d 601, 606 (E.D.La.1998). Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas is not a self-executing treaty and does not operate to limit the jurisdiction traditionally asserted by the United States over foreign vessels on the high seas. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 (5th Cir.1979); see also Roberts 1 F.Supp.2d at 606. Therefore, the question of whether section 910.006(3)(d) is in violation of this treaty is not properly before this Court.
Further, on the merits, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is not an attempt by the State to enter a treaty. In Skiriotes, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the State was preempted from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction because it would encroach upon the exclusive treaty-making power of the United States. 313 U.S. at 71-72, 61 S.Ct. 924. Instead, the Court reasoned that because the United States would have been able to exercise jurisdiction, the question of whether the State could also exercise jurisdiction was one of federal rather than international law. See id. at 75-77, 61 S.Ct. 924.
International law is not concerned with the question of whether this defendant is prosecuted by a state or the federal government.11 As a comment to the Restatement (Third) of...
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