State v. Stephen

• Decision Date: 21 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 24,007.,24,007.
• Citation: 137 N.M. 409,112 P.3d 270
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN F., Child-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

112 P.3d 270

137 N.M. 409

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN F., Child-Appellant.

No. 24,007.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

February 21, 2005.

Certiorari Granted April 26, 2005.

Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Vicki W. Zelle, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Certiorari Granted, No. 29,128, April 26, 2005.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} Stephen F. (Child) appeals the trial court's finding that he is a delinquent juvenile and its judgment committing him to the custody of the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) until the age of twenty-one. He requests a new trial, alleging that his jury trial was marred by evidentiary error and erroneous jury instructions. Alternatively, he argues the charges against him should be dismissed because his post-trial dispositional hearing occurred beyond the time limit provided in the Children's Court Rules. Because this claim of procedural error is dispositive, we need not address Child's other arguments. {2} The nature of Child's offenses subjected him to youthful offender status, and the State sought the imposition of an adult sentence. Rule 10-101(A)(2)(b) NMRA provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure govern youthful offender proceedings in the children's court under certain circumstances. However, we conclude that this rule governs only the adjudicatory phase of certain youthful offender proceedings, and that the Children's Court Rules govern the dispositional phase in all youthful offender proceedings. The trial court violated Rule 10-229(C) NMRA of the Children's Court Rules because it did not recommence Child's dispositional hearing within forty-five days of an order committing Child for diagnostic evaluation. Because we determine, as a matter of first impression, that this time limit is mandatory, we reverse and remand for the trial court to dismiss the claims with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

{3} A jury found Child guilty of two counts of criminal sexual penetration. Because of his statutory status as a youthful offender, see NMSA 1978, ? 32A-2-3(I) (2003), the trial court ordered that Child receive an amenability to treatment evaluation. See NMSA 1978, ? 32A-2-20 (2003). Approximately two months after this order, the dispositional hearing on amenability to treatment had not yet occurred, and Child filed a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the forty-five day time for dispositional hearings as set forth in Rule 10-229(C). The State countered that the time limit had not been reached, arguing that the trial court should instead apply the ninety-day time limit for sentencing found in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court ruled in favor of the State, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Applicability of Children's Court Rules or Rules of Criminal Procedure

{4} We begin our analysis with Rule 10-101 of the Children's Court Rules. The relevant portions of this rule provide as follows:

A. Scope. Except as specifically provided by these rules, the following rules of procedure shall govern proceedings under the Children's Code [32A-1-1 NMSA 1978]:

(1) the Children's Court Rules govern procedure in the children's courts of New Mexico in all matters involving children alleged by the state:

(a) to have committed a delinquent act as defined in the Delinquency Act;

. . . .

(2) the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts govern the procedure:

(a) in all proceedings in the district court in which a child is alleged to be a "serious youthful offender", as defined in the Children's Code [32A-1-1 NMSA 1978];

(b) in all proceedings in the Children's Court in which a notice of intent has been filed alleging the child is a "youthful offender", as that term is defined in the Children's Code [32A-1-1 NMSA 1978]. If the indictment or bind over order does not include a "youthful offender" offense, any further proceedings for the offense shall be governed by the Children's Court rules[.]

Rule 10-101(A)(1)-(2). Because the procedural issue in this case turns on interpretation of this rule and other rules of procedure, we apply de novo review. See In re Daniel H., 2003-NMCA-063, ? 8, 133 N.M. 630, 68 P.3d 176.

{5} Child does not dispute that the State filed a notice of intent alleging that Child was a youthful offender, nor does he dispute that the bind over order included allegations that Child committed a "youthful offender" offense. These undisputed facts bring this case within Rule 10-101(A)(2)(b), which means, according to the plain language of this rule, that the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to the proceedings. See In re Michael L., 2002-NMCA-076, ? 9, 132 N.M. 479, 50 P.3d 574 ("We apply the same rules to the construction of Supreme Court rules of procedure as we apply to statutes."); see also State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ? 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939

(explaining that courts must give effect to clear and unambiguous language in a statute). However, reading the Children's Code and the Children's Court Rules together, we conclude that the overall scheme contemplates that, while the Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the adjudicatory proceedings in youthful offender cases like the present one, the Children's Court Rules govern all dispositional proceedings for all youthful offenders. See Quantum Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-050, ? 8, 125 N.M. 49, 956 P.2d 848 (holding that statutes governing the same subject matter must be read in connection with one another).

{6} We first look to the statutory context. The proceedings against Child were governed by the Delinquency Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, ?? 32A-2-1 to -33 (1993, as amended through 2003), which is a chapter within the Children's Code. NMSA 1978, ?? 32A-1-1 to -21-7 (1993, as amended through 2003). The Act's purpose, in part, is to protect society and hold children accountable for their acts. ? 32A-2-2. At the same time, the Act's stated purpose includes the goals of insulating children from adult consequences and providing rehabilitation. Id.

{7} Because Child's status as a youthful offender is critical, we next consider the definition of youthful offender within the statutory scheme. When a child commits a delinquent act, the adjudication procedures and the available sanctions depend on whether the law defines the child as (1) a delinquent offender, (2) a youthful offender, or (3) a serious youthful offender. State v. Muniz, 2003-NMSC-021, ? 6, 134 N.M. 152, 74 P.3d 86. With respect to the consequences after a determination of guilt, offenders in the first category, delinquent offenders, receive only juvenile sanctions. ? 32A-2-3(C). Those in the second category, youthful offenders, may be subject to either juvenile or adult sanctions, ? 32A-2-3(I); adult sanctions apply to youthful offenders only where the State follows statutory procedures for seeking an adult sentence, and where the trial court subsequently finds that the offender is not amenable to treatment as a child. ? 32A-2-20. The third category, serious youthful offender, encompasses individuals who are fifteen to eighteen years of age at the time of an offense that results in charges of first degree murder. ? 32A-2-3(H). The definition of serious youthful offender is clear: from a legal perspective, these offenders are no longer considered children. Id.; see also Muniz, 2003-NMSC-021, ? 15,

134 N.M. 152,

74 P.3d 86 (holding that "the [l]egislature intended to treat children charged with first degree murder as adults").

{8} The legislature obviously intended to create three categories of juvenile offenders subject to varying degrees of accountability. With respect to the youthful offender category at issue here, the Act further divides this category into three subcategories. A youthful offender is a child who is "fourteen to eighteen years of age at the time of the offense," and who (1) is adjudicated for at least one of several specific offenses, or (2) has three prior felony adjudications within the past three years, or (3) has been adjudicated for first degree murder. ? 32A-2-3(I). In the present case, Child's youthful offender status resulted from his adjudication for the offense of criminal sexual penetration. ? 32A-2-3(I)(1)(h).

{9} Against this statutory backdrop, we now return to the Children's Court Rules. The Supreme Court apparently intended that application of the Children's Court Rules and Rules of Criminal Procedure in youthful offender cases turns on the nature of the offenses charged. Rule 10-101(A)(2)(b) provides that the Children's Court Rules govern proceedings involving youthful offenders "[i]f the indictment or bind over order does not include a `youthful offender' offense[.]" The same rule provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure govern proceedings involving all other youthful offenders. Referring back to the statutory definition of youthful offender, then, it is clear that the only youthful offenders who may be subject to proceedings governed by the Children's Court Rules are those who have three prior felony convictions within the past three years. The other two types of youthful offenders, defined by Subsections (1) and (3) of Section 32A-2-3(I), will, by definition, be subject to indictments or bind over orders alleging youthful offender offenses, and thus, their proceedings will be governed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

{10} Having said this, there is nevertheless a compelling argument that these subcategories of youthful offender proceedings?€” those governed by the Children's Court Rules, and those governed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure?€”apply only to the adjudicatory stage of the proceedings. No matter what kind of Rule 10-101(A)(2)(b) youthful offender category a child falls under, that child is entitled to a dispositional hearing to determine whether he or she...