State v. Stevenson
| Citation | 73 N.W. 360,104 Iowa 50 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA v. T. F. STEVENSON, Judge |
| Decision Date | 16 December 1897 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
From Polk District Court.--HON. T. F. STEVENSON, Judge.
THIS is a proceeding in certiorari to review an order of the district court of Polk county, which granted a new trial to a person adjudged to be in contempt for violating an injunction against the maintaining of a liquor nuisance. Order annulled.
Order of the district court ANNULLED.
James Howe, county attorney, and Jesse A. Miller for the state.
McVey & McVey for defendant.
In July, 1894, in a case then pending in the district court of Polk county, Iowa in which the state of Iowa was plaintiff and Joseph Lehner was defendant, a decree was rendered which in terms perpetually enjoined Lehner from selling or keeping for sale, and from permitting others to sell or keep for sale, in violation of law, intoxicating liquors at No. 213 Walnut street, in the city of Des Moines, on a portion of a lot which was particularly described. In October, 1895, a petition was filed, in which Lehner was charged with having violated that injunction. He was required to appear and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, and appeared and filed an answer. Evidence was offered in behalf of the state and for Lehner; and on the nineteenth day of November, 1895, he was found to have violated the injunction, and was adjudged to be guilty of contempt of court, and required to pay a fine of five hundred dollars and costs. On the twenty-ninth day of the same month he filed a paper entitled a "motion for re-hearing and new trial," supported by an affidavit, in which he asked for a re-hearing and a new trial in the contempt proceedings. At the next term of the court, in January, 1896, the attorneys for the plaintiff were orally notified of the application for a new trial, and appeared thereto. The affidavit of Lehner, and some applications to one of his clerks for the purchase of intoxicating liquors, were introduced in evidence, and the motion was sustained.
I. The plaintiff contends that the court acted illegally and exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the relief asked by the motion; that a re-hearing or new trial in contempt proceedings is unauthorized; that, if authorized, it is governed by the statute which regulates new trials in criminal cases; and if that is not the law, and a new trial was authorized, as the application in question was made ten days after the judgment in the contempt proceeding was rendered, it should have been by petition, and, as it was by motion, it should not, for that reason, have been granted. It has been said that a proceeding to punish a contempt of court is in its nature criminal. First Congregational Church v City of Muscatine, 2 Iowa 69; Fisher v. District Court, 75 Iowa 232, 39 N.W. 283; Grier v Johnson, 88 Iowa 99, 55 N.W. 80. In New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co., 87 U.S 387, 20 Wall. 387, 22 L.Ed. 354, it was said: "Contempt of court is a specific criminal offense." See, also, 4 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 766. While it is undoubtedly true that proceedings for the punishment of a contempt of court are designed to punish wrongful acts, and are to that extent criminal in their nature, yet they are not governed by the general provisions of the law which provide for the punishment of crimes, but by special statutes. Jordan v. Circuit Court, 69 Iowa 177, 28 N.W. 548. They are usually brought in the name of the state. Fisher v. District Court, supra. But they may also be entitled as in the case in which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Manderscheid v. District Court, 69 Iowa 240, 28 N.W. 551. The charges in such proceedings are not triable by jury (McDonnell v. Henderson, 74 Iowa 619, 38 N.W. 512), although it may be that the court can submit to a jury a disputed question of fact . The punishment for a contempt does not constitute a bar to an indictment for the same offense. Code 1873, section 3500; Code, section 4469. And the general statute which defines contempts and provides for their punishment is found in that portion of the Code of 1873 which was devoted to civil, and not to criminal, procedure. The provisions of the law under which Lehner was punished as for contempt are of the same character as is the general statute in regard to contempt. We conclude that the provision of the Code of 1873 which authorized new trials in criminal cases did not apply in proceedings to punish for contempt.
The power of a court to grant a new trial in contempt proceedings is questioned. We do not know on what legal principle the denial of the power in proper cases can be based. The statutes which authorize new trials in civil cases are sufficiently comprehensive to include within their scope new trials in contempt proceedings, and, in our opinion, apply to them.
II. It is said that, as more than three days from...
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