State v. Stevenson

• Decision Date: 16 February 1892
• Citation: 14 S.E. 385,109 N.C. 730
• Parties: STATE v. STEVENSON et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

14 S.E. 385

109 N.C. 730

STATE v. STEVENSON et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 16, 1892

Appeal from criminal court, New Hanover county; MEARES, Judge.

J. C Stevenson and J. Allen Taylor were convicted of failing to file for taxation a statement of the total amount of their purchases, as required by Laws 1891, c. 323. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Geo Rountree and Geo. Davis, for appellants.

The Attorney General and A. M. Waddell, for the State.

CLARK J.

The defendants, merchants residing and doing business in this state, have bought out of the state, and have brought into the state and sold, goods, not being farm products purchased from the producer, and have bought in the state and sold farm products which were not purchased from the producer. They refused to list them under Schedule B, § 22, ^[1] of the revenue act; and they contend the act is void and unconstitutional because:

1. "It denies to the defendants the equal protection of the laws. Const. U.S. 14th Amend, § 1." ^[1] It has been repeatedly held that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to "compel a state to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation," or "to prevent it from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways." Railroad Co. v Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237, 10 S.Ct. 533; Insurance Co. v. State of New York, 134 U.S. 594, 606, 10 S.Ct. 593. Both these cases are cited and approved in Express Co. v. Seibert, 12 S.Ct. 250, filed Jan. 4, 1892.) The fourteenth amendment certainly has no application to a case like the present, as we have held in State v. French, 14 S.E. Rep. 383, (at this term.)

2. "In so far as it applies to goods purchased outside of the state, it is a ' regulation of commerce among the states.' Const. U.S. art. 1, § 8, par. 3." This point was also presented and passed upon in the case of State v. French, (at this term.) It is sufficient to say that the tax is not on "interstate" dealings, but on the occupation of carrying on a mercantile business in this state; and instead of levying a fixed sum, irrespective of the quantity of business done, the statute graduates the tax according to the amount of purchases, "whether made within or without the state." If the defendants had removed here from another state, while there could be no tax on their transportation here, they would be liable after their arrival to a license tax on their "occupation," if there was no discrimination. In the same manner, if they brought goods with them, this would not prevent a property tax on the goods, or a license tax on the trade or occupation in which such goods were used, provided there was no discrimination on account of the place of origin of the goods.

3. "It discriminates against the products of other states, and is repugnant to the United States constitution, art. 4, § 2, par. 1." ^[2] The act makes no discrimination against products brought from elsewhere. It is couched in general terms, and exempts purchases of farm products from the producer, wherever raised, from being taken into account in ascertaining the basis upon which the amount of the license tax is graduated. This is neither necessarily nor within reasonable construction a discrimination against farmers in other states. Florida oranges, northern corn, wheat, and apples, and other farm products of other states, are ordinarily largely dealt in, and the amount of the purchases thereof from the producers are omitted, equally with similar purchases of farm products raised in this state, in adjusting the amount of license tax required by the act. It is true that a law professing to be non-discriminating on its face may, from the circumstances and in its application, be held to be really discriminating, and hence unconstitutional, as the Meat and Guano Inspection Cases, ( Brimmer v. Rehman, 138 U.S. 78, 11 S.Ct. 213; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 10 S.Ct. 862; Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 F. 613.) But these were cases of taxation or prohibition. The provision before us is only an exemption. It does not tax the non-resident farmer, or put him at any disadvantage as compared with the farmer residing in this state. This point has recently been considered by SEYMOUR, J., in the United States district court for the eastern district of North Carolina, in a very able opinion construing this very statute, (Ex Parte Brown, 48 F. 435;) the reasoning in which case, in this aspect of it, seems to us satisfactory and conclusive.

1. "That it violates the principle of uniformity in taxation. Const. N.C. art. 5, § 3. "This is a privilege tax on a trade or occupation, and is authorized by the constitution of North Carolina, (article 5, §3,) ^[3] in addition to the ad valorem tax on property. Albertson v. Wallace, 81 N.C. 479; State v. Cohen, 84 N.C. 771. It was in the discretion of the legislature to impose a specific tax on one, graduated by the extent of the business done. State v. Powell, 100 N.C. 525, 6 S.E Rep. 424. Such tax is uniform when it is equal on all persons in the same class. Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119; State v. Powell, supra. Graduating a merchant's license tax by the amount of his purchases of a certain class of goods, and not by the amount of his total purchases, is not imposing unequal taxes on the goods. It is merely a mode of graduating, according to the wisdom and discretion of the legislature, the amount of the license tax for carrying on any specified occupation. But, treating it as a "classification," this law puts all merchants dealing in farm products purchased...