State v. Stevenson, 2-94-510-CR
| Citation | 993 S.W.2d 857 |
| Decision Date | 27 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-94-510-CR,2-94-510-CR |
| Parties | (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999) THE STATE OF TEXAS, STATE, v. STEVEN LYLE STEVENSON, APPELLEE. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Panel B: DAY, DAUPUHINOT, and RICHARDS, JJ.
Lee Ann Dauphinot Justice.
In a single point, the State appealed the trial court's granting Appellee Steven Lyle Stevenson's motion to suppress evidence. On original submission, this court affirmed the trial court's ruling as modified. 1 The court of criminal appeals reversed and remanded the case to this court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. 2
On May 12, 1992, Appellee and his wife were involved in a one-car accident with a road sign. Both the car and the road sign were damaged. The police were called and Officer Hilliard and Officer West arrived on the scene shortly thereafter to conduct an accident investigation. The officers found the car in the parking lot of a convenience store. Hilliard asked Appellee for identification and then questioned him about who was driving the car. Appellee responded that his wife was driving. Hilliard then asked Appellee's wife the same question, and she responded that she was driving. Hilliard noticed that Appellee's wife was injured. Her injuries were so severe that Hilliard called for an ambulance.
While they waited for the ambulance, Hilliard and West examined the car. They found the front passenger-side window completely smashed out. Hilliard and West concluded that Appellee's wife's injuries were consistent with her being the passenger in the car. Convinced that Appellee was lying about being the passenger, Hilliard again asked him who was driving. Appellee then admitted that he had indeed been driving. Only after Appellee admitted that he was driving did Hilliard suddenly notice that Appellee smelled of alcohol. After Appellee answered his questions, Hilliard administered field sobriety tests. Appellee failed the tests, and Hilliard placed him under formal arrest for driving while intoxicated. At no time before formal arrest did either officer give Appellee his Miranda 3 warnings.
Appellee filed a motion to suppress, alleging (1) that his statements to the officers were privileged under section 47 of article 6701d of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes 4 and (2) that his right against self-incrimination was violated by the conjunction of the facts of the case with sections 39, 40, and 45(a). 5 The trial court initially granted the motion to suppress but later withdrew its ruling pending a live hearing.
At the hearing, both the State and Appellee raised the issue of whether Appellee was in custody for Miranda purposes at the time Officer Hilliard questioned him about the accident. Appellee contended that the various provisions of article 6701d 6 required him, as driver of the car, to give self-incriminating information to the police. He cited Lykins v. State, 7 arguing that such a requirement is unconstitutional. The State argued that the accident report was a public record after 180 days, that a person is not required to remain at an accident scene even when the property damage is great or a person is injured, and that Hilliard's interrogation of Appellee was not custodial.
After the hearing, the trial court re-granted the motion and suppressed all statements made by Appellee during Hilliard's investigation. The written order granting the motion to suppress contained no specific reason for doing so. In his oral comments, the trial Judge focused upon two issues, the privilege argument and the failure to give the Miranda warning. The trial Judge specifically inquired, "[A]t any time before you arrested Mr. Stevenson, did you advise him of his Miranda warnings?" Again, he inquired, "At any time before you arrested Mr. Stevenson for DWI did you advise him of his Miranda warnings?" A third time the trial Judge inquired, "At any time before you arrested Mr. Stevenson for DWI did you advise him of any warnings regarding whatever rights he may have under the Constitution of the State of Texas?" These questions indicate a clear concern that Hilliard did not provide Appellee the required warnings. The trial court further pointed out that section 47 8 seems to give a privilege and to take it away, stating,
In our original opinion, we held that "[w]hile the statutes, in and of themselves did not render Appellee in custody, the trial court found the combination of sections 39, 40, and 45 and the shift from an accident investigation to a DWI investigation rendered Appellee in custody." 9 In so holding, we relied on Hilliard's testimony:
"
[Emphases added.]
Appellee argued that any appellate court, using the traditional four-factor test for determining custody, would find that he was in police custody at the time he answered Hilliard's questions. 10 This court utilized this four-factor test in our original 1995 opinion, not having the benefit of the 1996 Dowthitt 11 decision, and concluded that Appellee's admission that he was driving was the product of custodial interrogation. 12 Because Hilliard had not yet given Appellee Miranda warnings, we found that the trial court was correct in suppressing his admission. 13
The court of criminal appeals determined that this court "found that the roadside encounter in the present case escalated into custody after Hilliard discovered that appellee's wife's injuries were consistent with her being the passenger rather than the driver." 14 The court of criminal appeals held that this court erred as a matter of law in analyzing the custodial interrogation issue. 15 In its opinion, the court of criminal appeals analyzed the custodial interrogation issue under both the accident statutes in article 6701d and Miranda and its progeny.
The Texas Constitution places a heavy burden on the courts of appeals. Once we determine the facts of a specific case, "the decision of [the court of appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error." 16 We therefore cannot rely on a higher court to correct any misunderstanding of the facts of which we may be guilty.
The court of criminal appeals recently held that the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's decision on a federal constitutional speedy trial claim is a bifurcated standard of review, under which the reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components and a de novo standard for the legal components of the trial court's decision. 17 A speedy trial claim is a mixed question of law and fact, as is the issue in this case, whether Appellee was in custody at the time he made the statements to Hilliard. We therefore shall apply a bifurcated standard of review.
The amount of deference an appellate court affords to a trial court's ruling on a mixed question of law and fact often is determined by which judicial actor is in a better position to decide the issue. 18 "If the issue involves the credibility of a witness, thereby making the evaluation of that witness' demeanor important, compelling reasons exist for allowing the trial court to apply the law to the facts." 19 As a general rule, we "should afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." 20 And we should afford the same amount of deference to the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. 21
When, as in this case, we are faced with a mixed question of law and fact, the critical inquiry under Guzman is whether the question "turns" on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. 22 The trial court's ruling on a mixed question of law and fact often depends in large part on how the trial court evaluates the credibility and demeanor of certain witnesses. 23 "For instance, the credibility of the arresting police officer would certainly be weighed heavily by a trial court in a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence based upon an alleged lack of probable cause." 24 The court of criminal appeals has held that a question turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor when the testimony of one or more witnesses, if believed, is always enough to add up to what...
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