State v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 12 March 1888 |
| Citation | 74 Iowa 336,37 N.W. 400 |
| Parties | STATE v. STEWART ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Appanoose county; DELL STUART, Judge.
Defendant Samuel Stewart was convicted in justice's court of a misdemeanor, and appealed from the judgment. To secure his appearance in the district court, he gave bond as required by section 4698 of the Code. He was tried at the March term, 1886, of the district court, found guilty, and adjudged to pay a fine and costs. At the October term, 1886, he was adjudged to be in default for failure to surrender himself in satisfaction of the judgment. This action is brought on the bond given as aforesaid, which was executed by said Samuel Stewart and his co-defendants, Lizzie and Anna Stewart. The cause was tried to a jury, and verdict and judgment rendered for plaintiff. The defendants appeal.T. M. Fee, for appellants.
C. F. Howell and Tannehill, Vermilion & Haynes, for appellee.
ROBINSON, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)
1. Defendants filed in the district court an application for a change of the place of trial, and as grounds therefor, alleged (1) that the inhabitants of Appanoose county were so prejudiced against them that they could not obtain a fair trial in said county; (2) that Appanoose county is a party to the action, and the real party in interest. The application was overruled. In this we discover no error. The first ground was supported by the affidavits of Lizzie and Anna Stewart and 44 others, residents of the county, and was resisted by the counter-affidavits of 73 persons, who stated that in their opinion the defendants could get a fair and impartial trial in that county. The court was required to decide the application on this ground, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and the record fails to show that such discretion was abused. The second ground of the application is within the rule announced in State v. Merrihew, 47 Iowa, 114, and was insufficient. The fact that the application alleged that the county was a party is not material. The pleadings showed that the statement was not true, within the meaning of section 2590 of the Code.
2. The defendants offered to prove by the attorney who represented Samuel Stewart in the district court when the criminal case was there tried, and judgment rendered, that, immediately after the rendition of the judgment, he had agreed with the district attorney that Stewart should not be arrested, nor the judgment against him be in any manner enforced, until after the April meeting of the board of supervisors. The objection of plaintiff to the offered evidence, on the grounds that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, was sustained. In this there was no error. Section 213 of the Code provides that no evidence of an agreement of an attorney to bind his client is receivable “except the statement of the attorney himself, his written agreement, signed and filed with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court.” We have had occasion to construe this provision in several cases. Hiller v. Landis, 44 Iowa, 224; Sapp v. Aiken, 68 Iowa, 701, 28 N. W. Rep. 24. It is clear that the proposed evidence was not competent.
3. The defendants offered to show that a warrant for the arrest and commitment to jail of Samuel Stewart was issued and placed in the hands of the proper sheriff for service, during the term of the district court at which said Stewart was convicted, and while he was present; that after he received such warrant the sheriff was instructed in writing by the district attorney to hold the same until after the April session of the board of supervisors; and that the sheriff acted upon the instruction so received, and made no attempt to serve the warrant until after the April session of the said board. The offered evidence was excluded, on the objection of plaintiff. Had it been received, it would have tended to show that proceedings under the judgment which imposed a fine on Stewart were stayed for the purpose of allowing some arrangement for its payment to be made with the board of supervisors. It is insisted by appellants that such an extension of time, as they proposed to prove, would operate to release the sureties on the bond in suit. Whether that effect would follow depends upon whether it was...
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Suggs v. State
...court, the sureties are not exonerated by the mere conviction of the principal. State v. Whitson, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 178; State v. Stewart, 74 Iowa, 336, 37 N. W. 400; Dennard v. State, 2 Ga. 137; Neininger v. State, 50 Ohio St. 394, 34 N. E. 633, 40 Am. St. Rep. 674; Hawk v. State, 84 Ala. 4......
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State v. Caruso
...which had convicted him. State v. Hutchins, 185 N.C. 694, 116 S.E. 740, another North Carolina case, is no more in point. State v. Stewart, 74 Iowa, 336, 37 N.W. 400, was case where the principal did not respond to the judgment of the court on an appeal bond given by him after conviction in......
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State v. Walker
...of the bond is not satisfied by appearance for arraignment. The case is ruled by State v. Brown, 16 Iowa, 314, and State v. Stewart, 74 Iowa, 336, 37 N. W. 400. [3] At the time under consideration the crime charged was a misdemeanor. The case could have proceeded to trial in the absence of ......