State v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 20 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. SC 97070,SC 97070
• Citation: 560 S.W.3d 531
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Robert E. STEWART, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

560 S.W.3d 531

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Robert E. STEWART, Appellant.

No. SC 97070

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued November 20, 2018

Stewart was represented by Samuel Buffaloe of the public defender’s office in Columbia, (573) 777-9977.

The state was represented by Garrick Aplin of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice

Robert Stewart appeals a judgment convicting him of unlawful use of a weapon, § 571.030, third-degree domestic assault, § 565.074, first-degree burglary, § 569.160, and armed criminal action, § 572.015.¹ Stewart argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his assault and burglary convictions. The judgment is affirmed.²

Factual and Procedural Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows Stewart and T.S. divorced in early 2014 but attempted to reconcile and began living together in November 2014. Stewart and T.S. made a $5,000 down payment on a rent-to-own arrangement for the residence at issue. When Stewart failed to return home one night, T.S. told him to leave and "not to come back." Stewart agreed and began sleeping in a camper on the property.

On January 23, 2015, a few days after Stewart agreed to move out of the residence, T.S. asked Stewart to deliver firewood to the residence. Stewart and T.S.'s uncle moved the firewood into the basement. After delivering the firewood, Stewart went upstairs and knocked on T.S.'s bedroom door. T.S. exited the bedroom with another man. T.S. observed Stewart holding a gun and told him to leave. Stewart responded by firing the gun into the ceiling. T.S. testified she was "startled" by the shot and more forcefully told Stewart to leave. Stewart threatened to kill T.S. and her guest. Stewart then left the residence and, as T.S. went to close the door behind him, Stewart fired a shot through a window near the door.

Following a jury trial, the circuit court entered a judgment convicting Stewart of third-degree domestic assault, first-degree burglary, armed criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon. The circuit court overruled Stewart's motion for judgment of acquittal. Stewart appeals.

Standard of Review

"When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must determine whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Wright , 382 S.W.3d 902, 903 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal quotation omitted). "The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict." Id. "This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.

Domestic Assault

The state charged Stewart with third-degree domestic assault in violation of § 565.074.1(3).³ The state bore the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, T.S. was a household member and Stewart purposely placed her in subjective apprehension of immediate physical injury by any means. Stewart argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for third-degree domestic assault because T.S. testified his actions did not place her in apprehension of immediate physical injury.

Stewart's argument fails because it requires this Court to credit T.S.'s testimony when the jury declined to do so. The jury, as the finder of fact, is under no obligation to believe any particular evidence, including T.S.'s testimony. State v. Jackson , 433 S.W.3d 390, 399 (Mo. banc 2014). This Court does not sit as a super juror with veto power over the jury's verdict and will not substitute its own credibility determination for that of the jury. Wright, 382 S.W.3d at 903 (internal quotation omitted).

There is no statutory definition of the word "apprehension" as used in § 565.074.1(3). "In the absence of a statutory definition, words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary." State v. Oliver , 293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009). The word "apprehension" means "the act or power of perceiving or comprehending" or "the result of apprehending mentally: conception." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 97 (1989). Therefore, Stewart's conviction for third-degree domestic assault will be affirmed if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt T.S. perceived, comprehended, or conceived immediate physical injury.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows Stewart knocked on T.S.'s bedroom door while holding a gun. When she told him to leave, Stewart discharged the gun into the ceiling. T.S. testified she was "startled" by the shot and more forcefully told Stewart to leave. T.S. testified, if the bullet had hit her at close range it would "do some damage." Finally, T.S. moved to shut the door behind Stewart, at which time Stewart fired a second shot back into the house. T.S.'s testimony that she was startled by the gunshot, forcefully told Stewart to leave, was aware she could have been injured by the gunfire, and moved to shut the door behind Stewart as he left constitutes sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find T.S. subjectively perceived, comprehended, or conceived immediate physical injury due to Stewart's actions. The circuit court did not err in overruling Stewart's motion for judgment of acquittal on his conviction for third-degree domestic assault.⁴

The dissent relies heavily on J.D.B. v. Juvenile Officer , 2 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. App. 1999), to support its argument there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find Stewart's actions placed T.S. in subjective apprehension of immediate physical injury.⁵ J.D.B. is factually distinguishable and analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for the separate crime of third-degree assault. The issue here is whether the fundamentally different facts of this case are sufficient to support Stewart's conviction for third-degree domestic assault. Further, J.D.B. did not follow this Court's basic rule of statutory interpretation for undefined statutory terms by applying the plain, ordinary meaning of the word "apprehension." J.D.B. reasoned there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find the victim was "placed in fear for her physical well-being, nor is there any other evidence in the record that would warrant such a finding." J.D.B. , 2 S.W.3d at 153. Therefore, J.D.B. did not apply the plain, ordinary meaning of the word "apprehension." Instead, the court of appeals uncharacteristically referenced Black's Law Dictionary and equated "apprehension" with "fear." While a victim's fear may prove apprehension, fear is only one way in which a victim may perceive, comprehend, or conceive immediate physical injury from the defendant's actions.

Burglary

The state charged Stewart with first-degree burglary pursuant to § 569.160.1(3) for knowingly remaining unlawfully in the residence possessed by T.S. for the purpose of committing a domestic assault.⁶ In pertinent part, § 569.010(8) provides "a person enters unlawfully or remains unlawfully in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so." Stewart argues there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he was not licensed or privileged to remain on the premises because he had a property interest in the residence and continued to use the residence.

Stewart's alleged property interest in the residence does not foreclose his burglary conviction. Section 569.160 defines the circumstances in which "a person" commits the crime of burglary. Similarly, § 569.010(8) provides "a person ... knowingly remains unlawfully when he is not licensed or privileged to do so." Both statutes apply, without limitation, to "a person," and neither statute immunizes those with a property interest in the premises from criminal liability for burglary.⁷ The dispositive issue is whether Stewart was licensed or privileged to remain in the residence.

Section 569.010 does not define the terms "licensed" or "privileged." "In the absence of a statutory definition, words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary." State v. Oliver , 293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009). Additionally, when the legislature utilizes an undefined statutory term with an established judicial or common law meaning, this Court presumes the legislature acted with knowledge of that meaning. Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Dir. of Dep't of Revenue , 766 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 1989).

A "license" is defined generally as "permission to act." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1304 (2002). A "privilege" is defined generally as "a right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage or favor." Id. at 1805. Consistent with these definitions, the common law provides a "license is a privilege to enter certain premises for a stated purpose" and "may be revoked at the will of licensor." Riverside-Quindaro Bend Levee Dist., Platte Cty., Mo. v. Mo. Am. Water Co. , 117 S.W.3d 140, 149 (Mo. App. 2003). Therefore, Stewart's license or privilege to remain in the residence was based on whether he had permission or a right to do so.

Viewed in the light most favorable to verdict, the evidence shows T.S. and Stewart agreed he would move out of the residence. Consistent with that agreement, Stewart stayed away from the residence and surrounding property, returning only at night to sleep in the camper. Stewart testified he and T.S. "were not living together on January 23, 2015." Under these circumstances, a reasonable juror could find T.S. was in sole...