State v. Stickle
| Citation | 792 N.E.2d 51 |
| Decision Date | 22 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 24A01-0212-CR-490.,24A01-0212-CR-490. |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Jeremy R. STICKLE, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Christopher L. Lafuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Clay M. Kellerman, Kellerman Law Office, Batesville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
The State charged Jeremy Stickle ("Stickle") with theft, as a Class D felony,1 possession of marijuana, as a Class D felony,2 and possession of marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor.3 Stickle moved to suppress the evidence supporting the charges on the ground the evidence was obtained pursuant to an investigatory stop conducted without reasonable suspicion. The trial court granted Stickle's motion.
The State argues on appeal that Stickle was not seized and that even if he was, an anonymous tip the police received was sufficient to support the investigatory stop of Stickle. We conclude Stickle was seized and the anonymous tip did not give the police reasonable suspicion that Stickle was engaged in criminal activity. We accordingly affirm.
The Indiana State Police received an anonymous tip that on December 28, 2001, between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., an illegal drug transaction would occur at the Batesville McDonald's Restaurant. The informant indicated the transaction would involve Stickle and Rebecca Carter and that Stickle and Carter would be driving either a maroon Ford Ranger or a copper Jeep. The informant indicated Stickle had short hair and a goatee and would be wearing bib overalls.
At 4:45 p.m., Troopers Robert Blanton and David Noah went to the McDonald's, ordered food, and waited to see if the anonymous tip proved accurate. At 5:00 p.m., the troopers noticed a maroon Ford Ranger circling the parking lot. The Ranger was driven by a woman, and a man with short hair and a goatee was a passenger. The Ranger proceeded to the Pamida discount store, which was located next to the McDonald's. The Ranger's two occupants, later identified as Stickle and Carter, went into Pamida. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Trooper Blanton observed the Ranger leave Pamida and return to the McDonald's parking lot.
After exiting their vehicle and entering the McDonald's, Stickle and Carter ordered food. Trooper Noah then approached the two and stated, "Ma'am, sir, we need you to come with us." (Tr. at 16.) After walking outside with Troopers Blanton and Noah, Stickle and Carter observed two police cars blocking their vehicle in a manner that made it impossible for them to drive their vehicle away.
Trooper Blanton asked Stickle his name and if he knew why the troopers wanted to talk to him. Stickle stated his name and admitted to stealing a cassette tape from Pamida. During the subsequent interrogation, Stickle informed the troopers that he had a small amount of marijuana in his vehicle. The troopers found marijuana on Stickle's person and in his vehicle.
Prior to trial, Stickle moved to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to his investigatory stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion.
The State challenges the order granting Stickle's motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing, the State had the burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of the measures it used to secure evidence. State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639, 641 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied 783 N.E.2d 695 (Ind.2002). In order to prevail on appeal, the State must show the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion is contrary to law. Id. We accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. In reviewing the trial court's decision, we consider the evidence most favorable to the ruling together with any adverse evidence that is uncontradicted. Id.
The State argues initially that Stickle was not "seized" and his Fourth Amendment rights were therefore not implicated. To determine whether an encounter with police amounts to a seizure, we consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Bentley v. State, 779 N.E.2d 70, 73-74 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). What constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude he is not free to leave varies according to the police conduct at issue and the setting in which the conduct occurs. Id. at 74. Police actions that a reasonable person might interpret as an intrusion on freedom of movement include "operation of a police vehicle in an aggressive manner to either block the person's course or otherwise control the direction or speed of the person," the threatening presence of several officers, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Id.
The evidence most favorable to the judgment is that the police approached Stickle and Carter and stated, "Ma'am, sir, we need you to come with us." (Tr. at 16.) After walking outside with the police, Stickle and Carter noted their vehicle was "completely blocked in" (Tr. at 17) by two police cars such that it would not have been possible for Stickle and Carter to leave in the vehicle.4 We cannot characterize as "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law" the trial court's determination a reasonable person in Stickle's position would have concluded he was not free to leave and had therefore been "seized."
An investigatory stop of a citizen by an officer violates constitutional protections where the officer does not have a reasonably articulated suspicion of criminal activity. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind.1997), modified on reh'g on other grounds 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind.1997). Probable cause is not necessary; rather, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to make an investigatory stop. Id. The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion must be measured by the officer's knowledge before the officer conducted the investigatory stop. Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).
Reasonable suspicion is determined under the totality of the circumstances. Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1271. If the facts known by the police at the time of the investigatory stop are such that a person of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate, the command of the Fourth Amendment is satisfied. Id.5 An anonymous tip is not sufficient to permit police to detain a citizen and subject him or her to an investigatory stop absent independent indicia of reliability or officer-observed confirmation of the anonymous informant's prediction of the suspect's future behavior. Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000),trans. denied 753 N.E.2d 7 (Ind. 2001). Federal precedent requires confirmation of the anonymous informant's ability to predict the suspect's future behavior in order to establish the credibility of the anonymous informant's claim concerning the suspect's alleged future illegal conduct. This requirement affords protection against information that might be relayed to the police by a prankster or by a police officer acting in bad faith. Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)).6
Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual's itinerary, it is reasonable to believe that people with access to such information are likely to also have access to reliable information about the individual's illegal activities. Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1271. When significant aspects of the anonymous informant's prediction are verified, there is reason to believe not only that the anonymous informant was honest, but also that the anonymous informant's information is sufficiently credible to justify an investigatory stop. Id. (citing White, 496 U.S. at 329-30, 110 S.Ct. 2412).
We recently addressed a similar situation in Glass, where we determined a defendant's motion to suppress was properly granted because a telephone call from an unnamed person did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability and because the police officer did not independently confirm the reliability of the caller or the salient information the caller provided. 769 N.E.2d at 640. There, an individual called the police to report reckless driving. The caller in Glass was not entirely "anonymous"—dispatch knew the identity of the caller and gave the officer a description of the vehicle that was being driven recklessly.
The officer found Glass driving the described vehicle. He followed Glass for about one block but witnessed no traffic violations or inappropriate driving. Nevertheless, the officer activated his emergency lights and stopped Glass. Based on the evidence found after the stop the State charged Glass with possession of marijuana, reckless possession of paraphernalia, and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance or metabolite in his body. The trial court granted Glass' motion to suppress all the evidence and we affirmed.
We noted in Glass that 769 N.E.2d at 643. At the time of the Glass stop, as in the case before us, the police officer "did not know whether the caller was a concerned citizen, a prankster, or an imposter." Id. We could not discern from the record in Glass, nor can we here, whether the caller identified himself in such a way as to place his credibility at risk or as to subject himself to criminal penalties.
In Glass, we distinguished State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d...
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