State v. Stigen
| Decision Date | 05 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | A11-452 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Zane Robert Stigen, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).
Affirmed
Polk County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Gregory Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Renée Bergeron, Assistant State
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Stauber, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for third-degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023subd. 2(6) (2008). Appellant also argues that his constitutional right to equal protection was violated because there is no rational basis for applying Minn. Stat. § 152.023 subd. 2(6), to the facts of this case. Lastly, appellant asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence. Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction, his constitutional claim has been waived, and that the district court properly denied his motion to suppress evidence, we affirm.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 8, 2010, two East Grand Forks police officers observed a car making a right-hand turn without using a blinker signal. The officers entered the license plate number of the car into their computer and found the license plate registration expired in 2005. The officers continued to follow the vehicle eastbound past Sacred Heart School, where the center line of the road is within 300 feet of school property. The officers followed the vehicle until it weaved to the right, crossing the fog line. They activated their emergency lights and pulled the car over. The stop occurred approximately two miles from Al LaFave Park and approximately one and one-half miles from Sacred Heart School.
Appellant Zane Stigen was driving the car; a passenger, J.M., was in the car. One officer approached appellant and one officer approached J.M. They noticed the sticker on the license plate showed it to be registered in 2010 but the previous police computer scan indicated it expired in 2005. One officer verified that the sticker was registered with a different vehicle. J.M. told one officer that they were traveling from Grand Forks, North Dakota en route to Crookston, Minnesota. Because of the path the car traveledfrom Grand Forks, North Dakota, to the location where it was stopped, it would have passed over the Sorlie Bridge. Al LaFave Park is located on both sides of the Sorlie Bridge.
During his conversation with both officers, appellant cursed, avoided eye contact, and admitted the car was not insured. Appellant also stated he had recently purchased the car. The officer asked appellant to step out of the vehicle because he admitted the car was not insured, appellant's actions were not normal for a typical traffic stop, and because the officers wanted to take him out of his comfort zone. Appellant continued to avoid eye contact so the officer asked to conduct a Romberg test.1 Appellant agreed to take the test and estimated 15 seconds and 30 seconds of real time. This showed he had a fast internal clock. During the test, one officer observed eyelid tremors that commonly occur when someone is under the influence of a controlled substance, namely stimulants. The officer then asked if appellant was under the influence of drugs; appellant denied that he was under the influence. He was not placed under arrest at this time.
The East Grand Forks Police Department policy mandates that uninsured vehicles be towed off the roadway and impounded. Appellant and J.M. were told of this policy and offered the choice of a ride in the police car, or walking to town. They were told that the officers had to wait for the tow truck and during that time they could wait in the police car. Both appellant and J.M. were told they were not under arrest. They chose toaccept a ride to town in the police car. One officer conducted a pat-down search of appellant before being placed in the police car to quickly check for anything that could harm the officer. After nothing was discovered, appellant entered the back of the patrol car to wait for a ride. Before the officers conducted a pat-down search of J.M., he informed them that he had a hypodermic needle in his pocket. J.M. indicated he was diabetic and used the needle for insulin. The needle was returned to J.M. and he was placed in the back of the police car with appellant.
The East Grand Forks Police Department policy also mandates that any vehicle impounded must undergo an inventory search.2 During the inventory search of appellant's car at the scene of the stop, the officers found pieces of broken glass from the bulb of a pipe and a broken glass pipe. The glass and glass pipe contained black marks that were consistent with a pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. Because the glass and glass pipe were discovered on the passenger side of the vehicle, J.M. was questioned about the glass. J.M. denied any knowledge of the pipe in the car. The officers conducted a full search of J.M., near the rear passenger side of the police car, seized the needle as evidence, and placed him under arrest.
After J.M. was placed under arrest and secured in a different patrol car, one officer removed appellant from the patrol car to question him near the driver's side rear bumper. During this initial conversation, appellant admitted he knew the pipe was in the car butlater recanted his statement in front of the officers. While the officer was questioning appellant, another officer discovered a clear baggie with a powdery substance and crystals in it near the rear tire of the patrol car from which appellant had exited. Appellant denied any knowledge of the baggie and indicated it may have come from another vehicle passing by. The officers did not see any vehicles drive by during the traffic stop, nor did they see the baggie on the ground before its discovery by one officer. Appellant was searched and placed under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. At his booking, appellant stated that giving a statement would not do him any good and that he was going to prison.
That same day, a detective obtained search warrants to obtain blood samples from appellant and J.M. Appellant's blood sample revealed .09 milligrams per liter of amphetamine and .25 milligrams per liter of methamphetamine. Later laboratory testing revealed .3 grams of methamphetamine in the small plastic baggie.
Appellant was charged with felony third-degree possession of a controlled substance. After a jury trial, he was convicted of third-degree possession as well as the lesser included fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 71 months in prison for the third-degree possession of a controlled-substance charge. He was not sentenced on the fifth-degree possession charge. He challenges his conviction.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court's review "is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in alight most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did." State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court must assume "the jury believed the State's witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence." State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. 1992). This is especially true when resolution of the matter depends mainly on conflicting testimony. State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). The reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
Because the glass pipe was found near the passenger seat and the bag of methamphetamine was found on the ground near where appellant was questioned, the evidence against appellant was circumstantial. "[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence." State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. 1994). But "[w]hile it warrants stricter scrutiny, circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence." State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1999). The circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt. Jones, 516 N.W.2d at 549. A jury, however, is in the best position to evaluate circumstantial evidence, and its verdict is entitled to due deference. Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430.
In applying this standard, the reviewing court examines only the inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved. State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. 2010). But the reviewing court does not "reverse convictions simply because the defendant can point to facts in the record that arguably support a rational inference other than guilt." Id. The court does not consider conflicting facts and circumstances that the jury has rejected, or inferences from those facts. Id. But in assessing the inferences to be drawn from the circumstances proved, the court examines whether there are "no other reasonable, rational inferences that are inconsistent with guilt." Id. at 716. This is because the "inquiry addresses not only the reasonableness of the inferences...
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