State v. Stilling
| Decision Date | 25 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 920186-CA,920186-CA |
| Citation | 856 P.2d 666 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Steven Michael STILLING, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale (argued), Haley & Stolebarger, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Jan Graham, State Atty. Gen., and J. Kevin Murphy (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., and RUSSON, Associate P.J.
Defendant, Steven Michael Stilling, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas five years after the pleas were entered. 1 In 1985, Stilling pled guilty to three counts of robbery, second degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990). We affirm.
As a result of alleged incidents in March of 1984, Stilling was charged with four counts of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990). The State also sought an enhanced penalty for Stilling, as an habitual criminal under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990). At his arraignment on August 31, 1984, before Judge Ronald O. Hyde, the informations were read aloud to Stilling and he pled not guilty. After hearings on various discovery and jurisdictional matters, Stilling decided to enter into a plea agreement. In furtherance of the plea agreement, the State filed amended informations on February 13, 1985, charging Stilling with three counts of robbery, second degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990). The State dropped the fourth robbery Stilling pled guilty to the three counts of robbery pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), under which he maintained his innocence while pleading guilty in order to accept a favorable plea agreement. The minute entry for the plea hearing states that the amended informations were filed in open court, copies given to Stilling and "the charge" read by the clerk. At the plea hearing, the court asked Stilling several questions, seeking oral responses which would indicate his understanding of the ramifications of his plea. First, the court compared the previous charges, "first degree felonies, committed with the use of a firearm," to the new charges, "second degree felonies, robbery by force and fear." The court then explained the difference in the penalties that attached to the second degree felonies. Defendant indicated he understood the nature of the new charges and the less serious sentences they potentially carried. Next, the court asked Stilling if he understood he was waiving his right to a jury trial and the ability to confront witnesses against him. The court apprised Stilling of his privilege against self incrimination and noted that the court would treat his plea as an admission of guilt for sentencing purposes. Stilling was advised that he had the right to appeal his sentence, but that a guilty plea "did not leave much" from which to appeal. The court also asked whether Stilling had been given any promises in exchange for his plea, and whether he had been coerced or threatened in any way. Stilling was also asked whether his judgment was impaired by alcohol or drugs. Stilling indicated that he had gone over the plea agreement with his attorney and believed he understood it.
count and the habitual criminal enhancement.
The court then discussed with Stilling an expiation agreement 2 that his counsel, Bernard Allen, had prepared and submitted to the court at the plea hearing. The agreement contained numbered paragraphs after which Stilling had signed the initials "S.S.," indicating his review of that topic with his attorney. Initially, the expiation agreement indicated that Stilling's attorney had
gone over the facts of [Stilling's] cases very carefully, and [had] talked with the State's key witness and [had] the statements of all the witnesses which the law enforcement officers and the prosecuting attorney claim[ed] to have.
The agreement then listed the original charges and the reduced charges under the plea agreement.
The expiation agreement indicated that "[Stilling was] entering a plea voluntarily and of [his] own free will after conferring with [his] ... attorney." The agreement stated that because the trial court had refused to grant dismissal of the charges, Stilling felt he "was in a position of severe exposure of being convicted on the 1st degree felonies." Both Stilling and his attorney signed the expiation agreement, and his attorney certified that the agreement had been discussed with his client and fully understood by him. On February 13, 1985, Stilling was sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the three second degree robbery charges.
In August of 1990, Stilling filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief to set aside his guilty pleas. The court assigned Stilling counsel and the petition was amended several times, finally resulting in a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. Judge Hyde recused himself and Judge David E. Roth was assigned to the case. One of Stilling's amended motions alleged that deficiencies at the plea hearing were due in part to ineffective assistance of counsel. The State responded with an affidavit of Stilling's trial counsel, Bernard Allen, in which Allen described meetings with Stilling leading up to the plea agreement and hearing. The affidavit included Allen's assessment of Stilling's mental capabilities and of Stilling's understanding of the consequences of the plea agreement. Stilling objected to the affidavit on the At the plea withdrawal hearing, Stilling's counsel argued that the trial court had failed to inquire adequately into the factual basis for Stilling's guilty plea. The argument stressed the inadequacy of the plea hearing under both procedural and constitutional requirements for a guilty plea and requirements for an Alford plea in particular.
basis that it violated the attorney-client privilege. New counsel entered an appearance for Stilling and clarified the scope of the plea withdrawal motion, dropping the ineffective counsel claim and renewing the request to exclude Allen's affidavit.
The State argued that the trial court had substantially complied with the requirements for entry of a guilty plea, claiming that inquiry into evidence of actual guilt was merely discretionary. The State also maintained that the record as a whole demonstrated sufficient evidence of substantial compliance with guilty plea requirements, without resorting to the affidavit submitted by Stilling's trial attorney. Nevertheless, the State argued that the affidavit was properly admitted and could be considered as part of the record.
The trial court found that Stilling's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and denied the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court also entered conclusions of law, paraphrased as follows:
1. The record as it existed at the time of the plea was insufficient to establish substantial compliance with Rule 11;
2. The State can demonstrate that the plea was knowing and voluntary through the use of an affidavit from Stilling's trial counsel; and
3. The affidavit demonstrates that Stilling's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and submission of the affidavit did not violate the attorney-client privilege.
Stilling appeals this decision.
Stilling claims on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the plea proceedings did not comply with Utah R.Crim.P. 11 and lacked a factual basis; and (2) holding that the State could rectify the lack of substantial compliance with requirements for entry of a guilty plea by supplementing the plea hearing record with the Allen affidavit, evidence not available at the time of the hearing.
The State seeks affirmance of the court's decision to deny the withdrawal of the guilty plea, but on different grounds than those stated in the trial court's ruling. The State claims that the trial court's ruling regarding lack of substantial compliance at the plea hearing was error. The State, therefore, urges this court to evaluate Stilling's motion based on the record existing after the plea hearing to determine whether there was substantial compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea. In the alternative, the State argues that the trial court properly admitted the affidavit of Stilling's trial attorney and that this evidence, together with the record as it existed at the plea hearing, sufficiently supports the court's substantial compliance ruling.
Appellate courts "review the ultimate decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). The trial court's findings of fact which lead to its ultimate decision will not be "set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. The trial court's ruling regarding substantial compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Willet v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991).
The requirements for accepting guilty pleas have evolved through court decisions construing both procedural rules and constitutionally guaranteed due process. Reviewing courts, in evaluating individual defendant's pleas, often overlap the Implementation of these requirements for accepting a guilty plea vary somewhat when the defendant enters an Alford plea, whereby he or she is sentenced without admitting guilt. In those cases the record must demonstrate that there is evidence of the defendant's actual guilt. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167-68, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
doctrines from these two sources. That overlap is predictable, given that the procedural...
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