State v. Stoddard

• Decision Date: 01 May 1940
• Citation: 126 Conn. 623,13 A.2d 586
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. STODDARD.

13 A.2d 586

126 Conn. 623

STATE v. STODDARD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 1, 1940

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Edward J. Daly, Judge.

Kent E Stoddard was charged with the crime of violating the rules and regulations of the Milk Administrator, made pursuant to statutes. A demurrer to the information was overruled motions to quash and dismiss the information were denied, and issues tried to the court. From a judgment of guilty defendant appeals.

Albert Levitt, of Redding, for appellant.

Hugh M. Alcorn, Jr., and John P. Hodgson, Asst. State's Atty. and Hugh M. Alcorn, State's Atty., all of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS, JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

Chapter 107a of the 1935 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes provided, § 797c, for the appointment of a milk administrator with extensive powers, detailed in § 800c, to regulate the milk industry of the state and, in § 801c, as amended by § 493d of the 1937 Supplement, that ‘ Said administrator shall have power to establish, from time to time, a minimum price for the different milk areas of the state for each class and grade of milk or milk products sold to dealers and shall have power to define the number and type of classes of milk for the purposes of this chapter. To stabilize specific markets, he shall also have power to establish, from time to time, in any market area, a minimum price for a fixed time for each class and grade; (a) to be paid to the producers; (b) to be paid, at wholesale or retail, by consumers; such minimum wholesale and retail prices to cover sales by dealers and licensees, other than stores, to constumers; (c) to be paid to dealers and licensees by stores and other wholesale purchasers, including such price for sales to other dealers or licensees who are shippers or distributors; (d) to be paid to stores by consumers; (e) to be paid to dealers and licensees by sub-dealers or store dealers; (f) to be paid to dealers by other dealers.’ In 1937 it was provided, further, § 494d: ‘ In establishing minimum prices for milk under the provisions of section 801c, the milk administrator shall take into consideration the type of container used and other cost factors which should influence the determination of such prices.’ The act contained no other provision controlling the administrator in fixing minimum prices. Pursuant to a provision in § 800c(f) the milk administrator passed a rule or regulation, designated Ruling No. 85 defining various market areas, in which the town of Glastonbury was allocated to the area designated as the Hartford Area, and under § 801c as amended he passed a rule, effective July 1st to October 31, 1938, inclusive, designated as Ruling No. 101, fixing minimum prices for the various grades and classes of milk in the several areas, wherein the minimum retail price of Grade B milk in quart bottles delivered to consumers in the Hartford Area was fixed at fourteen cents per quart. The information in this case, amplified by bill of particulars, charged that the defendant Stoddard violated rule and regulation No. 101, in that, on or about August 1, 1938, he sold Grade B milk to each of four named residents of Glastonbury at a price less than the fourteen cents per quart fixed thereby. After demurrer overruled trial was had and judgment of guilty rendered.

One of the numerous claims of law advanced by the defendant by demurrer and on the trial and under assignments of error on this appeal is that § 801c, as amended by § 493d, is an illegal delegation of the legislative powers to an administrative official in that it gives him uncontrolled power to fix prices of milk according to his unregulated discretion, and thus violates the Connecticut Constitution, Article Second, Article Third, Section 1, and Article First, Section 10, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The defendant concedes that the General Assembly may by proper legislation regulate the sale of milk and milk products in the state. The validity of such statutes, enacted to remedy conditions imperiling a state milk supply and dairy industry, and affecting the health and prosperity of the public has been definitely settled, as has the admissibility of adequate provision therein for the fixing of prices of milk and milk products by a milk control board or equivalent agency. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469; People v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 259, 186 N.E. 694; United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446. He contends, however, that § 801c of the Cumulative Supplement of 1935, as amended by § 493d of the 1937 Supplement, involves such an attempted delegation of the legislative power of the General Assembly to an administrative official as to violate those provisions of the Connecticut Constitution which provide for the division of the powers of the state government into ‘ three distinct departments'-legislative, executive and judicial (Article Second) and which vest the legislative power in the General Assembly (Article Third, Section 1) and, as well, to violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The Constitution of this state provides for the separation of the governmental functions into three basic departments, legislative, executive and judicial, and it is inherent in this separation, since the lawmaking function is vested exclusively in the legislative department, that the Legislature cannot delegate the lawmaking power to any other department or agency. In the establishment of three distinct departments of government the Constitution, by necessary implication, prescribes those limitations and imposes those duties which are essential to the independence of each and to the performance by each of the powers of which it is made the depositary. McGovern v. Mitchell, 78 Conn. 536, 547, 63 A. 433. Although our Constitution contains no specific limitations, relevant to the present inquiry, upon the exercise of legislative power ‘ the limitations * * * are no less real, and perhaps more effective, than if phrased in specific terms.’ State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 489,33 A. 519, 521,31 L.R.A. 55, 48 Am.St.Rep. 227. The statement in Shelton v. City of Shelton, 111 Conn. 433, 437, 150 A. 811, that the state may regulate the production, marketing and sale of milk either directly by its statute or may delegate its regulatory power to an official board or officer or to a municipality, while apt to the issue in that case-the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance-is not to be taken as meaning that it can be delegated to an administrative board or officer without regard to and observance of the recognized essentials of such delegation.

A Legislature, in creating a law complete in itself and designed to accomplish a particular purpose, may expressly authorize an administrative agency to fill up the details by prescribing rules and regulations for the operation and enforcement of the law. In order to render admissible such delegation of legislative power, however, it is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the protection of the public interests and with such degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits, and enjoin a procedure under which, by appeal or otherwise, both public interests and private rights shall have due consideration. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 426, 55 S.Ct. 241, and note, 79 L.Ed. 446, 474 et seq.; Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624; Wichita R. & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 59, 43 S.Ct. 51, 67 L.Ed. 124; Connecticut Co. v. Norwalk, 89 Conn. 528, 531, 94 A. 992; 11 Am.Jur. 956. If the Legislature fails to prescribe with reasonable clarity the limits of the power delegated or if those limits are too broad, its attempt to delegate is a nullity. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947; Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 262, 200 A. 672, 117 A.L.R. 639, 644, 645; Van Winkle v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 151 Or. 455, 466, 49 P.2d 1140; Jersey Maid Milk Products Co., Inc., v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 642, 91 P.2d 577, 589.

It appears that in most of the cases involving the validity of milk control acts their constitutionality has been attacked and sustained upon the general structure and scheme of the act as a whole as a permissible delegation of power to an administrative board or officer and the delegation of price-fixing power was not specifically in issue or discussed. However, the principle of necessity of declared policy and prescribed standards was directly involved and a finding of adequacy in these respects was implicit in the upholding of the law including, at least inferentially, the provisions pertaining to price-fixing. The New York statute, Chapter 158, Laws of 1933, adding section 300 et seq., Agriculture and Markets Law, Consol.Laws, c. 69, which was under consideration in the Nebbia case, supra, established a milk control board, prescribed its general powers and duties, and provided, § 312: (a) ‘ The board shall ascertain by such investigations and proofs as the emergency permits, what prices for milk in the several localities and markets of the state, and under varying conditions, will best protect the milk industry in the state and insure a sufficient quantity of pure and wholesome milk * * * and be most in the public...