State v. Stone

Citation452 P.3d 766 (Table)
Decision Date27 November 2019
Docket NumberNO. CAAP-17-0000078,CAAP-17-0000078
Parties STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kentaru Kristopher STONE, also known as Kentaro K. Stone, Defendant-Appellant
CourtCourt of Appeals of Hawai'i

On the briefs:

Phyllis J. Hironaka, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.

Brandon H. Ito, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

(By: Fujise, Presiding Judge, Chan and Wadsworth, JJ.)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Kentaru Kristopher Stone also known as Kentaru K. Stone (Stone) appeals from the January 18, 2017 Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court) Judgment of Conviction and Sentence.1 After a jury trial, the Circuit Court convicted Stone of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243 2 (2014). Stone was sentenced to five years of incarceration.

On appeal, Stone contends the Circuit Court erred by denying his motion for a new trial due to discovery of new evidence after trial and/or because a State witness gave false testimony at trial.

After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve Stone's appeal as follows and affirm.

Stone contends the Circuit Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. On appeal, Stone makes two arguments in support of his motion for new trial. First, the lack of Found Property reports regarding the various identification, bank, and member cards (identification cards) found at the scene was not established until after trial, and thus represented new evidence. Second, Officer Douglas Korenic (Officer Korenic), gave false testimony by stating that he had filed such Found Property reports.

A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence will be granted only if all of the following requirements have been satisfied: (1) the evidence has been discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered before or at trial through the exercise of due diligence; (3) the evidence is material to the issues and not cumulative or offered solely for purposes of impeachment; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature as would probably change the result of a later trial.

State v. McNulty, 60 Haw. 259, 267-68, 588 P.2d 438, 445 (1978), overruled on other grounds by Raines v. State, 79 Hawai‘i 219, 900 P.2d 1286 (1995), and State v. Eberly, 107 Hawai‘i 239, 112 P.3d 725 (2005). These requirements must be affirmatively demonstrated by the appellant. Id.

Stone asserts that "[t]he evidence that Officer Korenic had NOT submitted any Found Property reports regarding the various cards on the picnic table top was confirmed by the prosecution AFTER the trial had concluded." The lack of the Found Property reports Officer Korenic testified to having prepared was documented at trial. A recess was taken and the six reports referenced by number on the front page of his report were retrieved from the police department and Officer Korenic acknowledged that they were unrelated to this case. No other Found Property report numbers were referenced in Officer Korenic's report for this offense and he eventually admitted that he may have "made a mistake" by testifying he submitted reports regarding the identification cards. Thus, the lack of Found Property reports was discovered during trial and that further, post-trial efforts to search for these records were unsuccessful does not change this fact.

Second, it appears that the defense could have discovered this lack before or at trial through the exercise of due diligence. Id. Stone contends:

Nothing in the discovery received by defense counsel, particularly Officer Korenic's report, hinted that he would testify that: (1) the various ID and other cards on the picnic table did NOT belong to Stone; (2) Officer Korenic filed "found property" reports for the various cards that did not belong to Stone; (3) there were several "found property" reports because there were numerous items recovered; (4) he "verified ownership" of the items; and (5) the owners later picked up their cards.

The essential claim is discovery provided to Stone was incomplete in a way that caused his counsel to form the erroneous argument that all the identification cards belonged to Stone. However, this claim is not supported by the record. In State's Exhibit 16, the identification cards of at least two persons are clearly visible in the photograph. Of the three identification cards in the photo, one shows a dark skinned male with dark hair and the other shows a light skinned male or female with light hair. Stone was clearly aware of the existence of the photo prior to trial as he highlighted it to the jury in his opening statement.3 Thus, the key claim—that Stone could not have expected testimony that identification cards from multiple persons that were present on the picnic table did not belong to Stone—is without merit.

Third, Stone's assertion that Officer Korenic's discovery of the identification cards was inextricably intertwined with his discovery of the methamphetamine packet is not supported by the record. The sole role of these items was that they were on the table along with others in Stone's lap when Officer Korenic approached Stone. Although defense counsel maintained at trial that these items belonged to Stone, no evidence was presented to that effect.4 Beyond this assertion, Stone fails to argue any other purpose for the evidence besides impeachment and fails to establish an exculpatory connection between the impeachment evidence and the offense or that the impeachment evidence undermined critical inculpatory evidence. State v. Dural, 141 Hawai‘i 501, 413 P.3d 405, CAAP-13-0003694, 2018 WL 1063886, at *13-14 (App. Feb. 27, 2018) (mem.).

Fourth, we also agree with the Circuit Court's assessment that this evidence was not likely to have changed the verdict. McNulty, at 268, 588 P.2d 445. Whether Found Property reports were prepared for the identification cards was at best marginally relevant to the facts of this case and did not establish any of the elements of the offense charged.

Therefore, we reject newly discovered evidence as a basis for Stone's motion for a new trial.

Stone also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Officer Korenic gave false testimony by stating that he had filed Found Property reports.

A new trial motion based on false testimony given by a State witness must be granted where:

(1) [the court] is reasonably satisfied that the testimony at trial of a material prosecution witness is false; (2) defendant and his agents did not discover the falseness of the testimony until after the trial; (3) the late discovery is not due to a lack of due
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