State v. Storey
| Decision Date | 15 February 1909 |
| Citation | 99 P. 878,51 Wash. 630 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. STOREY. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Walla Walla County; Thos. H. Brents Judge.
John C Storey was convicted of permitting live stock to run at large in a quantity, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Cain & Hurspool, for appellant.
Otto B Rupp, for the State.
The appellant was convicted of the offense of permitting live stock to run at large in Walla Walla county. He was prosecuted under the provisions of chapter 230, p. 566, of Laws 1907. His contention here is that the act is unconstitutional upon three grounds: Because (1) it delegates legislative powers to private persons; (2) it confers judicial powers upon purely executive officers; and (3) it discriminates between persons and things of the same class. Section 1 of the act provides that it shall be unlawful for live stock to run at large in any county of the state in which three-fourths of the lands outside of incorporated cities and towns are under fence. Section 2 provides that it shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners of the respective counties of the state, when 10 or more freeholders shall make application for the enforcement of the act, to at once determine whether three-fourths of the lands outside of incorporated cities and towns in such county are under fence. Sections 3, 4, and 5 provide the manner of determining the fact whether the required amount of land in the county is under fence, and recording the same, and for a notice thereof to the public. Section 6 makes a violation of the act a misdemeanor, punishable by fine.
It is claimed by appellant that the act can become effective only upon the petition of 10 freeholders, and that the taking effect of the act depends entirely upon the discretion of these freeholders, and that this amounts to a delegation of legislative power to these 10 men in their private capacity. If we concede for this case that the county commissioners have no power to determine the facts or make the act effective without this petition, we still think it does not follow that there is any delegation of legislative power. The act was passed by the Legislature. That authority may say definitely when an act shall take effect, or it may fix an indefinite time in the future upon the happening of some event before the act shall take effect. Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 169. The mere fact that the act does not take effect until the contingency arises does not indicate a delegation of legislative power, even where the contingency depends upon the action of certain persons. It is conceded, if we understand the appellant's position, that certain laws may become effective or not upon local judgment, and Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) pp. 173, 174, is cited to that effect. In such cases it...
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Ex Parte Mode
...by the governor, even though it is left to some local body to determine whether and when it shall go into operation." In State v. Storey, 51 Wash. 630, 99 Pac. 878, the Supreme Court of that state "The act was passed by the Legislature. That authority may say definitely when an act shall ta......
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Amalgamated Transit v. State
...Servs., 113 Wash.2d 19, 28, 775 P.2d 947 (1989)); see also Royer v. P.U.D. No. 1, 186 Wash. 142, 56 P.2d 1302 (1936); State v. Storey, 51 Wash. 630, 99 P. 878 (1909). Here, appellants contend, the voters acted as legislators and determined that tax measures would be expedient only if approv......
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Lee v. State
...or by passing the law enacting the result.¶ 34 The State compares I–1366 to the contingent legislation at issue in State v. Storey , 51 Wash. 630, 99 P. 878 (1909), and Brower v. State , 137 Wash.2d 44, 969 P.2d 42 (1998). In Storey, the statute at issue dealt with a restriction against liv......
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Brower v. State
...Diversified Inv. Partnership v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wash.2d 19, 28, 775 P.2d 947 (1989); see State v. Storey, 51 Wash. 630, 632, 99 P. 878 (1909) ("[t]he mere fact that the act does not take effect until the contingency arises does not indicate a delegation of legislativ......