State v. Stout
Decision Date | 02 February 1988 |
Citation | 305 Or. 34,749 P.2d 1174 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. David Joseph STOUT, Petitioner on Review. TC C86-03-31225; CA A42431; SC S34328. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
John P. Daugirda, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the petition on behalf of the petitioner on review. With him on the petition was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Brenda J. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause and filed the response on behalf of the respondent on review. With her on the response were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Michael D. Schrunk, Portland, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Oregon District Attys. Ass'n. With him on the brief were David L. Hattrick and Charlene Woods, Deputy Dist. Attys., Portland.
Before PETERSON, C.J., and LENT, LINDE, CAMPBELL, CARSON and GILLETTE, JJ.
The issue in this case is whether an indictment must be quashed if it was based, in part, on hearsay evidence. We hold that it need not be quashed.
On March 24, 1986, a Multnomah County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with intentional murder, felony murder and robbery. Defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it "was obtained by presenting improper and inadmissible evidence to the grand jury," in violation of ORS 132.320(1), which provides:
"Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, in the investigation of a charge for the purpose of indictment, the grand jury shall receive no other evidence than such as might be given on the trial of the person charged with the crime in question." 1
Defendant objected that some of the witnesses who testified before the grand jury had no personal knowledge of the crime and, therefore, their testimony must have been hearsay. Accompanying the motion were copies of police reports based on interviews with these witnesses. The reports tend to substantiate defendant's claim that the indictment was based, in part, on hearsay testimony.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash. The state voluntarily dismissed the intentional murder charge before trial. A jury subsequently convicted defendant on the robbery charge and acquitted him of felony murder. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed from the bench. State v. Stout, 86 Or.App. 755, 740 P.2d 251 (1987). We also affirm.
The arguments in this case focus primarily on the validity of the rule set out in State v. McDonald, 231 Or. 24, 361 P.2d 1001 (1961), cert. den. 370 U.S. 903, 82 S.Ct. 1247, 8 L.Ed.2d 399 (1962). In McDonald, a grand jury returned an indictment against the defendant after hearing hearsay evidence. The state voluntarily dismissed the indictment. After a second proceeding, at which no hearsay evidence was presented, the same grand jury returned a second indictment against the defendant for the same crime. The defendant objected that the admission of hearsay evidence during the first proceeding influenced the grand jury in the second proceeding and, therefore, violated ORS 132.320. This court concluded that ORS 132.320 "is admonitory in character only, not mandatory," 231 Or. at 34, 361 P.2d 1001, and held that "the fact a grand jury may have been prejudiced by hearsay evidence or prejudicial publicity which it ought not to consider is not grounds for dismissing or quashing an indictment." Id. at 35, 361 P.2d 1001.
After McDonald was decided, the legislature enacted OEC 101(4)(b), which provides:
The unofficial commentary to OEC 101(4)(b) states, in part:
Legislative Commentary to OEC 101, published in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 4 (1982).
Defendant argues that OEC 101(4)(b) was intended to overrule this court's characterization of ORS 132.320 as "admonitory" in State v. McDonald, supra. The state argues that the commentary to the Oregon Evidence Code is not controlling, because it never was adopted by the legislature and is not an official part of the code. See State v. McClure, 298 Or. 336, 344, 692 P.2d 579 (1984). The state also argues that the commentary to the Proposed Oregon Criminal Procedure Code 42, § 68 (Final Report 1972) endorsed the McDonald court's interpretation of ORS 132.320.
However, we need not consider the effect of OEC 101(4)(b) on State v. McDonald, supra, because another consideration disposes of this case. ORS 135.510 provides:
Although the predecessors to ORS 132.320 and 135.510 both were enacted in 1864, the legislature did not include at that time the use of inadmissible evidence as a ground for setting aside an indictment under ORS 135.510, nor has it since amended the statute to include that ground. 2 This court has long held that the grounds listed in ORS 135.510 for setting aside an indictment are exclusive. In State v. Whitney 7 Or. 386 (1879), the defendant filed a motion to set aside the indictment on the ground that an unauthorized person attended the grand jury proceeding and examined some of the witnesses. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, this court held:
7 Or. at 388. At that time, the predecessor to ORS 132.320 ( ) was not in chapter 7 ( ), but in chapter 6 ( ). Thus, under the rule stated in Whitney, a violation of the predecessor to ORS 132.320 also would not have been a ground for setting aside an indictment.
In State v. Justus, 11 Or. 178, 180, 8 P. 337 (1883), the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that an unauthorized person had been present in the grand jury proceedings. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction because the objection to the indictment was not made until after the trial, and because no prejudice to the defendant resulted from the "irregularity" in the grand jury proceeding. In dictum, however, the court stated that, notwithstanding State v. Whitney, supra, " 'irregularities in the proceedings before the grand jury * * * may under some circumstances be taken advantage of upon a motion to quash the indictment' ". State v. Justus, supra, 11 Or. at 180, 8 P. 337 (citing 1 Bishop, Criminal Procedure, sections 747, 748, 762).
In State v. Kelliher, 49 Or. 77, 88 P. 867 (1907), the defendant filed a motion to quash the district attorney's information on the grounds, inter alia, "that West [the only witness examined by the district attorney], whose name is indorsed, had no knowledge of the facts upon which the information is based," and that "there was no legal evidence before the district attorney to sustain the charge." The court concluded that the statute defining the circumstances under which a grand jury should find an indictment applied to the district attorney in finding an information. Citing the predecessor to ORS 135.510 ( ), however, the court held:
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