State v. Straley

• Decision Date: 29 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2013–0544.,2013–0544.
• Citation: 11 N.E.3d 1175,139 Ohio St.3d 339
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. STRALEY, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

139 Ohio St.3d 339

11 N.E.3d 1175

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,

v.STRALEY, Appellee.

No. 2013–0544.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Feb. 5, 2014.

Decided May 29, 2014.

Syllabus of the Court

A conviction for tampering with evidence pursuant to R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant intended to impair the value or availability of evidence that related to an existing or likely official investigation or proceeding.

D. Andrew Wilson, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher L. Kinsler, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Valerie Kunze, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to resolve a conflict between the appellate districts presented by the following certified question: “Whether a tampering conviction requires proof that the defendant impaired evidence in an investigation by tampering with evidence related to the investigation.” We answer the certified conflict question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals.

I. Case Background

{¶ 2} The events that give rise to this case are not disputed. On the evening of April 18, 2011, two plainclothes narcotic detectives in an unmarked police vehicle observed a car travel left of center. Although they were not on traffic duty, the officers stopped the car for public safety because of the erratic driving. Detective Will Speakman approached the driver, appellee, Amanda Straley, who was alone in the car. He noted the smell of an alcoholic beverage and asked Straley to leave the vehicle. Straley could not produce a driver's license and also exhibited slurred speech. Speakman obtained her consent to search the vehicle and her bag, but no contraband was found.

{¶ 3} The detectives decided not to pursue any charges but would not allow Straley to drive home. They attempted to arrange a ride for her with her mother and her aunt but were unsuccessful. Detective Jason Via telephoned the shift lieutenant to get permission to take Straley home, and meanwhile, as Speakman testified at trial, Straley indicated that she needed to use the restroom and was jumping up and down, “doing a little dance.” Speakman instructed her to wait because there was no restroom available, but Straley started to unbutton her pants and stated, “I have got to pee. I have to urinate.” She trotted 20 to 30 feet away to the corner of a building, saying, “I'm not running; I just gotta pee. I don't care if you have to arrest me; I gotta pee.” She then pulled down her pants and urinated. Detective Speakman avoided looking directly at her but kept Straley in his peripheral vision.

{¶ 4} Afterwards, Straley returned to Speakman, who then escorted her back to Via. Speakman walked back to the area where Straley had been and saw a clear cellophane baggie covered with urine. Inside the baggie there appeared to be crack cocaine. Straley was placed under arrest, and the evidence was collected.

{¶ 5} As a result of these events, Straley was charged in a three-count indictment with trafficking in drugs, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); and tampering with evidence, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A). She filed a motion to suppress all the statements she had made to law enforcement.

{¶ 6} On the morning of trial, the trial court held a suppression hearing and denied the motion. Straley then entered pleas of no contest to the trafficking and possession counts. The case proceeded to jury trial on the remaining count of tampering with evidence, and she was found guilty. The trial court sentenced Straley to concurrent prison terms of nine months for tampering with evidence and for trafficking, after merging the counts of possession and trafficking.

{¶ 7} Straley filed a notice of appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction related to tampering with evidence. It concluded that nothing in the record supported a finding that Straley acted with purpose to impair the value of evidence of any ongoing investigation, i.e., of driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license, or of any likely investigation, i.e., of public urination. 2d Dist. Clark No. 2012–CA–34, 2013-Ohio-510, 2013 WL 596538, ¶ 14 and 16. It held that to be guilty of violating R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), “a defendant must ‘impair’ evidence in an investigation that is ongoing or likely to occur by tampering in some way with evidence related to the investigation.” Id. at ¶ 15.

{¶ 8} The Second District granted the state's motion to certify a conflict, holding that its judgment conflicted with the judgment of the Ninth District in State v. Skorvanek, 182 Ohio App.3d 615, 2009-Ohio-1709, 914 N.E.2d 418 (9th Dist.). We recognized the conflict. 135 Ohio St.3d 1446, 2013-Ohio-2062, 987 N.E.2d 702. The sole issue before this court is “[w]hether a tampering conviction requires proof that the defendant impaired evidence in an investigation by tampering with evidence related to the investigation.” Id.

II. Legal Analysis

Standard of Review

{¶ 9} The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law, and thus we review the court of appeals decision de novo, including consideration of the statute's ambiguity. State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9. Our main objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 (1995). To accomplish this, we first must look at the language of the statute itself. Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973). If the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written. “[I]t is the duty of this court to give effect to the words used, not to delete words used or to insert words not used.” Columbus–Suburban Coach Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 254 N.E.2d 8 (1969).

{¶ 10} We have, however, emphasized that “ ‘where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 370, 374, 406 N.E.2d 499 (1980), quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). This canon of strict construction, also known as the rule of lenity, is codified in R.C. 2901.04(A), which provides that sections of the Revised Code that define offenses or penalties “shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused.” Under the rule, ambiguity in a criminal statute is construed strictly so as to apply the statute only to conduct that is clearly proscribed. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997).

The Statute—R.C. 2921.12(A)(1)

{¶ 11} Straley was convicted of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), which provides:

No person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall do any of the following:

(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation.

There are three elements of this offense: (1) the knowledge of an official proceeding or investigation in progress or likely to be instituted, (2) the alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal of the potential evidence, (3) the purpose of impairing the potential evidence's availability or value in such proceeding or investigation.

{¶ 12} The state argues that the Second District Court of Appeals misinterpreted R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) by unduly limiting the definition of “investigation” to require that the evidence tampered with be related to the investigation of only those charges of which law enforcement was then aware or likely to be aware. The state contends that an investigation involves the process of gathering facts and information and may grow beyond the scope of initial charges. Accordingly, the state reasons that if law enforcement investigates a suspect for possible criminal conduct, that investigation necessarily encompasses all criminal conduct that law enforcement may discover.

{¶ 13} Straley counters that the state's expansive reading of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and the rule of lenity. She contends that the purpose of the tampering-with-evidence statute is to protect the availability of evidence related to an ongoing investigation during its progress and any related later proceeding. According to Straley, the statute should not be broadly interpreted to encompass the discarding of contraband when there is no investigation or potential investigation relating to that contraband.

The Conflict Cases

{¶ 14} The Second District in this case held that there was no proof of the third statutory element of purpose to impair the value or availability of evidence related to an ongoing or likely investigation. It determined that the weight of the evidence supported a finding that Straley had discarded contraband—the baggie of drugs. It also surmised that the jury could have found that she knew that an investigation was likely to be instituted regarding her act of public urination (“I don't care if you have to arrest me; I gotta pee”). But the court concluded that Straley did not discard the baggie of drugs with the purpose of impairing its availability as evidence in the investigation of public urination. Nor would the baggie relate to an investigation into driving while under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license. Because the baggie did not relate to any current or likely investigation, the Second District reversed the conviction for tampering with evidence.

{¶ 15} In...