State v. Strong (In re Me. Today Media, Inc.)
| Decision Date | 24 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. Yor–13–53,SJC–13–1.,Yor–13–54 |
| Citation | 2013 ME 12,59 A.3d 499 |
| Parties | In re MAINE TODAY MEDIA, INC. State of Maine v. Mark W. Strong, Sr. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Sigmund D. Schutz, Esq., and Benjamin S. Piper, Esq., Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Portland, for Maine Today Media, Inc.
Kathryn M. Slattery, District Attorney, and Justine McGettigan, Asst. Dist. Atty., appearing for the State of Maine in the trial court.
Daniel G. Lilley, Esq., and Tina Nadeau, Esq., appearing for Mark W. Strong Sr. in the trial court.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
[¶ 1] Before us are (1) Maine Today Media, Inc.'s expedited appeal from the Superior Court's (York County, Mills, J.) denial of its motions for a stay and to intervene in the matter of State v. Strong and (2) its motion for a temporary restraining order,1 seeking relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition, or, in the alternative, for an emergency stay of the court's order, seeking access for the public and the press to observe the process of jury voir dire in a criminal proceeding brought by the State against Mark Strong. See14 M.R.S. § 5301 (2012); M.R. Civ. P. 81(c); M.R.App. P. 10.
[¶ 2] We address only the pending appeal and we deny the motion for a temporary restraining order and petitions seeking relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition. We accept the interlocutory appeal according to the death knell exception to the final judgment rule. See Liberty v. Bennett, 2012 ME 81, ¶ 18, 46 A.3d 1141. In so doing, recognizing the press of time, we do not further address the right of intervention, and we reserve further analysis of the public's right to intervene in criminal matters to future proceedings.
[¶ 3] The appeal presented by Maine Today requires attention to, and the balancing of, rights protected by the United States and Maine Constitutions:
• At the jury voir dire stage of a criminal trial, the public, including the press, has rights protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Press–Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501 [104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629] (1984).
• At the same time, Mark Strong has the right to a public trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 [130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675] (2010).
• Both Strong and the State have the right to an impartial jury and a fair trial.
[¶ 4] The matter challenged here relates only to the jury selection process. The court initiated jury selection through a process regularly used in Maine courts that provided for extensive individual voir dire, with the practical effect that the public was excluded from the voir dire process. After jury selection had begun, the trial court received a letter from counsel for Maine Today asserting a greater right to public access. The court initially agreed to open the process to the public upon Strong's agreement.
[¶ 5] After considering the options, however, Strong, in consultation with counsel, expressed concerns about the ability to draw an impartial jury if the process used by the court were changed. The court then agreed to continue with the individual voir dire process. Maine Today's motion to intervene followed, at the end of the day of jury selection. Given the lateness of the request, the trial court denied the motion, and Maine Today filed the pending interlocutory appeal.
[¶ 6] We have determined that, in granting the defendant's request for the continuation of non-public voir dire, the court did not have an opportunity to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure in order to accommodate the right of the public to attend criminal trials, as required by Press–Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508, 510–13, 104 S.Ct. 819.
[¶ 7] The findings of the trial court reflect that the process barred the public, which includes the media, from voir dire based on the concern that juror candor would be reduced. Although the trial court exercises substantial discretion over the mode and conduct of voir dire, a generalized concern that juror candor might be reduced if voir dire is conducted in public is insufficient pursuant to Press–Enterprise to bar the public or media from the entirety of the process.
[¶ 8] Accordingly, we vacate the denial of the motion to intervene and allow intervention for the limited purpose of the matters addressed in this appeal.
[¶ 9] We vacate the court's order barring the public from the entirety of the voir dire process. The matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct the remaining voir dire in a presumptively public manner, exercising its considerable discretion to prevent the dissemination of sensitive juror information. The public's access to the jury selection that has already occurred can be addressed, again at the court's discretion, by the release of appropriately redacted transcripts.
[¶ 10] Recognizing that the urgency of this matter has resulted in an order entered without direct input to this Court from the State and the defendant, we note that the parties have presented their positions regarding the public's access to the jury selection in the record that is before us and that the parties will have an opportunity to address the future process of jury selection with the trial justice. Finally, in order to assure that we have not overlooked any aspect of the parties' positions, we provide the following process: if the State, the defendant, or Maine Today wishes to file a motion for reconsideration, that party shall notify the trial justice and the Clerk of the Law Court of the party's intent to do so by 2:00 p.m. today. In the absence of such notice, the mandate shall issue immediately to avoid any further delay of the proceedings. Any such motion shall be filed with the Clerk of the Law Court before 4:00 p.m. today, January 24, 2013.
The entry is:
Denial of the motion to intervene vacated. Intervention is allowed for the limited purpose of the matters addressed in this appeal. Order barring the public from the entirety of the voir dire process vacated. The matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct the remaining voir dire in a presumptively public manner, exercising its considerable discretion to prevent the dissemination of sensitive juror information.
If the State, the defendant, or Maine Today intends to file a motion for reconsideration, that party shall notify the trial justice and the Clerk of the Law Court of the party's intent to do so by 2:00 p.m. today. Any such motion shall be filed with the Clerk of the Law Court before 4:00 p.m. today, January 24, 2013.
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[¶ 11] I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to involve itself in the trial process to direct how the trial court should conduct voir dire and jury selection. I would not grant such extraordinary relief based on the one-sided request of a newspaper publisher, without full understandingof the reasons for the trial judge's action, and without even hearing the positions of the State and the defense in this difficult proceeding.
[¶ 12] We should not grant requests for injunctive relief lightly, particularly when that request comes to us ex parte. See Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric., Food & Rural Res., 2003 ME 140, ¶¶ 9–10, 837 A.2d 129. In Bangor Historic Track, we observed that the moving party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that: (1) it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) such injury outweighs any harm which granting the injunctive relief would inflict on the other party; (3) it has a likelihood of success on the merits (at most, a probability; at least, a substantial possibility); and (4) the public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Ingraham v. Univ. of Maine at Orono, 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me.1982)). Not one of those criteria, let alone all four, is demonstrated here.
[¶ 13] The First Circuit's opinion in Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir.2010), is instructive on the issue of stays or injunctive action by appellate courts, stating, “A party requesting injunctive relief pending appeal bears the burden of showing that the circumstances of the case justify the exercise of the court's discretion.” Id. (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1760–61, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009)). The First Circuit emphasized that in considering motions for stays or injunctions pending appeal, appellate courts are guided by consideration of four factors: (1) whether the applicant has made a “strong showing” that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent relief; (3) whether issuance of relief will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public...
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