State v. Stroud

• Decision Date: 07 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. CR-04-0234-PR.,CR-04-0234-PR.
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Sudden Rio STROUD, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

103 P.3d 912

209 Ariz. 410

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Sudden Rio STROUD, Appellant.

No. CR-04-0234-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

January 7, 2005.

Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General Phoenix, AZ by Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section and Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney Tucson, AZ General, Criminal Appeals Section Attorneys for Appellee.

Law Office of Stacy Taeuber, Madison, WI by Stacy Taeuber Attorney for Appellant.

OPINION

BERCH, Justice.

¶ 1 We are asked to resolve whether a conviction for the crime of escape is sustainable under the facts of this case. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict and therefore reinstate the conviction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-120.24 (2003).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Bisbee Police Officer William Silva saw Defendant Sudden Rio Stroud sitting in a car. Knowing that there was an outstanding felony warrant for Stroud's arrest, Officer Silva approached him. As Stroud got out of the car, Silva ordered him to put his hands on the patrol car. Although he questioned why he was being arrested, Stroud started to comply with the order. When the officer advised him of the arrest warrant, Stroud tried to evade Silva, but Silva grabbed Stroud's shirt collar, shoved him against the car and held him there, telling him that he was under arrest. Stroud continued to struggle and kick, so Silva used pepper spray in an effort to subdue him. Some of the spray blew into Silva's eyes, causing him to lose his grip on Stroud, who broke free and fled. Another officer later apprehended Stroud.

¶ 3 As a result of the incident, Stroud was charged with resisting arrest and second-degree escape. A jury convicted Stroud of both counts, finding also that he was on probation when he committed the offenses. The trial judge imposed consecutive prison terms totaling four years.

¶ 4 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Stroud's conviction and sentence for resisting arrest, but vacated his conviction and sentence for escape, finding the evidence insufficient to establish that Stroud had been "in custody," a prerequisite to an escape. State v. Stroud, 207 Ariz. 476, 479-80, 481, ¶¶ 12, 19, 88 P.3d 190, 193-94, 195 (App.2004).

¶ 5 The State of Arizona petitioned this court for review.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 6 The State urges us to find that the court of appeals erred in holding that the facts of this case cannot support convictions for both resisting arrest and escape.¹See id. at 477-78, ¶ 4, 88 P.3d at 191-92. We review the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial only to determine if substantial evidence exists to support the jury verdict. See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 13, 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998). Substantial evidence has been described as "more than a `mere scintilla'" of evidence; but it nonetheless must be evidence that "reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hughes, 189 Ariz. 62, 73, 938 P.2d 457, 469 (1997) (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (1990)). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict and resolve all inferences against Stroud. State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987).²

B. Discussion

¶ 7 In Arizona, the crimes of resisting arrest and escape are controlled by separate statutes, each having distinct elements. A person commits the crime of resisting arrest by

intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent a person reasonably known to him to be a peace officer ... from effecting an arrest by:

(1) Using or threatening to use physical force against the peace officer or another; or

(2) Using any other means creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another.

A.R.S. § 13-2508(A) (2001). A person commits second-degree escape by knowingly "[e]scaping or attempting to escape from custody imposed as a result of having been arrested for, charged with or found guilty of a felony." A.R.S. § 13-2503(A)(2) (2001) (emphasis added).

¶ 8 The court of appeals held that Stroud's convictions for resisting arrest and escape could not both stand. 207 Ariz. at 479-80, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d at 193-94. It concluded that the escape conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. To establish the second-degree escape charge, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stroud knowingly "[e]scap[ed] from custody imposed as a result of having been arrested for ... a felony." A.R.S. § 13-2503(A)(2). The court reasoned that because Officer Silva never "completed arresting Stroud," he was never in "custody," and thus the trial court erred by submitting the escape charge to the jury. Stroud, 207 Ariz. at 480, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d at 194.

¶ 9 In concluding that Stroud was never in custody, the court of appeals relied upon definitions of custody derived from other jurisdictions. Id. at 479-80, ¶¶ 11-12, 88 P.3d at 193-94 (citing Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala.1994); People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729 (Colo.1996); People v. Becoats, 88 A.D.2d 766, 451 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1982); Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)). Arizona statutes, however, specifically define "custody" as the "imposition of actual or constructive restraint pursuant to an on-site arrest." A.R.S. § 13-2501(3) (2001). "Restraint" is not defined by statute, but the common understanding of the word connotes controlling, limiting, or restricting the movement of another. See Black's Law Dictionary 1315-16 (7th ed.1999); see also A.R.S. § 1-213 (2002) (requiring that words in statutes "be construed according to the common and approved use of the language"); State v. Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470 n. 3, 671 P.2d 909, 911 n. 3 (1983) (stating that "words and phrases in statutes shall be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended"). Moreover, the term has been construed by Arizona case law. See State v. Sanchez, 145 Ariz. 313, 316, 701 P.2d 571, 574 (1985) (analyzing concepts of arrest and constructive restraint in the context of an escape charge); State v. Cole, 172 Ariz. 590, 592, 838 P.2d 1351, 1353 (App.1992) (analyzing "custody" in the context of the escape statute). Thus, Arizona authority provides ample guidance regarding the statutory requirements for proving escape.

¶ 10 Arizona authority also addresses what constitutes an arrest for purposes of the escape statute. Section 13-3881 provides that an "arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest." A.R.S. § 13-3881 (2001). No easily identifiable point defines the moment at which an arrest or custody occurs. Whether an arrest has occurred must be determined by examining the facts and circumstances of each case. See Cole, 172 Ariz. at 592,838 P.2d at 1353 (finding actual restraint when two police officers held the defendant's arms, only temporarily, and told him he was under arrest before he escaped).

¶ 11 Thus, to prove Stroud guilty of escape, the State had to show that Stroud was "arrested" (that is, that he was actually restrained) and was in "custody" (defined as the imposition of actual or constructive restraint pursuant to an arrest). On these points, the record shows that during the ongoing struggle, Officer "Silva grabbed Stroud's shirt collar, leaned him against his car, and held him down" while repeatedly telling "Stroud he was under arrest." Stroud, 207 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 2, 88 P.3d at 191. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Silva actually restrained Stroud, even if only temporarily, before Stroud broke free. See Cole, 172 Ariz. at 592, 838 P.2d at 1353. The jurors could reasonably have concluded that Silva's actual restraint of Stroud satisfied the definition of "custody" set forth in A.R.S. § 13-2501(3). This action, coupled with the declaration to Stroud that he was under arrest, provided sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the charge of second-degree escape, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-2503(A)(2).

¶ 12 Although the record contains conflicting evidence on the degree of control exercised by Officer Silva, viewing the evidence presented in favor of upholding the verdict, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find the evidence sufficient to support Stroud's conviction for escape. Thus, we find no fundamental error.

¶ 13 The court of appeals, however, found fundamental error in the trial court's submission of the escape charge to the jury because it concluded that Stroud had not been "restrained," as that term is used in the statute defining custody. A.R.S. § 13-2501(3); Stroud, 207 Ariz. at 480, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d at 194. In doing so, it relied upon language from this court's decision in Sanchez, 145 Ariz. at 316, 701 P.2d at 574. While we reaffirm the thrust of that opinion — that one cannot escape unless one has been actually restrained or arrested — we believe the court of appeals has unmoored the language of the opinion from its contextual anchor.

¶ 14 The Sanchez case involved constructive restraint, not the actual restraint at issue in this case. Id. at 314, 701 P.2d at 572. In Sanchez, the officer never was closer than ten-to-fifteen feet from the defendant, who walked away when the officer began to walk toward him. Id. As the two circled back and forth around a parked car, the officer finally said, "This is it, Roy; you're under arrest." Id. At that point, the defendant ran. Id. In light of those facts, this court concluded that the defendant could not have escaped because he had never submitted to the officer's authority, nor had he actually been restrained by the officer. Id. at 315, 701 P.2d at 573. That case, unlike the...