State v. Stufflebeam, 60255

• Decision Date: 21 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 60255,60255
• Citation: 260 N.W.2d 409
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Timothy Lynn STUFFLEBEAM, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 409

260 N.W.2d 409

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Timothy Lynn STUFFLEBEAM, Appellant.

No. 60255.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 21, 1977.

Robert W. Thompson and Gary W. Kazragis, of Rickert & Thompson Law Office, Reinbeck, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jay A. Mardini, Asst. County Atty., Waterloo, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ.

HARRIS, Justice.

Defendant appeals his jury conviction of larceny in excess of $20 in violation of §§ 709.1 and 709.2, The Code. We find his assignments of error to be without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Evidence taken in the light most consistent with the verdict showed that on June 15, 1976, Glen Frohn left his new black van parked in front of a Waterloo lounge while he went to work on a 3 p. m. to 11 p. m. shift at a nearby factory. After finishing work at 11 p. m. Frohn noted the van was parked where he had left it. He then went into the lounge. After 20 minutes Frohn came out of the lounge to find his van was gone. After unsuccessfully looking for it he went back into the lounge and called police. The Waterloo police were given a detailed description of the van which had special tires and wheels.

Timothy Lynn Stufflebeam (defendant) came to the lounge early in the evening of June 15, 1976 in company with Ruth Gardner, Terry Allen Peters, and several other people. Defendant and Peters left the lounge a short time before the van disappeared from the adjacent parking lot. They were not present in the lounge when Frohn came in and reported his van had been stolen. Stufflebeam however returned to the lounge an hour and one-half later.

Gardner and defendant later left the lounge and defendant told Gardner he and Peters had stolen the van in order to take its special tires. Defendant told Miss Gardner he and Peters had "hot wired" the van and defendant had driven it to a location known as "the pits." Defendant told Miss Gardner he and Peters had taken the tires from the van and put them in Peters's car. He further told Miss Gardner that he and Peters came back to the lounge and put the two front tires from the van in the trunk of defendant's car. The wheels and tires were worth in excess of $400.

Early in the morning of June 16, 1976 Waterloo police officers were called to investigate a reported accident which occurred near the pits. That investigation led them to an auto salvage yard where they noticed the stolen black van sitting without tires or wheels on a nearby abandoned road. Some of the lug nuts and washers were still attached to the wheel rims of the van.

The officers then returned to the salvage yard and examined an automobile which they believed had been involved in the separate accident at the pits. They saw no one present in the salvage yard but did see a mobile home parked there. Locks were missing from the door. Defendant and Peters were asleep in sleeping bags on the mobile home floor. One of the officers walked out to the automobile they suspected of being involved in the accident. Through the car windows he saw a number of lug nuts, washers, and adapters on the automobile's floor. These were similar to the lug nuts, washers, and adapters the officers had seen on the van.

Peters gave the officers permission to take some of the lug nuts and adapters to see if they fit on the van. They did. Peters opened the trunk of his automobile to show a set of tires and wheels which matched Frohn's description of those missing from his van.

In an attempt to examine the other car involved in the accident at the pits the officers, with permission, examined the pockets of defendant's trousers for car keys. A large washer was found in a pocket. This washer was similar to the washers on the van and on the floor of the other automobile. Defendant was arrested for larceny. While he was held in jail his car was towed away from where it had been parked across the alley from the tavern. Thereafter defendant's parents called Miss Gardner and asked her to get defendant's car from the towing service and drive it to New Hampton and leave it behind a hotel there.

On June 19, 1976 Miss Gardner, accompanied by a friend, did so. Defendant's father followed in his truck. When they arrived in New Hampton, in answer to a request of defendant, Miss Gardner and defendant's father opened the trunk of the car to see if the police had taken two tires out. Two tires and mag wheels were in the trunk. These were similar to the tires and mag wheels stolen from Frohn's van.

Thereafter Miss Gardner gave statements to the police. Shortly after these statements were given defendant was released from jail and confronted Miss Gardner at the home of Miss Gardner's mother. Defendant asked Miss Gardner if she had turned him in to the police, indicating he understood she was going to testify against him at his trial. Defendant then slapped Miss Gardner and stated if he had to do it again he would leave a mark and she would end up in the hospital. On a second occasion defendant told Miss Gardner he did not like her turning him in or testifying against him and hit her with his fist. Miss Gardner suffered a black eye from this blow.

At trial Miss Gardner testified, over defendant's objection, of the threats and assaults against her.

I. Defendant's first assignment of error asserts the trial court should have sustained his motion for new trial because, it is claimed, (1) the trial court erred in its accomplice instruction and (2) there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of Miss Gardner. The assignment is clouded by an indication of the trial court, out of the presence of the jury, that it would find as a matter of law that Miss Gardner was an accomplice.

In its instruction to the jury the trial court did not indicate any finding Miss Gardner was an accomplice as a matter of law. The trial court defined the term "accomplice" and instructed the jury on the necessity of corroborating the testimony of an accomplice under § 782.5, The Code. This instruction adopted instruction # 501.8 of the uniform instructions of the Iowa state bar association. We expressly approved that instruction in State v. Gray, 199 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1972).

We believe there was no prejudicial error in the ruling of the trial court. It seems obvious that Miss Gardner was not an accomplice as a matter of law. We have said:

"A witness is an accomplice if he could be indicted and convicted of the same crime. The question of who are accomplices is one of law for the court when the facts as to the witness's culpability are neither disputed nor susceptible of different inferences; when these facts are disputed or susceptible of different inferences, the question is one of fact for the jury. (Authority)." State v. Sallis, 238 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Iowa 1976).

Here the evidence is clearly susceptible of different interpretations and the trial court was wrong in first indicating it would find Miss Gardner to be an accomplice as a matter of law. But the trial court was not in error in the instruction as submitted because the question was properly one for the jury. The defendant...