State v. Sturgill
| Decision Date | 01 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16CA21,16CA21 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Nathaniel D. STURGILL, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Nathaniel D. Sturgill, Lancaster, Ohio, Pro Se Appellant.
Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Merry M. Saunders, Athens County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} Nathaniel D. Sturgill appeals the "Entry Overruling Jurisdictional Motion," dated September 21, 2016, in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. In 2009, Sturgill was indicted on six counts which included rape and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. In 2010, he pleaded to two counts of rape, R.C. 2907. 02(A)(2), felonies of the first degree, and was sentenced to a five-year mandatory prison term. He served his term and was released in 2014. On appeal, Sturgill asserts because he has served his prison sentence and has been released from custody, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hold a sex offender reclassification hearing, pursuant to the dictates of Megan's Law. However, we find no merit to Sturgill's sole assignment of error. Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant was indicted by the Athens County Grand Jury in Case Number 09CR0296, as follows: two counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and felonies of the first degree; three counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), and felonies of the first degree; and one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), and a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶ 3} On March 30, 2010 Appellant pleaded to two counts of rape, R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).1 In exchange for his guilty plea, the State of Ohio dismissed the remaining counts and there was a joint recommendation that Appellant be sentenced to a mandatory term of five (5) years in prison; that Appellant be ordered to register as a Tier III sexual predator with community notifications; and that Appellant have no direct or indirect contact with the victims or victims' family.2 Appellant served his five-year prison sentence and was released from the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections on September 4, 2014.
{¶ 4} On September 25, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Remove Void Sex Offender Classification. Within the motion, Appellant argued that his sex offender classification as a Tier III sexual predator with community notification is void because his offenses occurred prior to the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act (S.B. 10).3 He further argued that once an offender has been released from prison, he cannot be subjected to another sentencing to correct a trial court's flawed imposition of the sex offender classification.
{¶ 5} On October 25, 2015, the State filed its response. The State conceded that Appellant was incorrectly classified under the Adam Walsh Act, but argued that the trial court did have jurisdiction to vacate his Tier III prior classification and advise him that he was now classified under Megan's Law.4 On February 2, 2016, Appellant filed an objection to jurisdiction. The State filed a response and the trial court ultimately denied Appellant's objection.
{¶ 6} On September 20, 2016, Appellant appeared for a sex offender classification hearing. The trial court proceeded to inform Appellant of his requirements to register, pursuant to Megan's Law, as a habitual sex offender subject to community notification. On September 21, 2016, the court journalized its entry overruling Sturgill's jurisdictional motion. This timely appeal followed.
{¶ 7} Ohio's current sex offender registration requirements are codified in R.C. Chapter 2950. State v. Straley , 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA30, 2014-Ohio-5110, 2014 WL 6453961, ¶ 16. In 1996, the General Assembly enacted Megan's Law, which revised R.C. Chapter 2950 and established a comprehensive system of classifying sex offenders into three categories: sexually oriented offenders, habitual sex offenders, and sexual predators. Former R.C. 2950.09, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2618; In re Von, 146 Ohio St.3d 448, 2016-Ohio-3020, 57 N.E.3d 1158, ¶ 14.
{¶ 8} Then, in 2007, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 10, also known as the "Adam Walsh Act," which repealed Megan's Law, effective January 1, 2008, and replaced it with new standards for sex-offender classification and registration pursuant to the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code. In re Von, supra , at ¶ 15, quoting Bundy v. State , 143 Ohio St.3d 237, 2015-Ohio-2138, 36 N.E.3d 158, ¶ 5. This scheme, which the General Assembly codified in R.C. Chapter 2950, divides sex offenders into Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III sex or child-victim offenders. R.C. 2950.01(E) through (G). State v. Stidam , 2016-Ohio-7906, 74 N.E.3d 787, ¶ 12.
{¶ 9} Then, in State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether the Adam Walsh Act could constitutionally be retroactively applied to an offender who committed a sex offense prior to its enactment. Id. at ¶16. The High Court concluded that the Adam Walsh Act, part of which was expressly made retroactive, is punitive, and "as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws." Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, at ¶ 16 and at the syllabus. The Court subsequently clarified that only persons who commit their underlying offense on or after the effective date of the Adam Walsh Act can be constitutionally subjected to its requirements. Williams , at ¶ 17 ; In re Bruce S. , 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 2012-Ohio-5696, 983 N.E.2d 350. State v. Straley , at ¶ 16.
{¶ 10} In the sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold the sex offender classification hearing due to the fact he has served his sentence and his been released from incarceration for approximately two years. In particular, Appellant argues that the trial court must have classified him as a sex offender "before or at the time of sentencing." Former R.C. 2905.09(B)(1) directed a court to hold a sex offender classification hearing prior to or at the time of sentencing.
{¶ 11} The jurisdictional question was raised in State v. Miller , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100768, 2014-Ohio-4568, 2014 WL 5306772. There, Miller was convicted in May 2009 of five counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of kidnapping with a sexual motivation. The convictions stemmed from multiple incidents occurring in August, 2007. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences and was classified as a Tier II sex offender under the Adam Walsh Act. Miller completed his sentences and was released from custody in 2011.
{¶ 12} In 2012, Miller filed motions to correct and amend the registration requirements. He argued that the trial court's classification of him as a Tier II Sex Offender was void because his crimes were committed prior to the effective date of the Adam Walsh Act. Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, supra , the Miller court ordered that a sex-offender reclassification hearing be conducted.
{¶ 13} During his hearing Miller objected to reclassification as a sex offender because he had completed his prison sentence for the underlying offenses. As such, he argued the court was without jurisdiction to conduct a reclassification hearing. The State, however, argued that Miller's status as a sexually oriented offender under Megan's Law attached by operation of law and therefore the court had the authority to notify him of this status. The trial court agreed and advised he would be classified as a sexually oriented offender by operation of law under the version of Megan's law that was in effect at the time of the offense. The court proceeded to provide the pertinent notification and registration requirements.
{¶ 14} On appeal, Miller again made the jurisdictional argument. The appellate court observed at ¶ 8 :
{¶ 15} Citing State v. Hayden , 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 18, the Miller court went on to find that Miller's classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan's Law retroactively attached to his conviction in 2009 by operation of law.5 The Miller court found no merit to his argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose his classification.
{¶ 16} In the case sub judice, the State has also directed us to a recent decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, State v. Bell , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-10-077, 2016-Ohio-7363, 2016 WL 6069066. Bell, a foster parent convicted of sexual battery and imposition of two teenage boys committed to his care, was sentenced to a five-year prison term in April 2008. He was also designated a Tier III sexual offender pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act. Given the sentencing date, the trial court followed the sexual classification requirements set forth in S.B. 10 rather...
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