State v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 26 April 1879
• Parties: STATE v. SULLIVAN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

51 Iowa 142

50 N.W. 572

STATE

v.SULLIVAN.¹

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 26, 1879.

Appeal from district court, Webster county.

The defendant, upon an indictment for the murder of Philip McGuire, was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for eight years. He brings the case on appeal to this court.J. A. O. Yeoman, for appellant.

J. F. McJunkin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BECK, C. J.

1. The homicide in this case, like a very large proportion of crimes of the same character which are before the court, may be very clearly traced to the intoxicated condition of one or both of the parties. The deceased, according to the testimony, at the time he received the wound from the hand of the defendant, and for some time before, during which there had been quarrels between the parties, was unquestionably drunk. Defendant was also under the influence of intoxicating liquors, but not to such an extent that his condition would be so readily remarked. The parties had met a short time before the homicide, in a saloon, when a quarrel arose, growing out of old difficulties, and the deceased endeavored to press defendant into a conflict, and, indeed, laid hands upon him. They were separated, and afterwards met at another saloon, when the quarrel was renewed, and deceased again laid hands on defendant. They were again separated, and the deceased was, by persons present, put out of the front door. The defendant remained in the saloon until deceased returned. Thereupon defendant went immediately into the back room adjoining the saloon, followed by the deceased, who returned almost instantly with a fatal wound in his bowels. No one witnessed the stabbing. The evidence shows that the parties were neighbors, and had, before this, frequent quarrels and affrays, and we infer that deceased was usually the aggressor. Certain it is that in the quarrels and affrays immediately preceding the stabbing the deceased was the aggressor, and defendant showed a disposition to avoid a conflict. The parties were not armed, and the fatal stab was inflicted with a common pocket–knife. The evidence shows that the deceased possessed superior strength, which was well known to defendant.

2. The defendant, in justification of the homicide, insisted, upon the trial in the court below, that he acted in defense of his own person against the assault of deceased. The law upon the subject of self–defense was laid down in the instructions given to the jury with correctness and reasonable clearness. We will notice the objections made by counsel to the instructions with the particularity they merit.

3. The tenth instruction announces the familiar rule that a man is presumed to intend the necessary consequences of his own act, and then proceeds in the following language: “And when a man assaults another with, or uses upon another, a deadly weapon, in such a manner that the natural, ordinary, and probable result of the use of such deadly weapon in such manner would be to take life, the law presumes that such person so assaulting intended to take life.” Counsel thinks the instruction is not applicable to the case, for the reason that defendant used the deadly weapon. This is the very reason the instruction is applicable. It was importantfor the jury to determine the intent with which defendant used the weapon to aid them in this inquiry. The instruction was properly given. The facts are unlike those in State v. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, (163,) cited by counsel.

4. The eleventh instruction is as follows: “(11) Where one person assaults another, such person so assaulted has a lawful right to use a sufficient amount of force to resist such assault, and compel the person so assaulting to desist therefrom. But where one person is assaulted by another it is not lawful for the person so assaulted to use a deadly weapon in his defense, unless such an assault was made with such a weapon, or in such a manner, as would cause a person of ordinary courage and prudence to believe that he was in imminent peril of losing his life, or of receiving enormous bodily injury.” It is insisted that this instruction should have been so modified that the jury would have been required to consider the circumstances surrounding defendant, and his situation, as well as his knowledge of previous occurrences and the ill will of defendant, to determine whether, in the exercise of ordinary courage or prudence, he was authorized to believe he was in imminent peril of life or great bodily injury. It is very plain that ordinary prudence cannot be exercised without regarding the condition and surrounding circumstances of the party called upon to act. These things must be considered from very necessity, and the jury could not understand the instruction differently. But ill will of deceased, and former quarrels and affrays, could have nothing whatever to do with defendant's peril. However hostile deceased may have been, and however many quarrels and affrays the parties may have had, if deceased, by his acts and arms, did not threaten peril to defendant, he would not be authorized by the law to infer peril on account of ill will or prior contests. These remarks are applicable to like objections made to the fourteenth instruction.

5. In the twelfth instruction the court announced the rule that if defendant was so assaulted as to be in imminent peril of life or great bodily injury, as it would appear to a person of ordinary courage and prudence, and had no means of escape, he was justified in taking the life of his assailant. Counsel insist that the instruction is erroneous, in that it fails to present this thought: If means of escape existed, and yet “could not reasonably have been known,”––that it would not have been known under the circumstances to a man of ordinary reason and...