State v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 03 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-2099.,99-2099.
• Citation: 90 Ohio St.3d 502,739 NE 2d 788
• Parties: THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SULLIVAN, APPELLEE.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

90 Ohio St.3d 502

739 NE 2d 788

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SULLIVAN, APPELLEE.

No. 99-2099.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted September 26, 2000.

Decided January 3, 2001.

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Cheryl A. Ross, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Anthony Comunale, for appellee.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Sharon A. Jennings and Darrell M. Pierre, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio.

DOUGLAS, J.

On May 13, 1997, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted defendant-appellee, Roger H. Sullivan, on one count of forcible rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and two counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). Each of these alleged crimes involved a child under the age of thirteen.

On June 5, 1997, appellee entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. On that same day, appellee's court-appointed counsel moved the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County for an order to have appellee evaluated by a medical professional to determine whether appellee was competent to stand trial.

On June 11, 1997, the trial court ordered, in accordance with R.C. 2945.371, that appellee undergo a mental examination at the Forensic Psychiatry Center for Western Ohio. Dr. Kim Stookey, a licensed clinical psychologist, performed the examination. Upon appellee's motion, the trial court, on October 21, 1997, ordered a second evaluation of appellee's mental condition. The second examination was performed by Dr. D. Susan Perry Dyer, also a licensed clinical psychologist.¹

After performing the examinations, both Dr. Stookey and Dr. Dyer testified at a June 19, 1998 hearing as to their conclusions regarding appellee's mental state. Both psychologists testified that appellee was mildly mentally retarded, that he was not competent to stand trial, and that no form of treatment would be effective in restoring appellee's competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future. Recent amendments to R.C. 2945.38 require that all defendants found incompetent to stand trial be ordered to undergo treatment for a set amount of time to attempt to restore their competency. In a motion to dismiss the indictment against him, appellee urged the court to find that this statute was an unconstitutional violation of a defendant's right to due process of law² because it required that incompetent defendants be ordered to undergo treatment for a mandatory period of time without considering whether they could actually be restored to competency. In support of his motion, appellee relied primarily on Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, which held that an incompetent defendant may not be held for more than a reasonable amount of time to determine if competency can be restored.

The trial court found that the mandatory treatment period required by R.C. 2945.38 was reasonable "in length and purpose, to determine the possibility of [appellee] attaining the competency to stand trial within the foreseeable future, as prescribed by the Supreme Court [in Jackson]." For that reason, the trial court held that R.C. 2945.38 did not violate appellee's constitutional right to due process and denied appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court found appellee incompetent to stand trial and ordered appellee committed to Twin Valley Psychiatric Hospital.

Upon appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that committing appellee for a mandatory period, as required by R.C. 2945.38, "despite uncontroverted evidence that there was no probability he would be restored to competency in the foreseeable future," constituted a violation of appellee's due process rights.

This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

We are asked to review, in this case, the court of appeals' ruling that R.C. 2945.38, as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 285 ("S.B. 285"), violates an incompetent defendant's right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

R.C. 2945.38 prior to S.B. 285

Prior to July 1, 1997, the effective date of S.B. 285, R.C. 2945.38(B) provided that if a court determined that a defendant was incompetent to stand trial, the court was required to make an additional finding as to whether there was a substantial probability that, with treatment, the defendant would become competent to stand trial within one year. If the court found that there was not a substantial probability that the defendant would become competent to stand trial within one year, the court could not impose treatment on the defendant. Rather, the court was required to dismiss the indictment against such a defendant, but, at its discretion, could cause an affidavit to be filed in the probate court alleging that the defendant was a mentally ill or mentally retarded person subject to institutionalization by court order. Former R.C. 2945.38(C) and (G), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10976-10979. Subsequent commitment proceedings in the probate court would be civil in nature and governed by R.C. Chapter 5122 or 5123. Former R.C. 2945.38(C), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10976-10977.

If, on the other hand, the court determined that there was a substantial probability that, with treatment, the incompetent defendant would become competent to stand trial within one year, the court was required to order the defendant to undergo treatment. Former R.C. 2945.38(D), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10977. If during the defendant's treatment the person supervising the treatment came to the conclusion that there was not a substantial probability that the defendant would become competent to stand trial, that person was required to file a written report with the court advising of this conclusion. Former R.C. 2945.38(E)(3), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10978. Within ten days of receiving such a report, the court was required to hold a hearing on the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial. Former R.C. 2945.38(F), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10978. If at that hearing the court determined that there was not a substantial probability that the defendant would become competent to stand trial within the time prescribed for treatment, the court was required to dismiss the indictment against the defendant. Former R.C. 2945.38(F) and (G), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10978-10979. Again, the court, at its discretion, could cause an affidavit to be filed in the probate court to commence civil commitment proceedings against the individual. Former R.C. 2945.38(F), id.

Effects of S.B. 285 on R.C. 2945.38

In 1996, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 285, which contained amendments to R.C. 2945.38. 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 11192-11199. These amendments were effective July 1, 1997. See Section 4 of S.B. 285, id. at 11259. The S.B. 285 amendments to R.C. 2945.38 removed the requirement that a court, before ordering treatment, find that there was a substantial probability that the incompetent defendant could attain competency within one year. In addition, S.B. 285 removed the requirement that the person supervising an incompetent defendant's treatment advise the court if he or she determined that there was not a substantial probability that the defendant would attain competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future. The result of these changes is that R.C. 2945.38, as amended by S.B. 285, requires that all defendants found incompetent to stand trial undergo treatment for a mandatory period of time. The length of the mandatory treatment period is determined by the crime with which the defendant is charged, with the most serious crimes requiring one year of treatment. R.C. 2945.38(C), id. at 11193-11194. The treatment can be interrupted only if, during treatment, the trial court determines that the defendant has become competent to stand trial. R.C. 2945.38(H)(1), id. at 11196-11197.

Constitutionality of R.C. 2945.38, as Amended by S.B. 285

The court of appeals held that R.C. 2945.38, as amended by S.B. 285, violates an incompetent defendant's due process rights and is, therefore, unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we agree.

In Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, the United States Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional an Indiana statute that permitted the indefinite commitment of defendants found incompetent to stand trial. In that case, the court stated:

"At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.

"We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future." Id. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858, 32 L.Ed.2d at 451.

This court applied the Jackson holding in Burton v. Reshetylo (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 35, 67 O.O.2d 53, 309 N.E.2d 907. In that case, we stated:

"Due process requires that the duration of [commitment due to incompetence to stand trial] must bear a reasonable relation to the purpose behind it. It is clear that the state's interest is in aiding petitioner through care and treatment to attain competency. When it is determined that there is little likelihood that he will ever attain that goal the state must either institute other proceedings or release him." Id. at 43, 67 O.O.2d at 57, 309 N.E.2d at 912.

Appellant, the state of Ohio, argues that R.C....