State v. Superior Court In and For Spokane County

• Decision Date: 18 April 1913
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LANGLEY et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR SPOKANE COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

131 P. 482

73 Wash. 110

STATE ex rel. LANGLEY et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR SPOKANE COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 18, 1913

Original application for writ of review by the State, on the relation of W. L. Langley and another, against the Superior Court in and for the County of Spokane and William A. Huneke, Judge. Writ denied.

Post Avery & Higgins, of Spokane, for respondents.

FULLERTON J.

This is an original application for a writ of review. In January 1912, the applicants for the writ as plaintiffs began an action in the superior court of Spokane county against one A J. Devlin and one Alfred Page as defendants to recover certain shares of corporate stock of the Corbin Coal & Coke Company, which they alleged they had been wrongfully deprived of by the fraudulent acts of the defendants. Issue was taken upon the allegations of the complaint, and a trial had before the court sitting without a jury.

The evidence taken at the trial developed the fact that certain persons other than the parties to the action had, or apparently had, interests in the shares of stock in question adverse to both the plaintiffs and the defendants, and the court, after taking the case under advisement, filed an opinion in which he directed findings to be made for the plaintiffs, but for the shares of stock only which the evidence developed the third persons named had no interest.

The defendants thereupon filed a motion for a new trial, and later on filed another motion, supported by affidavits, asking the court to reopen the cause for the introduction of further testimony. These motions were duly brought on for hearing, after which the court by an opinion in writing modified its first opinion to the effect that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment, and directed that the persons having interests in the shares of stock adverse to the plaintiffs be brought into the action by the plaintiffs that their interests might be adjudicated and the rights of all persons interested be finally and conclusively determined. Before the formal order was entered, the plaintiffs filed in the proceedings written disclaimers of interest in the subject-matter of the action, executed by certain of the persons whom the court thought to be necessary parties, and sought to show that certain of the others were estopped by their acts from making claim to the stock, and that only one, a certain Galbraith, who had brought an independent action against the defendants for a share of the stock, was the only necessary additional party, and asked that the court enter an order directing a consolidation of his action with the action in suit. The court, however, adhered to its original opinion, and entered a formal order directing that the plaintiff make parties to the action all persons having or who appeared to have an interest in the shares of stock, notwithstanding their disclaimers, or the facts thought to work an estoppel against them. A further attempt was made to have this order modified, but the court declined to accede to the request further than to allow the same to show more fully the exceptions taken by the plaintiffs to the order; the order finally entered being in the following words: 'The above matter coming on to be heard before me this 4th day of December, 1912, upon motion of the plaintiffs herein that this court amend and change its order entered in the above-entitled action on the 13th day of November, 1912, directing that certain additional parties be brought in, and that the action of R. L. T. Galbraith, against the defendants above named, be consolidated with this action, and now, after hearing arguments upon the motion, it is hereby ordered that the same be denied, except that plaintiffs herein are given an exception to said order wherein A. W. Vowell, Anna L. Gordon, and George N. Judd are required to be brought into this case as additional parties, and an exception to the said order wherein said R. L. T. Galbraith is directed to be brought in as an additional party, and an exception to the said order wherein L. W. Patmore and W. R. Hibbard are required to be brought in, either as plaintiffs or defendants, as additional parties, and an exception to said order wherein it is directed that upon failure of said plaintiffs to comply therewith within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, unless the time therefor is extended by order of court, and judgment shall be entered dismissing this action, and an exception also to said order wherein it is directed that the case entitled R. L. T. Galbraith, Plaintiff, v. A. J. Devlin and Alfred Page, Defendants, be consolidated with this action. Plaintiffs are given thirty (30) days additional time to bring in said additional parties, or to take such other action as they may be advised--that is, they are given one hundred and twenty (120) days, instead of ninety (90) days from the said 13th day of November, 1912--and plaintiffs are further allowed an exception to each and every part of this order.'

This writ is sought to review these several orders. The applicants for the writ contend that they are erroneous and deprive them of substantial rights which cannot be reviewed by an appeal from the final judgment in the cause, and consequently they are entitled to review the same in advance of such final judgment. But we cannot accept this view of the case. The orders differ in no respect from interlocutory orders generally; they are merely orders made during the progress of the cause deemed necessary by the court to a proper determination of the case. As such they are not reviewable in this court in advance of the final judgment entered in the cause, but must be reviewed here, if reviewed at all, on an appeal or writ of review taken from the final judgment. This we have held in a long line of cases: State ex rel. Coplen v. Superior Court, 66 Wash. 225, 119 P. 383; State ex rel. Seattle, etc., C. Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Wash. 649, 106 P. 150, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 516; Jones v. Paul, 56 Wash. 355, 105 P. 625; State ex rel. Mohr v. Superior Court, 54 Wash. 225, 103 P. 17; State ex rel. Wilkeson Coal, etc., Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Wash. 203, 94 P. 920; State ex rel. Korsstrom v. Superior Court, 48 Wash. 671, 94 P. 472; State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 47 Wash. 508, 92 P. 349; State ex rel. Young v. Denney, 34 Wash. 56, 74 P. 1021; State ex rel. Harris v. Superior Court, 34 Wash. 248, 75 P. 809; State ex rel. Nelson v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 33, 71 P. 601; State ex rel. Carrau v. Superior Court, 30 Wash. 700, 71 P. 648; State ex rel. Oudin v. Superior Court, 28 Wash. 584, 68 P. 1052.

The application for the writ is denied.

CROW, C.J., and MORRIS, MAIN, ELLIS, PARKER, and MOUNT, JJ., concur.

CHADWICK J. (dissenting).

It was the boast of the common law that it gave a remedy for every wrong. So thoroughly was this principle impressed upon the English people that, where the remedy offered by the common law was inadequate, they found a way to grant full and adequate relief through courts of equity. That the relators have been grossly wronged is, I believe, admitted by most every member of this court. They have earned a judgment after a fair and full trial. The court announced a decision in their behalf, yet for no reason apparent in the record, and for no reason made to appear sufficient on the oral argument, it has upon the demand of the defendants ordered new parties to be brought in. The parties ordered in were all before the court, or their interests determined as between the parties. Three of the parties were the grantors of the defendants who claim through them their title to the property involved. The defendants assert absolute ownership; therefore they cannot set up a title in the new parties without defeating their own. Defendants do not contend that these three have any interest; and, furthermore, they were witnesses upon the trial, and have filed a complete disclaimer of any interest whatsoever in the subject-matter of this controversy.

As to the remaining parties, their interest, if any, is against the plaintiffs and the defendants can have no interest therein and, as in the case of the other new parties, these were witnesses at the trial, and if they had or claimed any interest they might have intervened, or defendants might have then asked that they be made parties. The so-called new parties, having been before the court and with full knowledge of the subject-matter of the controversy, would be estopped to maintain an independent action, and therefore could not set up a right in this proceeding. Murne v. Schwabacher Bros. & Co., 2 Wash....