State v. Superior Court for Thurston County
Decision Date | 09 August 1917 |
Docket Number | 14300. |
Citation | 97 Wash. 569,166 P. 1126 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. HOWELL, Secretary of State, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THURSTON COUNTY et al. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Writ of review by the State of Washington, on the relation of I. M Howell, Secretary of State, against the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Thurston County and Hon. D. F Wright, Judge of the court, to reverse a judgment awarding a writ of mandate requiring relator to file referendum petitions and canvass the names signed thereto. Judgment affirmed.
W. V Tanner, Atty. Gen., and Lindsay L. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.
Frank C. Owings, of Olympia, for respondents.
The relator, I. M. Howell, as secretary of state, has caused to be brought to this court by writ of review, and seeks reversal of, a judgment of the superior court for Thurston county, awarding a writ of mandate requiring him to file referendum petitions and canvass the names signed thereto. The facts are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows: During the session of the Legislature of 1917 there was passed, and thereafter on February 19th approved by the Governor, an act restricting importation, sale, use, and possession of intoxicating liquors, amending initiative measure No. 3, enacted by the people of the state in the year 1914. Laws 1917, p. 46. On February 20th one E. M. Williams filed in the office of the secretary of state papers in due form evidencing his demand and proposal to have ordered by petition the referring of the above-mentioned act of February 19th to the people. On March 1st the Attorney General formulated a ballot title for the act as a referendum measure. Upon the ballot title being so formulated, the proponent Williams caused to be printed in due form blank petition for circulation among the voters of the state. These petitions were signed by a large number of persons claiming to be legal voters. On June 4th the proponent Williams submitted to the secretary of state for filing a large number of these signed petitions attached as one petition. The secretary received and filed these petitions, and commenced his canvass looking to the final determination of the number of properly authenticated signatures of legal voters signed thereto. On June 6th the proponent Williams submitted to the secretary for filing several additional petitions, exactly like those submitted on June 4th, except as to the signatures. There were on these additional petitions 390 signatures, purporting to be those of legal voters. When the additional petitions were submitted to the secretary, he had not completed the canvass of the names signed to the previously submitted petitions, and the number of signatures of legal voters attached to the previously submitted petitions had not then been ascertained. Respondent Williams alleges that, if it should appear that there are not a sufficient number of signatures of legal voters attached to the petitions submitted on June 4th to call for the referring to the people of the act of February 19th, there will be more than a sufficient number of signatures for that purpose, counting the signatures of legal voters upon the petitions submitted on June 4th with those upon the petitions submitted on June 6th. The secretary refused to receive and file these additional petitions and canvass the signatures thereon in connection with the signatures upon the petitions submitted on June 4th.
Thereupon respondent Williams sought in the superior court of Thurston county a writ of mandate, requiring the secretary to receive and file these additional petitions and canvass the signatures thereon, together with the signatures upon the petitions submitted on June 4th. Trial in the superior court resulted in judgment awarding a writ of mandate as prayed for. It is the reversal of this judgment which is here sought. Our problem is this: When the proponent of a referendum measure has filed with the secretary a petition, consisting of a number of sheets or petitions, such as the law prescribes, does such filing constitute the final submission of such petition, in the sense that no additional petitions relating to the same referendum can be filed in behalf of the original proponent or of the signers of such filed petition within the 90 days prescribed by our Constitution for the filing of referendum petitions, and the original proponent or the signers of the filed petition have the right to have signatures upon such additional petitions canvassed in connection with the signatures upon the filed petitions; or, stated conversely, have the signers of such additional petitions the right to have the signatures upon such previously filed petitions canvassed in connection with the signatures upon the additional petitions?
Section 1, art. 2, of our Constitution, as amended (see Laws 1911, p. 136), providing for the initiative and referendum, reads in part as follows:
While this section of the Constitution provides generally for the initiative and referendum, and purports to be self-executing, it would seem somewhat difficult to render it effective without legislation. So, in compliance therewith, the Legislature of 1913 passed an act facilitating the operation of the initiative and referendum. Laws 1913, p. 418. That act, after providing for the filing with the secretary of state, by a legal voter or committee or organization of voters, of a demand or proposal for the referring to the people of an act passed by the Legislature, the formulating by the Attorney General of a ballot title for such referendum measure, and the form of petitions to be circulated, provides in part as follows:
Sections 15, 16, and 17 provide for the canvassing by the secretary of the signatures upon the filed petitions, with a view of finally determining the sufficiency of the number of legal voters signing the same to call for the referendum of the act in question,...
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