State v. Superior Court of King County

• Decision Date: 25 November 1914
• Docket Number: 12463.
• Citation: 144 P. 291,82 Wash. 356
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HOWELL et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY et al.

144 P. 291

82 Wash. 356

STATE ex rel. HOWELL et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY et al.

No. 12463.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 25, 1914

Department 2. Original application by the State, on the relation of Nancy C. Howell and another, for a writ of mandamus against the Superior Court of the County of King and Hon. King Dykeman, one of the judges thereof. Writ denied.

Will H Fouts, of Dayton, and Reeves, Crollard & Reeves, of Wenatchee, for respondent.

MOUNT J.

This is an application for a writ of mandamus to require the respondent, judge of the superior court for King county, to proceed to make up the issues and try the case of Howell et al. v. Blewett Mine Leasing Co. It appears from the application that in October, 1912, the relators began an action in the superior court for King county against the Blewett Mine Leasing Company, alleging that the plaintiffs had been defrauded in the purchase of certain stock of that company. On the filing of the complaint in that case a temporary receiver was appointed. Thereafter, in November 1912, the defendant made a general appearance by serving and filing a demurrer to the complaint. Nothing was done in the case thereafter until the 7th day of October, 1914, when the defendant filed a motion for a change of venue and to discharge the receiver. This motion for change of venue was based upon four grounds, stated as follows:

'(1) For the reason that the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county; (2) for the reason that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be forwarded by the change; (3) for the reason that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action and (4) for the reason that this court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.'

Affidavits in support of the motion were served and filed. Counter affidavits were also filed. Upon the hearing the trial court sustained the motion, and made an order changing the venue to Chelan county, in this state, but denied the motion to discharge the receiver. The relators thereupon applied for this writ.

It is frankly conceded by counsel for the relators that, if the superior court of Chelan county has jurisdiction of the case then the writ should be denied. We are satisfied that the superior court of Chelan county has jurisdiction of the case. We may concede for the purposes of this case that the action brought by the relators in the superior court for King county in 1912 was a local action, as distinguished from a transitory one, and we may concede that the action could not have been originally brought in Chelan county. We may also concede that the superior court for King county was the proper county in which the action should have been brought under the statute, though these two last-named questions are disputed by the respondents. The motion for change of venue interposed by the defendant in that case was based, as we have already seen, upon the ground, among others, that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice demanded a change of venue.

The statute, at section 209 of Rem. & Bal. Code, provides:

'The court may, on motion, in the following cases, change the place of trial, when it appears by affidavit or other satisfactory proof,

'1. That the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county; or

'2. That there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had therein; or

'3. That the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice would be forwarded by the change; or

'4. That from any cause the judge is disqualified. * * *'

It is apparent that this statute applies both to local actions and to transitory actions, for in the next section it is provided that, if the action is one where the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county, the change shall be made to the county where the action ought to have been commenced. And in other cases named in section 209 the cause must be transferred to the most convenient county where the causes alleged in the affidavit or motion do not exist.

And section 215, Rem. & Bal. Code, provides that:

'The court to which an action or proceeding is transferred has and exercises over the same the like jurisdiction as if it had been originally commenced therein.'

It is plain, from these provisions of the statute, that where these causes exist in either a local or transitory action the change may be made; and the statute expressly provides that the cause shall be tried in the county to which the change is made. That court necessarily must have jurisdiction of the case.

Upon the oral...