State v. Superior Court of Chehalis County

• Decision Date: 24 July 1906
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BURROWS et ux. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CHEHALIS COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

86 P. 632

43 Wash. 225

STATE ex rel. BURROWS et ux. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CHEHALIS COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 24, 1906

Application by the state, on the relation of O. P. Burrows and wife, for prohibition to the superior court of Chehalis county, and W O. Chapman, as judge thereof, to prevent the suspension of a prohibitory injunction pending an appeal by defendant, in a suit by relators against the Grays Harbor Boom Company and another. Writ denied.

J. B Bridges, for respondent.

MOUNT, C.J.

Application for a writ of prohibition to prevent the suspension of a prohibitory injunction pending an appeal to this court. In December, 1905, the relators brought an action in the superior court of Chehalis county to restrain the Grays Harbor Boom Company and the Humptulips Driving Company from injuring the relators' land, across which the Humptulips river flows, and from obstructing said river with logs. The complaint alleged, in substance, that the plaintiffs were the owners of certain lands across which the Humptulips river flows; that such lands were improved and used by plaintiffs as a home and stock farm; that the Humptulips river is a navigable fresh-water stream over which plaintiffs and their children exercise the right of ingress and egress to and from their home; that the defendants maintain a boom at the mouth of said river immediately below the lands of plaintiffs which boom has been used since September, 1905, for catching holding, and sorting sawlogs; that the defendants were engaged in driving sawlogs down the said river by means of splash dams, thereby overflowing said lands; that the defendants fill said river with logs from bank to bank for the greater portion of the year, thereby obstructing plaintiffs' right of ingress and egress by means of the river, and depriving plaintiffs of the use of the river for domestic purposes, and rendering the use of the river by plaintiffs hazardous to life and property. All these allegations were denied by the defendants, excepting that defendants admitted that the Humptulips river was a navigable fresh-water stream, and that they were using the same immediately below and adjacent to plaintiffs' land for the purpose of driving, catching, holding, and sorting logs and that in driving logs they used said river by means of splash dams and freshets. The trial court found all of the issues in favor of plaintiffs, and on the 19th day of May, 1906, entered a judgment perpetually enjoining the defendants from obstructing the said river to navigation, and from storing and rafting logs therein above the line of mean high water, and from so obstructing said river as to cause the same to overflow plaintiffs' land, and from using the banks of plaintiffs' land above the line of mean high tide for one side of the boom, and ordered the defendants to keep an open waterway 50 feet in width along the west bank of plaintiffs' lands. After the trial court had announced his findings and conclusions, but before the same had been reduced to writing, or signed, and before the judgment was entered, the defendants applied to the trial court for a suspension of the judgment pending an appeal to this court. The matter was argued by both parties, and the court then announced that he would make such an order conditioned upon defendants filing a bond in a stated sum to respond in such damages as plaintiffs might sustain pending such appeal, but delayed making the order pending this application for a writ of prohibition. The findings of fact and conclusions and the decree were thereupon signed and entered as above stated.

It is apparently conceded by the counsel for respondent that the trial court cannot be required as a matter of right under the statutes to grant a stay of a prohibitory injunction, and it is also conceded that there is no statute authorizing the trial court to make an order granting a stay of such judgment pending an appeal to this court. But respondent contends that, independent of the statute, the trial court, by virtue of its equity jurisdiction, has inherent power to suspend the operation of the injunction upon such conditions as appear just, pending appeal to this court. The power of the trial court in this respect is the question presented upon this hearing. This court has repeatedly held that the trial court would not be required by mandate to order a stay or fix a bond which should operate to supersede a prohibitory injunction pending appeal, and that a statutory supersedeas could not stay such decree. State ex rel. Gibson v. Superior Court, 39 Wash. 115, 80 P. 1108; State ex rel. Flaherty v. Superior Court, 35 Wash. 200, 77 P. 33; State ex rel. Sprague v. Superior Court, 32 Wash. 693, 73 P. 779; State ex rel. Oudin v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 481, 71 P. 1095, and other cases. The question of the power of the trial court to suspend the operation of an injunction pending appeal has never been directly passed upon by this court so far as we are advised. The question was mooted in State ex rel. Gibson v. Superior Court, supra, where we said: 'It may be that the court itself has inherent power to suspend the effect of a prohibitory injunction, when the purposes of justice require it, pending a decision of the merits on an appeal ( Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 3 S.Ct. 136, 27 L.Ed. 888), but this question we do not decide.' The trial court in this case is a court of general equity jurisdiction. Section 6, art. 4, Const.; section 4663, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. It has all the powers of the English chancery court, and may grant and enforce its decrees in such manner as the justice of the particular case requires. The power of suspending the operation of injunctive decrees has frequently been exercised by courts of general chancery jurisdiction. Genet v. Canal Company, 113 N.Y. 475, 21 N.E. 390; Carson v. Jansen (Neb.) 91 N.W. 398; Tenement House v. Moeschen (Sup.) 85 N.Y.S. 19; Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 3 S.Ct. 136, 27 L.Ed. 888; Nat. Docks Ry. Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 54 N. J. Eq. 10, 33 A. 219, and cases there cited. In Hathaway v. Light & Power Co., 14 Wash. 469, 44 P. 896, 53 Am. St. Rep. 874, the trial court granted a permanent injunction against the maintenance of a ditch across the plaintiff's land, but suspended the injunction for 30 days to allow condemnation by the defendant. On appeal this court affirmed that judgment, thus recognizing the power of the trial court to suspend the injunction. See, also, Rigney v. Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 P. 147, 26 L. R. A. 425; New Whatcom v. Fair-haven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 64 P. 735, 54 L. R. A. 190; Slaght v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 39 Wash. 576, 81 P. 1062. In the case of Genet v. Canal Co., supra, it was said: 'The general practice permits courts to control their judgments in the interest of justice, and unless some statutory rule prescribes the method...