State v. Superior Court for King County

• Decision Date: 19 June 1918
• Docket Number: 14819.
• Citation: 174 P. 473,102 Wash. 600
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LUNDIN, Pros. Atty., v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY et al.

174 P. 473

102 Wash. 600

STATE ex rel. LUNDIN, Pros. Atty., v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY et al.

No. 14819.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 19, 1918

Department 1. Mandamus by the State of Washington, on the relation of Alfred H. Lundin, Prosecuting Attorney of King County against the Superior Court for King County and Hon. John S Jurey, Judge. Writ ordered to issue.

Alfred H. Lundin and Everett C. Ellis, both of Seattle, for plaintiff.

Morris & Shippley, of Seattle, for defendants.

PARKER J.

The relator seeks a writ of mandate from this court commanding the superior court for King county and Hon. John S. Jurey the judge thereof, to cause Fred Percy Rowell to be arrested and brought into that court for sentence upon his plea of guilty to a charge of having committed the crime of bigamy, and commanding the court and the judge thereof to render final judgment and sentence against Rowell upon his plea of guilty.

On January 18, 1918, the prosecuting attorney for King county filed in the superior court for that county an information charging Rowell with the crime of bigamy. On March 12th Rowell, being duly arraigned in that court, Judge Jurey presiding, pleaded guilty to the charge as made in the information. Judge Jurey, having taken under advisement the matter of rendering judgment upon Rowell's plea of guilty, on March 15th entered an order suspending the rendering of judgment and sentence against Rowell indefinitely, and releasing him from custody upon his personal recognizance. This disposition of the case by Judge Jurey was made upon his own motion, and was rested upon the ground that the information did not state facts constituting the crime of bigamy, and also upon the ground that facts stated and conceded to be true by both Rowell and counsel for the state in open court at the time he pleaded guilty showed that he was not guilty of the crime of bigamy within the meaning of the statute defining that crime. We proceed upon the assumption, as counsel for both sides do in their argument, that Rowell was past 21 years of age at the time of committing the acts charged in the information. No motion was made in the superior court in Rowell's behalf for an arrest of judgment, nor has he as yet asked to withdraw his plea of guilty and substitute another plea therefor.

The principal contention here made in relator's behalf is that neither the superior court nor a judge thereof has any authority to suspend judgment and sentence indefinitely upon a verdict or plea of guilty establishing the guilt of an accused in a criminal prosecution, except in cases where the accused is under the age of 21 years. We feel constrained to sustain this contention, though, as we shall presently notice this view of the law will not entitle the relator to relief to the extent prayed for in this proceeding.

We have no statute authorizing the suspension of judgment and sentence after conviction by verdict or a plea of guilty, other than section 2280, Rem. Code, which has reference only to convicted minors. Section 2190, Rem. Code, makes it the mandatory duty of the court to pronounce judgment and sentence in other cases as follows:

'After verdict of guilty or finding of the court against the defendant, if the judgment be not arrested or a new trial granted, the court must pronounce judgment.'

It is true that this section does not in terms refer to a plea of guilty, but it is elementary that a plea of guilty has the same effect in law as a verdict of guilty, except that it may be withdrawn and another plea substituted therefor by leave of the court at any time before the rendering of final judgment and sentence thereon. 12 Cyc. 353; 8 R. C. L. 115. But, aside from these statutory provisions which negative the view that our superior courts have the power to suspend sentence indefinitely after conviction by the verdict of a jury or by a plea of guilty, we think the law is, in the absence of statute, that courts do not have the inherent authority to suspend sentence indefinitely, nor did they ever possess any such power at common law. This subject was learnedly reviewed by Chief Justice White, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129, L. R. A. 1917E, 1178, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355. Answering the contention that the courts possess inherent power to suspend sentence or the execution thereof, the learned Chief Justice said:

'Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.

'The proposition might well be left with the demonstration which results from these considerations, but the disregard of the Constitution which would result from sustaining the proposition is made, if possible, plainer by considering that, if it be the plain legislative command fixing the specific punishment for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial power upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction it would seem necessarily to follow that there could be likewise implied a discretionary authority to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge because of the

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