State v. Sutterfield
| Decision Date | 04 January 1944 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, Respondent, v. G. C. Sutterfield, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Francois County; Hon. Norman D Houser, Judge.
Reversed and defendant discharged.
Wm P. Elmer, J. D. Leffler, C. I. Hoy and Elmer R January for appellant.
(1) Section 4090, R. S. 1939, is leveled at conveyance to defraud prior and subsequent purchaser, and to hinder, delay and defraud creditors and other persons. It contemplates a grantor conveying his own property for a fraudulent purpose of defrauding persons who had some interest in keeping property in grantor's name, and could be defrauded by the conveyance. (2) It is a criminal offense to convey property to defraud creditors. Ex parte Meyers, 18 S.W.2d 560; State ex rel. v. Haid, 30 S.W.2d 466. (3) The section creates two offenses (1) a grantor making a deed to defraud purchaser and creditors; (2) putting the same deed in use as if made in good faith, by a privy, or one having knowledge of its fraudulent character. The deed must create a fraud under the civil law. If it does not prejudice purchaser or creditors, they cannot complain. State v. Bragg, 63 Mo.App. 27. Where second mortgagee knows of first mortgage, he cannot be defrauded. State v. Wilson, 66 Mo.App. 540. (4) The making of a second deed must be with fraudulent intent and is no offense unless such intent exists and the deed has such effect. Where grantee in second deed knew of the first deed, he could not be defrauded. The grantee in first deed could not be defrauded as its deed was on record -- rights fixed -- and grantor had no power to change them. There was nothing illegal in making second deed without reciting existence of first deed if there is no intention to defraud; the deed does not have that effect. Armstrong v. Winfrey, 61 Mo. 354, 358-359; 27 C. J., page 872, sec. 75. The acts of Toppins and defendant were futile to defraud the real owners of the land. (5) Where general words follow special words in a criminal statute, the general words are limited in scope and effect to the special ones preceding. The words "other persons" used in Section 4490, follow the word "creditors." The latter is a special class. That is, people occupying contractual relations with grantor; "other persons" must be those who like creditors could be hindered, delayed and defrauded by the deed, because they have some right in grantor's property. The words "other persons" could not have an unlimited meaning so broad that anyone who imagines himself inconvenienced by the deed, falls within the terms. 19 C. J., page 1255; State v. Wade (Mo. Sup.), 183 S.W. 600; McClaren v. G. S. Robins Co., 162 S.W.2d 856-857. (6) Our statute authorizes the conveyance of a claim to land notwithstanding adverse possession. Sec. 3405, R. S. 1939. (7) The Statute of Limitations had divested all claimants of title and vested the same in R. H. Millman, who had fenced the land in 1939, and had possession and no other person had previously paid any taxes on the land for more than 30 years. Sec. 1008, R. S. Mo. 1939; Schofield v. H. L. & M. Co., 187 S.W. 63; Wilkerson v. Eilers, 114 Mo. 245, 21 S.W. 514; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 33.
W. E. Coffer, Prosecuting Attorney for respondent.
(1) Section 4490, R. S. Mo. 1939 denounces two offenses, one of which is the making of a fraudulent deed, the other is being privy to or knowing of such conveyance and "putting the same to use." State v. Bragg, 63 Mo.App. 22; Mo. R. S. A., Vol. 13, page 744. (2) To say the least, appellant knew the false character of the fraudulent deed, and that is all the statute requires to be shown for him to be convicted, for putting into use as though made in good faith. A charge in the language of the statute is sufficient in charging a statutory offense. Kelly's Cr. Law & Prov. (4 Ed.), sec. 187; State v. Harroun, 199 Mo. 519. (3) The General Assembly meant for the last part of Section 4490, supra, to condemn the foul course of conduct done by the appellant, Sutterfield. Crawford on Construction of Statutes (1940), page 304, sec. 182 and Author, Section 4490, supra. Pleading the acts of Toppins in the making and delivery of the false deed are all matters of inducement and do not vitiate the information. Joyce on Indictments (1908), sec. 272. The allegations of ownership of the land may be inducement or surplusage, as beyond that which is condemned by the last part of Section 4490, supra, and in neither event does it vitiate the information. Joyce on Indictments, secs. 198, 199, 263, 265, 284, 291, 293, 338, 339 and 353. Appellant was not charged with making of the deed, but being privy to making it, and putting it to use; not with stealing land, or timber, therefore, title was not involved and description and ownership were collateral issues, beyond what were condemned by the statute. Sec. 4490, supra; Joyce on Indictments, sec. 358; State v. Riley, 100 Mo. 493; State v. Hudson, 314 Mo. 599; Sec. 3951, Mo. R. S. A. 231. (4) There is no direct attack on the Section 4490, supra, and only a general claim that the information does not state any offense. The evidence amply sustains the verdict. Sec. 4490, R. S. 1939; Kelly's Cr. L. & Prov. (4 Ed.), secs. 242, 243, 244 and 246. (5) Most, if not all, the assignments in the motion for a new trial are so general that they raise no point for review. That is true of the motion to quash the information. State v. Standifer, 316 Mo. 49; Mo. Laws 1925, page 198. (6) The Faulkner heirs asserted a bona-fide claim to this land, as well as the timber thereon. That, together with the other evidence in the record, is sufficient ownership as against appellant. Sec. 179, Kelly's Cr. L. & Prov. (4 Ed.); Also sec. 183. (7) Appellant or his successors have not perfected a title to this land under section 1008, R. S. 1939, by bringing suit as required by said section, and the evidence shows he and his successors alleged possession is not lawful, but fraudulent. Bothrock v. Lumber Co., 80 Mo.App. 510; Haarstick v. Gabriel, 200 Mo. 237; Keaton v. Hamilton, 264 Mo. 564; Weir v. Lumber Co., 186 Mo. 338; Mo. R. S. A., Vol. 4, page 116.
On June 5, 1940, the prosecuting attorney of St. Francois County filed in the circuit court an information charging that the defendant, G. C. Sutterfield, on or about the 18th day of September, 1939, did unlawfully, willfully and knowingly cause to be made and delivered by Charles Toppins, and was privy to said making and delivering, of a known false and fraudulent general warranty deed and conveyance, and put the same to use as having been made in good faith, the said Charles Toppins being the grantor and the said G. C. Sutterfield being the grantee, of certain real estate situate in the County of Ste. Genevieve, to-wit: All of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 37, Range 6, containing 80 acres; which real estate was then and there owned by Nancy Ann Faulkner, Major Thurman, Nase Janis, Virgie Moss, Edna Johnson, Pearl Vineyard, Ann Marshall, Harvey Faulkner, Norville Faulkner and Virginia Zatchritz, who had previously inherited the same and in which the said Charles Toppins had no right, title or interest at the time he delivered, made and executed the said deed to the said G. C. Sutterfield, a fact well known at the time to Charles Toppins and G. C. Sutterfield, and that said deed was made, executed and delivered as aforesaid and received by the said G. C. Sutterfield with intent to deprive Nancy Ann Faulkner (and the other alleged owners named above) of said real estate and of beneficial use thereof.
Defendant's motion to quash the information was overruled.
At the trial, Charles Toppins, called as a witness for the State, said that defendant Sutterfield told him that he knew where he could get some land if he had anyone to sign a "free-action" deed; that nobody owned the land; and asked him if he would sign the deed, that it would help him out; that later defendant took him to Farmington where he signed a deed; that he was given no money for signing the deed; that he did not owe anybody at the time he made the deed and did not make it to keep from paying debts and did not make it to defraud or cheat anyone; that he never owned any land anywhere; that he only signed one deed, and that was in the fall of 1939.
Gertrude Banes, testified that on May 12, 1939, Toppins and Sutterfield came to the office of W. N. Flemming in Farmington, where she worked, and at Sutterfield's direction she prepared a deed from Toppins to Sutterfield to land in Ste. Genevieve county, that Sutterfield gave her the description of the land, and after the deed was prepared Toppins signed and acknowledged it. Later, on September 18, 1939, they both returned, and Sutterfield stated he had found an error in the description of the land, and directed her to prepare a deed of correction, which she did, and this deed was signed and acknowledged by Toppins; that she saw no money passed from Sutterfield to Toppins, but Sutterfield paid for her services.
Leo Karl, who is Circuit Clerk and Recorder of Ste. Genevieve County, identified Exhibit 1, which was later received in evidence, as a certified copy of the deed from Toppins to Sutterfield dated September 18, 1939, and purporting to convey the land described in the information for a consideration of $ 80.
Ray Faulkner testified that sometime in 1940 he left word for Sutterfield to come and see him and he came, ...
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