State v. Sutton

• Decision Date: 11 December 1886
• Citation: 30 N.W. 567,70 Iowa 268
• Parties: STATE v. SUTTON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

70 Iowa 268

30 N.W. 567

STATE

v.SUTTON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 11, 1886.

Appeal from district court, Dallas county.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of larceny, and he appeals.North & Nichols, for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

ROTHROCK, J.

The crime of which the defendant was accused was the larceny of a cow, the property of one Denton. There was no dispute but that the cow was stolen, and that one Reed was a party to the crime. The defendant introduced several witnesses who testified that at the time of the theft he was so far away from where the crime was committed that he could not have been guilty as charged. As opposed to this, there was the testimony of one Johnson, who stated that he saw the defendant leading the cow soon after she was stolen, and there was evidence to the effect that a rope with which the cow was tied when stolen was found in the defendant's barn. There were also admissions of defendant put in evidence, which tended to connect him with the commission of the crime.

It will be seen by the above statement of some of the facts put in evidence that the defendant relied upon the defense called an “ alibi,” and that it was supported by the testimony of several witnesses. The court did not, in its instructions to the jury, call special attention to this feature of the case. There was nothing in the instructions directing the attention of the jury to the claimed alibi, except the general direction that they should consider all the facts in the case in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It is urged that the court should have instructed the jury that, as the defendant relied upon an alibi, he should establish the same by a preponderance of evidence, as held in the case of State v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa, 596, S. C. 11 N. W. Rep. 5, and cases there cited. But we think the omission to so instruct the jury was an omission favorable to the defendant, rather than prejudicial. If, under the instructions as they were given, the jury had a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in a place where he could participate in the crime, it was their duty to acquit, and all that was required was that they should have a reasonable doubt upon that question.

The defense of alibi does not confess the act charged, and seek to excuse it, as in the defense of insanity. In such defense it is necessary that the force and effect of the excusatory evidence should be...