State v. Sweetland

• Decision Date: 15 February 1893
• Parties: STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendant in error, v. L. D. SWEETLAND, Plaintiff in error.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

3 S.D. 503

54 N.W. 415

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendant in error, v. L. D. SWEETLAND,

Plaintiff in error.

South Dakota Supreme Court

Error to County Court, Hand County, SD

Hon. J. A. Hughes, Judge

Reversed

Shunk & Hughes

Attorneys for plaintiff in error.

Robert Dollard, Attorney General

Attorney for defendant in error.

Opinion filed Feb. 15, 1893

CORSON, J.

This was a proceeding for contempt, resulting in the conviction and sentence of the plaintiff in error. The affidavit of J. A. Hughes, as the basis of this action, is as follows:

“(1) That I am the county judge of Hand county, duly elected, qualified, and acting. That on the 14th, 15th, and 16th days of January, 1892, the county court in and for Hand county was in due and lawful session, and a criminal cause was pending in said court, and was on trial before me, entitled, ‘The State of South Dakota vs. D. G. Butts,’ charged with violating the quarantine law. I do further depose and say that at that time the said L. D. Sweetland was the editor and publisher of a newspaper published in the town of Miller, Hand county, South Dakota, and that an issue of said newspaper was published upon Friday, January 15th, 1892, or about that date.

(2) That in said newspaper said L. D. Sweetland, with intent to slander the courts of this county and to bring the same into disrepute, and with intent to disregard the due and legal proceedings in courts of justice in this county and in this county court, and with intent to impair the respect due its authority, did in said newspaper publish the following article:

(3) ‘It was anarchy in the extreme when County Judge Hughes, in almost total disregard to law and all rules of practice, in the Butts Case, made the jurisprudence of the county of Hand look red with shame by his dishonest and fulsome rulings, and it was no less anarchistic that the little big lawyer from Beadle always advised it, and whose every “Simon says thumbs up” by him was announced. One of the crowning acts of tyranny on the part of Judge Hughes was that of fining Counselor Pusey $10 for contempt of court, and shows the desperation to which the combine was driven to protect Lane in his regime of tyranny and outlawry. The Butts quarantine trial came for hearing before the self-declared, but self-demonstrated, unbiased (?) County Judge Hughes on last Tuesday, dragging heavily through three days and a night. It was the most notoriously disgusting farce ever perpetrated in the county.’

(4) And I do further depose and say that the said publication is a false and grossly inaccurate one of the proceedings in said court, and which, on my best information and belief, I do allege that the said report was maliciously made with a view to entirely disrespect the authority of this court and of other courts in this county. This petition is filed as a basis for an order directing the said L. D. Sweetland to appear and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court.

J. A. Hughes.

Sworn to before me this 27th day of January, 1892.

W. H. Smith, Clerk of Co. Court.”

The errors assigned may be condensed and stated as follows: (1) That the said affidavit does not state facts sufficient to constitute a contempt over which said county court had jurisdiction; (2) that it does not appear from the said affidavit that the county court was in session; or the criminal case referred to was pending before the court, at the time of the alleged publication of the article referred to in the affidavit. A preliminary motion was made to dismiss the writ of error upon the ground that a judgment for a contempt cannot be brought to this court for review by such writ. This court has, however, decided in the case of State v. Knight, 413, 44 AmStRep 809 (1893), that a final judgment in proceedings for a criminal contempt may be brought to this court by such writ. Following the decision in that case, the motion to dismiss is denied.

The learned attorney general states the doctrine he contends for in this case as follows: “The publication of an article in a newspaper is a contempt if it reflect upon the conduct of a court in reference to a pending suit, and tends in some measure to influence its decision therein, or to impede, interrupt, or embarrass the proceedings of the court in reference thereto;” and he insists that the affidavit in this case brings the plaintiff in error within the doctrine above stated. The learned counsel for the plaintiff in error do not controvert the doctrine above laid down as to such a publication constituting a contempt when made while a case is pending, but contend that the affidavit does not state facts that bring the plaintiff in error within the rule. The only question presented in this case, therefore, is, does the affidavit state facts sufficient to constitute a contempt over which the county court had jurisdiction? In other words, does it show that the publication complained of was made while the criminal case referred to was pending in court? It will not, therefore, be necessary to discuss the doctrine of contempts generally, as the attorney general has stated the doctrine held by the courts in recent decisions quite fairly, with the limitation upon the power of courts to punish, to publications calculated to intimidate, influence, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the courts in the due administration of justice in matters pending before them. This limitation upon the power of the courts is fully recognized in Myers v. State, (Ohio Sup.) 22 N.E. 43; Cooper v. People, 13 Colo. 337, 22 Pac. 790; Sturoc’s Case, 48 NH 428; Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 50. The affidavit upon which the proceedings for a constructive contempt are based must state facts which, if established, would constitute an offense over which the court has jurisdiction. As was said by the supreme court of California:

“The power of a court to punish for an alleged contempt of its authority, though undoubted, is in its nature arbitrary, and its exercise is not to...