State v. Taber

Decision Date08 July 2020
Docket NumberNo. SD 36076,SD 36076
Parties STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Matthew Curtis TABER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Attorney for Appellant: Christian Lehmberg of Columbia, MO.

Attorneys for Respondent: Eric S. Schmitt, Atty. Gen., and Garrick Aplin, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Jefferson City, MO.

JEFFREY W. BATES, C.J.

Following a jury trial, Matthew Taber (Defendant) was convicted, as a prior offender, of first-degree assault and first-degree trespassing. See § 565.050; § 569.140.1 Before sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion to determine whether Defendant was competent to proceed. At a hearing on the motion, a competency hearing was scheduled for three months later. At the competency hearing, however, the defense expert witness was not available to testify. Defense counsel requested a continuance. The trial court denied the request and, after hearing the evidence presented, decided that Defendant was competent to proceed to sentencing.

Presenting one point on appeal, Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's request for continuance at his post-trial competency hearing. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

"In our review of the facts, we are to view them in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling challenged on appeal, deferring to the trial court's superior opportunity to determine the credibility of witnesses." State v. Williams , 134 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Mo. App. 2004) (citation omitted). The following summary of facts has been prepared in accordance with these principles.

Defendant was originally charged with three counts. Count 1 charged the class A felony of assault in the first degree. It alleged that Defendant "knowingly caused serious physical injury" to Edward Dossett, Jr. (Victim) "by beating him repeatedly with his hands and fists." Count 2 charged the class C felony of burglary in the second degree. It alleged that Defendant "knowingly entered unlawfully into an inhabitable structure" owned by Victim, "for the purpose of committing the crime of stealing therein." Count 3 charged the class A misdemeanor of stealing. It alleged that Defendant "appropriated pizza and beer," which was owned by Victim, without his consent and with the purpose to deprive him thereof. The beating mentioned in Count 1 was alleged to have occurred on or about November 16, 2013. The burglary of Victim's residence and the stealing of his food mentioned in Counts 2 and 3 were alleged to have occurred on November 17, 2013. Defendant was charged as a prior offender. The trial court – assigned in 2014 and continuing throughout the case – found that Defendant was a prior offender before the first of his two trials.

In July 2015, Defendant's first trial resulted in a mistrial before the jury was seated due to Defendant's visible intoxication. The trial court noted that Defendant had "made himself unavailable for trial" when "he got kind of nervous and sat out in his car and probably drank a pint of something[,]" causing himself to become intoxicated. Trial counsel later claimed that Defendant was "self-medicating with alcohol because of ... his delusions[.]"

Thereafter, defense counsel raised concerns about Defendant's competency to proceed to trial. The trial court ordered that Defendant undergo a competency evaluation by the Department of Mental Health (DMH). Dr. Bridget Graham, a DMH forensic examiner, conducted the evaluation. In her opinion, Defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect that rendered him unable to assist his attorney in his own defense. Dr. Graham opined that Defendant: (1) "holds the persecutory delusion that an underground bunker is beneath his RV on his [parents’] farm"; (2) believes "that individuals in his community, including the alleged victim's family, his defense attorney, the prosecutor and judge are all conspiring against him"; and (3) is convinced "that his current charges are the result of this conspiracy[.]" Further, "[w]hen asked how he could be defended against the charges, ... it appears that [Defendant] plans to put forth a defense rooted in delusion." Based on the results of Dr. Graham's evaluation and the parties’ stipulation, the trial court decided in October 2015 that Defendant was incompetent to proceed to trial. He was committed to the custody of DMH.

In May 2016, DMH filed a motion to proceed to trial. The motion stated that, based on the opinion of a DMH examiner, Defendant was no longer incapable of understanding the proceedings against him or assisting in his own defense. According to the DMH examiner: (1) "[a]s compared to [Defendant's] initial competency evaluation, his understanding of the charges against him was realistic and not rooted in delusion"; and (2) Defendant "repeatedly noted that his beliefs related to the supposed group of people living underneath the family farm is not related to his current defense strategy and is irrelevant at this time." Based on DMH's motion and report, the trial court decided that Defendant was competent to proceed to trial and sustained the motion to proceed.

Defendant's second jury trial took place January 9-10, 2017. After the State had rested its case, the trial court discussed Defendant's right to testify. Defense counsel announced that he anticipated Defendant would be testifying. The trial court informed Defendant, among other things, that no one could force Defendant to testify or prevent him from testifying. The court also informed Defendant that, by testifying, he would be subject to cross-examination. Defendant acknowledged his understanding of his right to testify and the potential consequences, and he confirmed that it was his intention to testify. The trial court also noted that Defendant could always change his mind at the last minute and decide that he did not want to testify.

After the first of two defense witnesses testified, defense counsel asked the court for a moment to talk with Defendant about "possible testimony." The court recessed for approximately 20 minutes. Thereafter, the trial court asked if there were "any issues" that they needed to "take up on the record" before the jury was brought in, and defense counsel stated: "No, not from us." Defendant did not testify. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged on Count 1, guilty of the lesser-included offense of first-degree trespassing on Count 2, and not guilty on Count 3. The matter was set for sentencing.

Defendant's motion for a new trial included a claim that he was denied a fair trial because he had lacked the capacity to assist in his own defense and that he was incompetent at the time of trial. The motion alleged that: (1) the defense had prepared for trial with the understanding that Defendant would testify, but he then refused to testify during the trial; (2) post-trial discussions between Defendant and trial counsel caused counsel to believe that "Defendant's diagnosed mental health problems with delusions and paranoia ... had led to Defendant's pullback from testifying at trial"; (3) Defendant was evaluated by defense expert clinical psychologist, Dr. Kent Franks, on January 27, 2017; and (4) Dr. Franks had concluded that Defendant was not competent during the trial because his delusional disorder had influenced his view of the trial and his ability to testify. Defense counsel also filed a notice of competency issue pursuant to § 552.020 RSMo Cum. Supp. (2014). This notice alleged that Defendant had lacked competence at the trial and that he was incompetent to proceed.2

In March 2017, based on defense counsel's request and Dr. Franks’ report, the trial court ordered that Defendant undergo another evaluation by DMH to determine whether he had been competent at trial and whether he was competent to proceed. The trial court noted, however, that "[n]othing at the trial, that [the court] saw, indicated that [Defendant] was not competent[,]" that he "interacted with his attorneys" and that Defendant made statements in the sentencing assessment report, which was conducted after Dr. Franks’ evaluation, that were "completely logical, consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial, and totally consistent with his defense of self-defense[.]"

The trial court also raised the possibility that the defense had "sandbagged," in that the defense had failed to communicate any concern about Defendant's competence during the trial, and that "this is the situation where it's ripe for manufacturing grounds to set aside a conviction." Defense counsel responded that Defendant's "delusions that there was ... an underground tunnel system that he was aware of and that this prosecution was connected to that never stopped[,]" but that counsel "genuinely believed that [Defendant] was still going to be able to testify because that wasn't really relevant to this case[.]" The trial court replied that defendants "get cold feet all the time at trial." Defense counsel agreed and said, "that's why I didn't raise it then. But discussing it with him afterwards, I came to believe that ... his not testifying was connected to his fear of this being brought up.... [I]n his mind, it became connected, and that's what prevented him from testifying[.]"

In August 2017, DMH filed a report in which its examiner, Dr. Bridget Graham, concluded that Defendant had been competent at trial, but that he was not competent to proceed to sentencing. Defense counsel responded by filing a challenge to Dr. Graham's opinions.

In October 2017, a competency hearing was held. The trial court agreed to hear evidence about Defendant's competency at trial, but the record would be left open with no final determination until Defendant was competent and could participate in the hearing on the motion for a new trial. Dr. Graham and defense expert Dr. Franks then testified about Defendant's competency, both during the trial and as of the date of the hearing. While each expert differed in their...

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1 cases
  • State v. Oldham
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 18 Marzo 2022
    ...and indicate a lack of careful consideration." State v. Harding , 528 S.W.3d 362, 376 (Mo. App. [E.D.] 2017). State v. Taber , 604 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020). "Reversal is warranted only upon a very strong showing that the court abused its discretion and prejudice resulted." Edwar......

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