State v. Taggart, 22636.
| Decision Date | 29 October 1930 |
| Docket Number | 22636. |
| Citation | 292 P. 741,159 Wash. 201 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. PACIFIC COAST ADJUSTMENT CO. v. TAGGART, Justice of the Peace. |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; J. M. Phillips Judge.
Mandamus by the State, on the relation of the Pacific Coast Adjustment Company, against R. E. Taggart, Justice of the Peace for Aberdeen Precinct, Grays Harbor County. From judgment dismissing action, relator appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
Ackerman & Manley, of Aberdeen, for appellant.
E. E Boner, of Aberdeen, for respondent.
This action was instituted in the court below to compel respondent as justice of the peace to assume jurisdiction of a civil case tendered him for filing by appellant. The petition of appellant alleged that respondent had refused to accept the case for filing on the ground that he was not required by law to assume jurisdiction of civil cases excepting those brought before him on a change of venue. The petition sets out the complaint which had been tendered for filing by respondent, which discloses an action on two small claims well within the civil jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. An alternative writ of mandate was issued by the superior court. To the petition and the alternative writ respondent answered, admitting that he is one of the justices of the peace of Aberdeen, a first-class city, and alleged that he had been duly appointed, qualified, and was acting police judge for that city; that the law in such cases requires such police judge and justice of the peace to give preference first, to causes of action arising under ordinances of the city; second, the prosecution of violators of the criminal laws of the state within the city; third, civil cases coming before him on change of venue from the other justice of the peace of the city. He further alleged that, pursuant to law and the discretion vested in him at the time appellant presented his case for filing, after giving due precedence to the matters as required by law, respondent was unable to take jurisdiction of the case and try and dispose of the same within the time required by law; that the duty of police judge and justice of the peace entail a great volume of business under the ordinances of the city and the criminal laws of the state and respondent was not provided with a clerk. He further alleged that appellant had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law, in that there is another justice of the peace in and for the city of Aberdeen, duly qualified and acting, where appellant could have its case filed and procure a fair and speedy trial.
The affirmative allegations in respondent's reply, except the allegations that he is one of the justices of the peace in Aberdeen and was the duly appointed, qualified, and acting police judge of that city, and that he was required to give preference to the trials of causes as alleged therein, were denied by appellant, and the cause went to trial.
After hearing on the merits, judgment was entered in the court below denying appellant any relief and dismissing the action.
We shall dispose of the case upon the law as we find it to be, without regard to the evidence offered in the trial court as to the amount of municipal and state business that would be brought before respondent, and his lack of time for such civil litigation.
The principal statutes governing this matter are Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 8992 to 9000, inclusive. A brief synopsis of some of them is necessary.
Section 8992 provides for the appointment of a police judge from the two justices of the peace authorized to be constituted and appointed for such a city. Section 8993 provides that, 'in addition to his powers as justice of the peace, [he] shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses defined by any ordinance of the city,' etc. Section 8996 provides for a clerk to assist the police judge and for a salary to be paid the clerk. Section 8997 provides for a salary for the police judge in addition to his salary as justice of the peace, and also requires that the city furnish him a suitable office and supplies therefor. Section 8999 provides that the police judge shall give preference to cases arising under the ordinances of the city; then to prosecution for violation of the criminal laws of the state within the city; then to civil cases coming before him upon change of venue from the other justice of the peace in the city.
Other pertinent sections of the law relating to justice of the peace are Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 43 to 60, inclusive. It is also an office established by the State Constitution. Washington Constitution, art. 4, §§ 1, 10.
Respondent contended in the court below, and contends here, that, since, section...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Custody of Miller, In re
...order of September 2, 1975. A writ of mandamus lies to compel performance of that duty. See State ex rel. Pacific Coast Adjustment Co. v. Taggart, 159 Wash. 201, 204, 292 P. 741 (1930). Although there may not be sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that the father had delivered the......
-
O'Connor v. Matzdorff
...of their poverty, would be to deny a large part of the justice which is so sorely needed. In State ex rel. Pac. Coast Adjust. Co. v. Taggart, 159 Wash. 201, 204, 292 P. 741, 742 (1930), this court In this state a justice of the peace court is a constitutional court. It is a court regarded a......
-
Rushing v. Bush
...him to assume jurisdiction of, proceed with, and hear and determine an action, * * *.' State ex rel. Pacific Coast Adjustment Co. v. Taggart, Justice of the Peace, 159 Wash. 201, 292 P. 741, 742. See also Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 48 Utah 342, 159 P. 737, 4 A.L.R.......