State v. Tamez
| Decision Date | 04 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86,86 |
| Citation | 506 So.2d 531 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Claudio TAMEZ, III and Genaro Sanchez. KA 0865. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
William R. Campbell, Jr., Attorney for the State, New Orleans, for state.
George C. Ehmig, Covington, for defendants.
Before LOTTINGER, SHORTESS and CARTER, JJ.
Defendants, Claudio Tamez, III and Genaro Sanchez, were charged by bill of information with the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966. The defendants jointly moved to suppress physical evidence seized after a search of the automobile in which they were riding at the time of their arrest. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendants' motion to suppress. Thereafter, each accused entered a plea of guilty, reserving his right to review of the ruling denying the motion to suppress. See State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). The court sentenced each defendant to serve four years at hard labor. They appealed, urging the court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
On or about January 1, 1986, Trooper Phillip Domiano observed the vehicle in which defendants were riding heading eastbound on Interstate 12 in St. Tammany Parish. From the shoulder of the highway, Domiano observed the car weaving across the traffic lanes. Thereafter, Domiano pulled behind defendants' vehicle, and saw it cross the center line and run off the road onto the right shoulder. Domiano stopped the car and asked the driver, defendant Sanchez, to get out. In response to Domiano's request for a driver's license, Sanchez produced an alien registration card. Domiano testified that he asked Sanchez who owned the car and Sanchez replied that it belonged to a friend; however, Sanchez was not able to provide the friend's name.
Domiano further testified that Sanchez became nervous during this questioning and that he was able to detect the odor of alcohol on Sanchez's breath. He then asked Sanchez to consent to a search of the car and obtained Sanchez's signature on a consent form. Domiano specifically testified that he read and explained the form to Sanchez and that Sanchez understood the form before he signed it.
During the search of the automobile, Domiano discovered defendant Tamez sleeping on a pile of clothing on the back seat. Domiano asked Tamez to exit the vehicle and searched the pile of clothing. After two packages of marijuana were found hidden in the legs of a pair of trousers, Domiano arrested Tamez and Sanchez for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. A further search of the automobile revealed fourteen more packages under the back seat. In all, twenty-seven one pound packages of marijuana were found.
In brief to this court, defendants address only the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We note, however, that an error patent on the face of the record requires this court to vacate the guilty plea entered by defendant Sanchez.
The colloquy which occurs when the court canvasses the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences is a part of the plea of the accused. State v. Godejohn, 425 So.2d 750 (La.1983). It is in the nature of a pleading or proceeding, rather than testimony or evidence. Therefore, a review of it for error on appeal constitutes a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence. Id.
A crucial determination in this proceeding is whether defendant Sanchez was able to read and speak English. After the hearing on defendants' motion to suppress the marijuana, the trial court found that Sanchez was sufficiently fluent in English to consent to the search of the automobile. This ruling is the subject of defendants' appeal. Notwithstanding its earlier ruling, during the Boykin colloquy the trial court requested co-defendant Tamez to translate the proceedings into Spanish in order to establish Sanchez's understanding of the nature of the proceedings and the waiver of his constitutional rights. The court did not modify its previous ruling or make a factual determination that an interpreter was necessary before proceeding through a third party. Moreover, the court did not attempt to find an impartial interpreter nor did he instruct Tamez to accurately translate the proceedings.
Our Legislature has not as yet determined the necessary qualifications for interpreters who serve the court by translating proceedings into or from a foreign language. 1 Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that an interpreter should be a neutral and detached individual whose abilities are first screened by the court and who is sworn to make a true, literal and complete bilateral translation. The use of an unqualified, unsworn interpreter who was the co-defendant with the accused and also has a substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings, renders the plea itself questionable. In the instant case, the record contains no indication that a neutral interpreter could not be obtained. We find the court erred in permitting Tamez to translate the responses of his co-defendant, despite the fact that the suggestion to do so was made by counsel for Sanchez (who also represented Tamez). We find, therefore, that the trial court erred in accepting Sanchez's plea. The guilty plea entered by Sanchez must be vacated, the conviction and sentence reversed, and he must be permitted to plead anew.
Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress the marijuana. They argue the search was unconstitutional because defendant Sanchez does not speak English and, therefore, could not validly consent to a search of the automobile by signing a form written and explained in English. 2
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper Domiano testified that Sanchez told him he understood the significance of the waiver and that, in his opinion, Sanchez understood every word of the waiver form. Sanchez took the stand on his own behalf. Questioned in Spanish, he testified that he spoke English "poquito" (a little) but was unable to read it. After advising the court that he had unsuccessfully attempted to locate a translator for the hearing, defense counsel suggested the court question defendant through a Spanish-speaking party who was apparently in or near the courtroom. The state objected on the grounds that a translator had to be qualified by the court and that defendants' request appeared to be totally self-serving. Defense counsel briefly resumed direct examination in English, and Sanchez identified his signature by affirmatively shaking his head. He did not testify further.
Trooper Domiano was called to testify in rebuttal. He testified that translators were available through the Border Patrol and other...
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... ... 9/24/10), 45 ... So.3d 1074. An interpreter should be a neutral and detached ... individual whose abilities are first screened by the court ... and who is sworn to make a true, literal and complete ... bilateral translation. State v. Tamez , 506 So.2d ... 531, 533 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1987) ... We have ... located no Louisiana cases directly on point, but in ... People v. Munoz-Casteneda , 300 P.3d 944, 947 ... (Colo.App. 2012), cert. denied , 2013 WL 1409900 ... (2013), the ... ...
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...are first screened by the court and who is sworn to make a true, literal and complete bilateral translation.” State v. Tamez, 506 So.2d 531, 533 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987). In Louisiana, an interpreter is an expert whose testimony is governed by the Code of Evidence. “An interpreter is subject to......
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Thongsavanh v. Schexnayder
...and held that, absent any showing of “prejudicial error,” the issue was properly for the legislature to address. In State v. Tamez, 506 So.2d 531, 533 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), a criminal case, we Our Legislature has not as yet determined the necessary qualifications for interpreters who serv......
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State v. Fung, 950262-CA
... ... 2 In contrast, courts have found bias where the trial court allowed the co-defendant of the accused to act on behalf of the accused, State v. Tamez, 506 So.2d 531, 533 (La.Ct.App.1987), or allowed a witness's friend ... ...