State v. Tanner
| Decision Date | 02 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 23097,23097 |
| Citation | 385 S.E.2d 832,299 S.C. 459 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Bennie Charles TANNER, Appellant. . Heard |
John H. Blume, Columbia, Reese I. Joye, Jr., of Joye Law Firm, and D. Mark Stokes, of Pieper & Stokes, North Charleston, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Attys. Gen., Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Norman Mark Rapoport and Staff Atty. Miller W. Shealy, Jr., Columbia, Sol. Wade S. Kolb, Jr., and Asst. Sol. R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Sumter, for respondent.
Bennie Charles Tanner was arrested and charged with three counts of felony driving under the influence on June 26, 1987, in connection with an automobile accident which occurred in Clarendon County on May 24, 1987. He was subsequently indicted for these charges, as well as for two counts of reckless homicide. We reach two issues in this case: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a continuance; and (2) whether a formal arrest is required before a blood sample may be taken from one suspected of driving under the influence.
On the day of the accident, Tanner and Ms. Dale Taylor were returning to Sumter from Goat Island on Taw Caw Creek Road. They were travelling in Ms. Taylor's car. Randy Langley was travelling in a southerly direction from Manning to Summerton on Highway 301. At the intersection of Highway 301 and Taw Caw Creek Road, the two vehicles collided. The Taylor-owned vehicle caused the collision by running a stop sign at a high rate of speed. Another car, operated by Ophelia Tindall, was struck by the Langley vehicle after the primary collision occurred, but Ms. Tindall was fortunately unharmed.
As a result of the accident, Randy Langley was killed, as was one of his passengers, Crystal Langley. Tanner and Ms. Taylor were seriously injured. Connie Summers, the second passenger in the Langley vehicle, also suffered injuries. Ms. Taylor and Tanner were taken to Clarendon Memorial Hospital for treatment. Officer John Parker arrived at the hospital some time afterwards and requested that a blood sample be taken from Tanner so that a blood/alcohol reading could be obtained.
Tanner based his defense on the assertion that he could not be guilty as charged since he was not driving at the time of the accident. He claimed that Ms. Taylor was the driver. At trial, neither Tanner nor Ms. Taylor could recall much about the accident, including which one of them was driving at the time. Several witnesses testified that Tanner was lying on the driver's side of the car after the collision, while Ms. Taylor was on the passenger side. Tanner presented an accident reconstruction expert who testified that in his opinion it was impossible to determine who had been the driver of the Taylor vehicle. There was evidence that Tanner told Officer Parker that he didn't think he was driving, but there was also evidence, admitted over objection, that Tanner told others shortly after the accident that he had been the driver.
Tanner was found guilty of three counts of felony driving under the influence on January 18, 1988, and was sentenced to a term of fifteen years imprisonment. He timely appealed and we reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
The defendant asserts a number of trial court errors. We hold that the failure of the trial judge to grant a continuance was error, and we therefore reverse and remand this case for a new trial.
The defendant contends that he should have been granted a continuance in this case. A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on such motion will not be reversed without a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Browder, 277 S.C. 206, 284 S.E.2d 775 (1981).
In State v. Squires, 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d 601 (1966), we held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. We stated there, in pertinent part: "There is no showing that any other evidence on behalf of the appellant could have been produced, or that any other points in their behalf could have been raised had more time been granted for the purpose of preparing the case for trial." Squires, 248 S.C. at 244, 149 S.E.2d at 603. See also, State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328 (1977). In the instant case, blood, skin, and hair samples were taken from the Taylor-owned car after the accident and held in police custody. It appears from the record that Tanner's attorney may have become aware of the existence of these samples some time before trial. However, it is...
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...sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Tanner, 299 S.C. 459, 462, 385 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1989); State v. Mansfield, 343 S.C. 66, 72, 538 S.E.2d 257, 260 (Ct.App. 2000); State v. White, 311 S.C. 289, 293, 428 S.E......
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