State v. Tanner
| Decision Date | 24 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–0634.,11–0634. |
| Citation | 229 W.Va. 138,727 S.E.2d 814 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. Karen TANNER, Defendant Below, Petitioner. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. Pursuant to the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act, W. Va.Code § 62–11B–12(a) (2002) (Repl.Vol.2010), a circuit court has the same authority as that possessed by the West Virginia Parole Board to release on parole a person who is serving a sentence of home confinement ordered by the circuit court.
2. When exercising the authority of the West Virginia Parole Board to grant parole to a person who is being released from home incarceration pursuant to the authority granted in the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act, W. Va.Code § 62–11B–12(a) (2002) (Repl.Vol.2010), a circuit court has broad discretion to impose special conditions it deems necessary, so long as its actions are not unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary.
Barbara Harmon–Schamberger, Clay, WV, for the Petitioner.
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Laura Young, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for the Respondent.
In this case, Karen Tanner, the petitioner herein and defendant below (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Tanner”), appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Clay County that granted her parole with the condition, inter alia, that she not “be in the presence or accompaniment of anyone convicted of a felony[,] including her husband.” Ms. Tanner contends that the circuit court was without authority to grant parole insofar as parole is an executive function. She further argues that the condition that she not associate with her husband was an unreasonable burden on her right of marriage. We find that the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act, W. Va.Code § 62–11B–1, et seq., imparts authority to circuit courts to grant parole under the conditions specified therein. In addition, we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion, and did not act in an unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary manner, when it imposed upon Ms. Tanner's parole the condition that she not associate with her husband. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.
On June 9, 2009, Ms. Tanner pled guilty 1 to one felony offense of manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of West Virginia Code § 60A–4–401 (2005) (Repl.Vol.2010).2 Ms. Tanner had been manufacturing methamphetamine together with her husband, Michael Tanner.3 This was her first criminal offense, and she was released on post-conviction bond pending her sentencing. On July 10, 2009, however, Ms. Tanner failed a drug screen, which was a violation of the terms and conditions of her bond. Consequently, she was incarcerated in the Central Regional Jail to await her sentencing. Ms. Tanner ultimately was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than five years in the penitentiary.4 While she was apparently still awaiting transfer from the Central Regional Jail to the West Virginia Department of Corrections, Ms. Tanner learned that her father was seriously and terminally ill.5 She subsequently filed an amended motion pursuant to Rule 35 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking to have her sentence reduced.6 Following a hearing on the motion, the circuit court granted the requested sentence reduction. The circuit court suspended the remainder of Ms. Tanner's sentence and placed her on home confinement in her parents' home.
After serving six months of home confinement, Ms. Tanner filed a motion asking the circuit court to release her from home confinement. Following a hearing on the motion, and by amended order entered December 9, 2010, the circuit court released Ms. Tanner from home confinement and placed her on court-supervised parole for a minimum period of two years. In granting court-supervised parole to Ms. Tanner, the circuit court imposed upon her numerous terms and conditions. One of those conditions was that she “shall not be in the presence or accompaniment of anyone convicted of a felony[,] including her husband.” It is from the December 9, 2010, order of the circuit court that Ms. Tanner now appeals.
This Court is herein asked to review a circuit court order granting court-supervisedparole, and imposing certain conditions thereon. In analyzing this case, we are mindful of our general standard for reviewing final orders issued by a circuit court: Syl. pt. 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996). With due consideration for this standard, we proceed with our analysis.
Ms. Tanner raises two issues related to the parole condition that she not associate with her husband. She first argues that the circuit court erred by imposing an undue burden upon her liberty interest in her marriage without stating upon the record its specific reasons for doing so and without explaining how restricting her association with her husband would assist her rehabilitation. She next argues that the circuit court erred by ordering a blanket ban against her association with her spouse without narrowly tailoring the prohibition to serve a rationally-related state purpose. Following our discussion of a preliminary matter that must be addressed, we will consider these errors in turn.
In this case, the circuit court placed Ms. Tanner on court-supervised parole. Ms. Tanner states that this was done in contravention of both case law and statutes that make parole an executive function. She contends that courts may impose probation as a proper exercise of their judicial function, and she therefore analyzes this case as if the circuit court had placed her on probation.7 The State appears to acquiesce in this characterization. We, however, disagree. Prior to her parole, Ms. Tanner had been serving a sentence of home confinement that was imposed by the circuit court. The West Virginia Home Incarceration Act expressly states:
Notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary, in any case where a person has been ordered to home incarceration where that person is not in the custody or control of the Division of Corrections, the circuit court shall have the authority of the board of probation and parole regarding the release, early release or release on parole of the person.
W. Va.Code § 62–11B–12(a) (2002) (Repl.Vol.2010) (emphasis added). 8
In our consideration of the meaning of the foregoing statute, we are guided by the long-standing principle that “[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). We are guided further by our recognition that, “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity[,] the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syl. pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
We find the language of W. Va.Code § 62–11B–12(a) to be clear. Accordingly, we expressly hold that, pursuant to the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act, W. Va.Code § 62–11B–12(a) (2002)(Repl.Vol.2010), a circuit court has the same authority as that possessed by the West Virginia Parole Board to release on parole a person who is serving a sentence of home confinement ordered by the circuit court. Therefore, because the circuit court had the authority to place Ms. Tanner on parole following her home confinement, we will analyze this case as a parole case, and not in the context of probation.
Having determined that, under circumstances involving release from home confinement, the circuit court possesses the same authority to grant parole as does the West Virginia Parole Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Parole Board”), we next examine the extent of the Parole Board's authority to impose conditions on a parolee. We engage in this analysis to determine whether the challenged condition imposed upon Ms. Tanner by the circuit court was a proper exercise of its authority.
That conditions may be imposed upon a parolee is beyond dispute. As this Court previously has recognized, “a parolee still has substantial restrictions imposed upon his freedom arising from the conditions of his parole.” Conner v. Griffith, 160 W.Va. 680, 685, 238 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1977).9 In fact, certain conditions upon parole are mandatorily imposed by statute. SeeW. Va.Code § 62–12–17 (2004) (Repl.Vol.2010) (directing that release on parole “ shall ” be upon certain enumerated conditions).10 In addition, the West Virginia Legislature has explicitly directed the Parole Board to adopt procedural rules to govern the granting of parole. SeeW. Va.Code § 62–12–13(g) (2006) (Supp.2006) (“The board shall, with the approval of the Governor, adopt rules governing the procedure in the granting of parole.”).11 In fulfilling this mandatory duty imposed by statute, the Parole Board has established procedural rules that, inter alia, recognize its authority to “[g]rant parole with or subject to special conditions.” 92 W. Va.C.S.R. 1–8.1.b. (emphasis added). The Parole Board's procedural rules further state that “[i]f the panel decides to grant parole, it shall issue written notification thereof, specifying the grant decision and any Special Conditions for supervision of parole, in addition to those specified in W. Va.Code § 62–12–17[,] the Board deems necessary.” 92 W. Va.C.S.R. 1–8.4. (emphasis added).12
The plain language of this procedural rule demonstrates that the Parole Board has the discretion to impose upon a...
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State v. Varlas
...to appreciate this critical distinction.Other considerations support that conclusion. In Workman , we cited a partial footnote from State v. Tanner40 for the proposition that "probation has no correlation to the underlying criminal sentence."41 This citation is wrong for several reasons. Fi......
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State v. Varlas
...to appreciate this critical distinction. Other considerations support that conclusion. In Workman, we cited a partial footnote from State v. Tanner40 for the proposition that "probation has no correlation to the underlying criminal sentence."41 This citation is wrong for several reasons. Fi......
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United States v. Hobbs
...The presentence report declares them "equally culpable." The government's other main case, State v. Tanner , is closer. 229 W.Va. 138, 727 S.E.2d 814 (2012). Tanner upheld a parole condition separating a couple who made and used methamphetamine together. Id. at 816. The rationale was reduci......
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United States v. Hobbs, 16-1956
...her crimes. The presentence report declares them "equally culpable." The government's other main case, State v. Tanner, is closer. 727 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 2012). Tanner upheld a parole condition separating a couple who made and used methamphetamine together. Id. at 816. The rationale was red......