State v. Target Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 March 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 41130,41130 |
| Citation | 279 Minn. 447,156 N.W.2d 908 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. TARGET STORES, INC., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
General statutes prohibit generally the Sunday sale of property in Minnesota. L 1967, c. 165, imposes more severe penal sanctions for the Sunday sale of property classified therein as restricted commodities. It did not repeal the general statutes but is so vague and uncertain in its statutory scheme and criminal consequence as to deny due process under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, John G. Pidgeon, City Atty., Adrian E. Herbst, Asst. City Atty., Bloomington, for appellant.
Vennum, Newhall, Ackman & Goetz, Minneapolis, for respondents.
Robins, Davis & Lyons, and Elliot Kaplan, Lynn S. Castner and LeRoy E. Haglund, Minneapolis, amicus curiae.
This is a test case to determine the constitutionality of L. 1967, c. 165, a statute prohibiting the Sunday sale of specified classes of commodities designated as restricted. The test arises out of an order of the Municipal Court of Hennepin County (the Honorable Donald S. Burris, Judge) on October 25, 1967, dismissing criminal complaints against Target Stores, Inc., and one of its employees, for making sales of restricted commodities on Sunday, October 8, 1967, in alleged violation of this statute. 1 The order dismissing the complaints was based solely on constitutional grounds, and the state appealed from that order. 2
Defendant Target Stores, Inc., commonly known as Target, operates a number of department stores in major suburban locations in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, and elsewhere in Minnesota. Amicus curiae SC Trading Corporation, commonly known as Shoppers City, operates discount department stores of a similar nature and location as Target and has likewise been a defendant in criminal proceedings under the statute. 3 Amicus curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union appears out of its interest in the important constitutional questions presented.
L. 1967, c. 165, printed in full text in the Appendix, prohibits 4 the sale of specific classes of commodities, designated as 'restricted,' on Sunday. 5 The so-called 'Sunday closing' provision is subject to an alternative Saturday closing provision for establishments which elect to remain open on Sunday. 6 The specific classes of restricted commodities, important to note, are:
Cameras; musical instruments including pianos and organs; records and other recordings; phonographs and tape recorders; radio receivers and television receivers; jewelry; clocks and watches; furs; furniture and other home furnishings; home appliances; footwear; wearing apparel of all kinds; luggage; lawn mowers and other power driven or manually operated outdoor machinery and equipment; hardware and tools; paints, varnishes and wallpaper, and painting and wallpaper tools and supplies; lumber and other building materials and supplies; floor coverings. 7
Sales activities not restricted by This statute are:
(a) Sales of any commodities falling outside the specific classes designated as restricted; 8
(b) Rentals of commodities Except if the rental agreement incorporates an option to buy the commodity. 9
(c) Isolated sales from a residence by a person not regularly engaged in selling the kind of merchandise sold. 10
(d) Sales at specified places of entertainment and recreation for use at such places. 11
(e) Sales, At retail, for recreational purposes made by a retail seller whose business is 'seasonal' as defined in the statute. 12
(f) Sales at a state or county fair. 13
It is a penal statute, and the penalties imposed for violations 14 are more severe than in most of our other statutes on this subject. 15 The statute contains no express declaration of purpose and no statement of standards by which it is to be interpreted.
The constitutional challenge is made on two broad grounds: (1) that it is unconstitutional in fundamental Purpose and (2) that, regardless of purpose, it is unconstitutional in Effect. More specifically stated:
(1) Defendant Target and amicus curiae Shoppers City assert that the 'real' purpose of the act is to suppress competition by discriminating against suburban discount stores for the advantage of downtown stores which prefer to close on Sunday, thereby exceeding the state's police power 16 and violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Amicus Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, alone, additionally contends that its inherent effect, constitutionally tantamount to purpose, is to 'establish religion' or 'to prohibit the free exercise of religion' in violation of the First Amendment. 17 These contentions, we conclude, are supported neither by evidence nor by settled principles of law.
(2) Defendants and amici contend that this statute nevertheless violates both the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 18 because (a) this statute, which they assert has repealed all other statutes restricting Sunday commercial activities, singles out only retail merchants for such restraint and, even within that narrow class, has arbitrarily exempted certain commodities and certain sellers of commodities from restriction; 19 and (b) the statute, being a penal statute, is too vague and uncertain reasonably to inform a defendant of the criminal consequences of his acts. We conclude that the statute is unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness alone, a conclusion that does not exclude reservation as to the rationality of certain other aspects of the statutory implementation of the legislative objective. 20
1. A preliminary discussion of legislative and judicial background for such legislation affords a necessary perspective for an understanding and disposition of these important issues. First, a tradition of restricting commercial activity on Sunday, as a common day of rest and repose, is rooted deep in this state, as it is in every one of the United States except Alaska. It has existed in Minnesota since territorial days. 21 Ours is a conglomeration of statutes and amendatory or supplementary statutes, which for convenience we collectively call the 'general statute,' and which, with like generality, we relate to the basic prohibition of--
'* * * all noises disturbing the peace of the day; all trades, manufacturers, and mechanical employments, except works of necessity performed in an orderly manner so as not to interfere with the repose and religious liberty of the community; All public selling or offering for sale of property, and all other labor except works of necessity and charity * * *.' (Italics supplied.) 22
The sweeping prohibition of this general statute is subject to a myriad of more detailed provisions having the effect either to indicate activities legislatively determined as not interfering with that basic objective or as coming within the exemption of 'works of necessity and charity.' 23 This basic general statute was most recently amended in 1961, contemporaneous with the advent of major league professional sports in this state, and stated its basic objective of 'peace, repose, and comfort of the community.' 24 The penalty for violation of the general statute, with the exceptions noted, is 'a fine of not less than $1 nor more than $10' or 'imprisonment in the county jail for not more than five days.' 25 However anachronistic these traditional Sunday closing laws may appear to be, they are, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, 'as contemporary as their latest-enacted exceptions.' 26
Second, statutes closely comparable to our statutes, both in text and context, exist in other states and were held constitutionally valid by the United States Supreme Court in four landmark decisions in 1961, which we will call the 'Sunday Closing Cases': McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393; Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563; and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617, 81 S.Ct. 1122, 6 L.Ed.2d 536. 27 The most comparable of the statutes is that of Pennsylvania, which was sustained in the McGinley case against objections similar to those in the instant case, except that the objection as to unconstitutional vagueness was not directly presented.
The 'whole body of Pennsylvania Sunday Laws,' in the words of the United States Supreme Court (366 U.S. 586, 81 S.Ct. 1137, 6 L.Ed.2d 555), consisted of a basic statute generally prohibiting 'all worldly employment, business and sports' on Sunday, with a general exception for '(w)orks of necessity and charity' and with specific exceptions for 'wholesome recreation (defined as golf, tennis, boating, swimming, bowling, basketball, picnicking, shooting at inanimate targets and similar healthful or recreational exercises and activities) and work in connection with the rendering of service by a public utility.' 366 U.S. 585, 81 S.Ct. 1137, 6 L.Ed.2d 554. Other statutes prohibited such activities as operating a pool room, conducting boxing or wrestling matches, harness racing, pawnbrokering, netting fish in the Delaware River, dog-retrieving contests, and extension education in public schools. Expressly permitted were such activities as baseball, football, and polo during stated hours; public concerts, 'of music of high order though not necessarily sacred,' after a stated hour (366 U.S. 587, 81 S.Ct. 1138, 6 L.Ed.2d 555); fishing from public lands or in public waters; exhibition of motion pictures after a stated hour, if approved by local option; the delivery of milk 'or the necessaries of life' during certain hours (366 U.S. 585, 81 S.Ct. 1137, 6 L.Ed.2d 554); and the on-sale service of alcoholic beverages in private clubs and, during stated hours, in hotel restaurants in certain cities, if...
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