State v. Tate
| Decision Date | 22 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16311) |
| Citation | 256 Conn. 262,773 A.2d 308 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES TATE |
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js. Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Eileen McCarthy Geel, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene J. Callahan, state's attorney, and Maureen Ornousky, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The dispositive issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court properly found, over the defendant's objection, the requisite manifest necessity to declare a mistrial despite its failure to inquire of the jurors, as requested by the defendant, whether they had reached a unanimous verdict on the charge of murder, or any of the lesser included offenses charged, before declaring that they were deadlocked. We conclude that the trial court's finding of manifest necessity was improper.
The record discloses the following pertinent facts. The defendant, James Tate, was charged with the intentional murder of the victim, Carol Chapman, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.1 At trial, the state claimed that the defendant intentionally had caused the death of the victim by manual strangulation. The defendant denied having caused the victim's death intentionally. He raised several weaknesses in the state's case and suggested, in accordance with his earlier statement to the police, that after they had smoked crack cocaine together, the victim started to choke and that he may have damaged the victim's neck accidentally while trying to help her.
In addition to the crime of murder as charged in the one count information, the trial court, Nigro, J., instructed the jury, at the request of the state, on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3).2 On its own motion, the trial court also instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1),3 and, at the defendant's request, the trial court also charged the jury on criminally negligent homicide in violation of General Statutes § 53a-58.4
As part of its charge, the trial court also advised the jury that it could not deliberate on a lesser included offense unless and until it first unanimously had acquitted the defendant on the greater charge. Specifically, following its instructions on murder, the trial court stated the following to the jury:
After advising the jury of the elements of first degree manslaughter, the trial court stated: "If you have determined that the state has failed to prove the elements of the crime of murder ... and also has failed to prove the elements of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, you should then consider if the State has proven... the offense of manslaughter in the second degree." Thereafter, following its instructions on the elements of manslaughter in the second degree, the trial court told the jury: "Finally, if you find that the state has failed to prove the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, you should finally come to consider whether the state has proven the elements of the offense of criminally negligent homicide."
The trial court then provided the jury with the following summary of its prior instructions: Lastly, before allowing the jury to commence its deliberations, the trial court provided them with a written list summarizing the possible verdicts.5
On September 30, 1999, the third day of deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jury requesting that the pertinent criminal statutes be provided to it in writing. The jury then sought clarification on how circumstantial evidence can be used to determine recklessness, an element of first and second degree manslaughter.6 Thereafter, the jury sent another note indicating that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. In response, the trial court delivered a "Chip Smith" instruction7 asking them to make another effort to reach a verdict. Before asking them to return to the jury deliberation room, the trial court provided the jury with a template for guidance. Specifically, the trial court stated: "Consider first the crime that's charged in the information, that is, the crime of murder. If you're unconvinced that the state has proven that count, that charge beyond a reasonable [doubt], then you should return a verdict—your decision would be not guilty of murder.
Another note followed, again reflecting the jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict. Concluding that there was no point to bringing the jury back for another Chip Smith instruction, the trial court determined that it should discharge the jury.
The defendant then requested the court to inquire of the jury as to whether it had reached a partial verdict. Specifically, the defendant argued that, consistent with State v. Sawyer, 227 Conn. 566, 630 A.2d 1064 (1993),8 and pursuant to the trial court's instructions, the jury could not have deliberated regarding first degree manslaughter until it had acquitted him first of the murder charge, and it could not have deliberated regarding second degree manslaughter until it had acquitted him first of first degree manslaughter. On the basis of the earlier note regarding the clarification of recklessness, an element that pertains both to first and second degree manslaughter, the defendant claimed that the jury unanimously had agreed that he was not guilty of murder, and that perhaps he was not guilty of either first or second degree manslaughter. Relying on Practice Book § 42-29,9State v. Aparo, 223 Conn. 384, 391, 614 A.2d 401 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972, 113 S. Ct. 1414, 122 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1993), and State v. Goodman, 35 Conn. App. 438, 447, 646 A.2d 879, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 940, 653 A.2d 824 (1994), the defendant contended that the trial court had the authority to obtain a partial verdict, and that, if the jury indeed had acquitted him of murder, as he had argued, the state would be precluded from retrying him under the double jeopardy protection afforded under both the state and federal constitutions.10 The trial court denied the defendant's request, concluding that the record as to whether the jury had reached a verdict was ambiguous, and that, because this case did not involve multiple counts, there was no authority to support his position. The defendant responded that, even if the record had been ambiguous, the trial court had the ability and the obligation to clarify the record by asking whether the jury had reached a partial verdict. Nev...
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...be retried for assault or attempted assault because of his acquittal on those counts at the first trial; see, e.g., State v. Tate, 256 Conn. 262, 284, 773 A.2d 308 (2001); and the introduction of evidence of the victim's assault claims, which the jury already had rejected on the basis of it......
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...of the greater charge. See Commonwealth v. Roth, 437 Mass. 777, 794 n. 14, 776 N.E.2d 437 (2002). See also State v. Tate, 256 Conn. 262, 279–280 & n. 12, 773 A.2d 308 (2001); People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 179, 513 N.Y.S.2d 83, 505 N.E.2d 594 (1987). Under the “soft transition” rule, a......
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...on a lesser included offense justifies the assumption that the jury acquitted on any greater offenses. See State v. Tate, 256 Conn. 262, 283–285, 773 A.2d 308, 323–324 (2001) ; Stone v. Superior Ct. of San Diego Cty., 31 Cal.3d 503, 511–512, n. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809, 815, n. 5 ......
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...jury's deadlock on a lesser included offense justifies the assumption that the jury acquitted on any greater offenses. See State v. Tate, 256 Conn. 262, 283–285, 773 A.2d 308, 323–324 (2001) ; Stone v. Superior Ct. of San Diego Cty., 31 Cal.3d 503, 511–512, n. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d......