State v. Granillo

• Citation: 384 P.3d 1121
• Decision Date: 22 August 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 33,637,33,637
• Parties: State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Veronica Granillo, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

384 P.3d 1121

State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Veronica Granillo, Defendant–Appellant.

NO. 33,637

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: August 22, 2016

Certiorari Denied, November 15, 2016, No. S-1-SC-36095

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

FRENCH

, Judge.

{1} This appeal requires us to construe the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment. NMSA 1978, § 30–6–1(D)(1) (2009)

. Veronica Granillo (Defendant) appeals her conviction for intentional child abuse by endangerment, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) the jury was improperly instructed as to the elements of the crime; and (3) the district court improperly limited her closing argument. Defendant's insufficiency of the evidence argument raises the main issue in this case—the requisite mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment. We hold that intentional child abuse by endangerment requires a conscious objective to endanger the child. Because we agree with Defendant that the evidence was insufficient to prove the requisite mens rea , we reverse her conviction for intentional child abuse by endangerment. We do not reach Defendant's remaining arguments.

BACKGROUND

{2} A witness testified at trial that a car veered onto the wrong side of the road, continued driving that way for approximately five or six blocks, and in so doing forced “quite a few cars off the road.” The witness noted the license plate number, called the police, and kept the car within eyesight.

{3} Upon arrival, Lieutenant Conrad Jacquez of the City of Deming Police Department observed the car stop in the center of the road, then start and stop twice more, eventually coming to rest on the wrong side of the road. Lieutenant Jacquez initiated a traffic stop.

{4} Lieutenant Jacquez knocked on the driver's side window, received no response, and knocked again. When Defendant rolled down the window, she had a strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and did not focus her eyesight on Lieutenant Jacquez while they spoke. There was an open, half-empty bottle of whiskey on the passenger seat and a full bottle of whiskey on the floor of the front passenger seat.

{5} A three-year-old child was in the back of the car. Officer Robert Ramirez, who had arrived to assist, observed the child unbuckle himself from his child seat, stand up, and turn around.

{6} Lieutenant Jacquez made two attempts to administer field sobriety tests to Defendant, but abandoned both because Defendant was unable to stand. Lieutenant Jacquez placed Defendant under arrest.

{7} Once arrested, Defendant became verbally and physically belligerent. Lieutenant Jacquez read Defendant the New Mexico Implied Consent Act and she agreed to a blood test. At the hospital, Defendant—still verbally abusive and physically uncooperative—refused to exit the police car. Defendant was not tested for the presence of alcohol or drugs.

{8} Defendant was charged and tried not only for intentional child abuse, of which she was convicted, but also for: aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs under NMSA 1978, § 66–8–102(D) (2010, amended 2016)

, on which the jury was unable to reach a verdict; driving with a suspended or revoked license under NMSA 1978 § 66–5–39 (2013)

, on which the jury acquitted; and failure to maintain a lane on a laned road under NMSA 1978, § 66–7–317 (1978), on which the district court directed a verdict in favor of the Defendant.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

{9} Defendant argues that her conviction for intentional child abuse by endangerment must be reversed because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the child was endangered, and even if Defendant endangered the child, she did not do so with the requisite state of mind. Essentially, Defendant argues that evidence was lacking of both the actus reus and the mens rea . Either insufficiency requires this Court to reverse. See State v. Vigil , 2010–NMSC–003, ¶ 15, 147 N.M. 537, 226 P.3d 636

(“[O]bserving that [A] conviction of child abuse cannot be sustained in the absence of sufficient evidence of both [the actus reus and the mens rea .]”), (citing State v . Schoonmaker , 2008–NMSC–010, ¶ 48, 143 N.M. 373, 176 P.3d 1105 (Schoonmaker

II )); State v. Padilla , 2008–NMSC–006, ¶ 12, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (“Typically, criminal liability is premised upon a defendant's culpable conduct, the actus reus , coupled with a defendant's culpable mental state, the mens rea .”).

Standard of Review

{10} We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine “whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Sutphin , 1988–NMSC–031, ¶ 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314

. “[Appellate courts] view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State v. Astorga , 2015–NMSC–007, ¶ 57, 343 P.3d 1245 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ultimate question is “whether a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.” Id . (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{11} We review any question of statutory interpretation raised by Defendant's argument de novo as a question of law. State v. Chavez , 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891

. When we interpret a statute, “[the appellate court's] main goal ... is to give effect to the Legislature's intent.” State v. Almanzar , 2014–NMSC–001, ¶ 14, 316 P.3d 183 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Textual ambiguity is resolved in favor of the defendant, in accordance with the rule of lenity. State v. Consaul , 2014–NMSC–030, ¶ 40, 332 P.3d 850.

Child Abuse by Endangerment

{12} Child abuse by endangerment “consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or [recklessly],¹ and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be ... placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health[.]” Section 30–6–1(D)(1)

. Abuse by endangerment is a special class of child abuse designed to punish conduct that “exposes a child to a significant risk of harm, even though the child does not suffer a physical injury.” Chavez , 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 15, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also

State v. Gonzales , 2011–NMCA–081, ¶ 20, 150 N.M. 494, 263 P.3d 271 (“[E]ndangerment is something that exists as an antecedent to any harm that might befall a child.”), aff'd on other grounds by 2013–NMSC–016, 301 P.3d 380. Our Supreme Court concluded that “by classifying child [abuse by] endangerment as a third-degree felony, our Legislature anticipated that criminal prosecution would be reserved for the most serious occurrences, and not for minor or theoretical dangers.” Chavez , 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 16, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891. In accordance with the purpose of the child abuse by endangerment statute to “punish conduct that creates a truly significant risk of serious harm to children[,]” id. ¶ 22, a child is considered endangered only when placed at “a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm.” Id .

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mens Rea for Intentional Child Abuse by Endangerment

{13} We analyze first whether any rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with the requisite mental state. The Legislature established three specific mental states by which a person may commit child abuse by endangerment: intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly. See State v. Montoya , 2015–NMSC–010, ¶ 40, 345 P.3d 1056

. In this case, Defendant was charged only with intentional child abuse by endangerment. She was not charged with knowing or reckless child abuse by endangerment, nor was the jury presented with a step-down instruction for endangerment committed knowingly or recklessly.² Thus, Defendant's conviction required sufficient evidence that she committed the actus reus intentionally. Cf.

Gonzales , 2011–NMCA–081, ¶ 30, 150 N.M. 494, 263 P.3d 271 (stating that a conviction for child abuse by endangerment requires proof that the defendant's “culpable mental state coincided with the act”). Before analyzing whether there was sufficient evidence that Defendant acted intentionally, we must first define the mens rea applicable to the crime of intentional child abuse by endangerment. This is a question of law that we examine de novo. See

Chavez , 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891.

{14} The Legislature does not define the mental state “intentionally” in Section 30–6–1

. State v. Cabezuela , 2011–NMSC–041, ¶ 23, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705. Nor have our appellate courts interpreted the mens rea requirement for intentional child abuse by endangerment. The State argues that because child abuse is not a specific intent crime but instead a general intent crime, the mental state required for intentional child abuse by endangerment is “only a ‘conscious wrongdoing,’ or ‘the purposeful doing of an act that the law declares to be a crime.’ ” State v. Brown , 1996–NMSC–073, ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. Therefore, argues the State, an intentional mens rea in this context requires that a person intend the underlying conduct that might support a finding that a child was endangered—e.g., that Defendant intended to drive her vehicle while intoxicated, with a child in the car—but not that a person intended to endanger the child. We disagree and explain below.

{15} The common-law classification of crimes as requiring either “specific intent” or “general intent” has been the cause of...