State v. Taylor, No. M2005-01941-CCA-R3-DD (Tenn. Crim. App. 3/7/2008)

Decision Date07 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. M2005-01941-CCA-R3-DD.,M2005-01941-CCA-R3-DD.
PartiesSTATE OF TENNESSEE v. RICHARD C. TAYLOR.
CourtTennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Cassandra Stubbs, Durham, North Carolina; Kelly A. Gleason, Nashville, Tennessee; and E. Covington Johnston, Jr., Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Richard C. Taylor.

Robert E. Cooper, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Elizabeth Ryan and C. Daniel Lins, Assistant Attorneys General; Ronald L. Davis, District Attorney General; and Derek K. Smith, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Robert W. Wedemeyer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Joseph M. Tipton, P.J., and James Curwood Witt, Jr., J., joined.

OPINION

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE.

The Defendant, Richard C. Taylor, was convicted by a Williamson County jury of one count of first degree murder, and he was sentenced to death. On appeal, he alleges twenty-three errors. Upon review, we conclude the trial court failed to consider the full panoply of evidence relevant to whether the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The Defendant is, thus, entitled to a new trial. Additional errors that also require reversal are as follows: the Defendant's constitutional right to counsel was denied at a competency hearing; the trial court erred when it failed to hold a competency hearing during trial; and the trial court erred in failing to appoint advisory counsel. We also conclude that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury at the sentencing phase, which requires that the Defendant be given a new sentencing hearing. As such, we reverse the conviction and the sentence, and we remand the case for a new trial.

I. Facts
A. Procedural Background

In 1984, a jury convicted the Defendant of the first degree murder of a correctional officer, and, finding the existence of four aggravating circumstances, the jury sentenced the Defendant to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1989). The Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After conducting several evidentiary hearings in 1994 and 1995, the post-conviction court concluded that counsel was ineffective during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial and granted post-conviction relief. Specifically, the post-conviction court found that counsel failed to adequately explore and assert the Defendant's competency and mental health condition at trial or as mitigation during sentencing. When the post-conviction court set aside both the conviction and sentence, it further concluded that the Defendant was not competent to stand trial; this occurred in 1997. The post-conviction court directed that the Defendant be evaluated for competency before the new trial began. The State appealed the trial court's decision, and this Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. Richard C. Taylor v. State, No. 01C01-9709-CC-00384, 1999 WL 512149 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul. 21, 1999). The State did not seek an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

After he received post-conviction relief, the Defendant filed several pro se motions in the trial court, including a motion to represent himself. The trial court determined it could not rule on the Defendant's pro se motions until after a competency hearing, and it appointed Attorneys Thomas Overton and John Appman to represent the Defendant. The parties agreed to select an independent psychiatrist to evaluate the Defendant. However, when they failed to do so, and when the trial court learned the Administrative Office of the Courts lacked funds available to pay a court witness, on May 10, 2000, the trial court directed the Forensic Services Division of the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute ("MTMHI") to evaluate the Defendant's competency to stand trial. The court's order provided that the Defendant could move the court within fifteen days for funding of an independent evaluation.

On August 21, 2000, MTMHI wrote a letter informing the trial court the Defendant was incompetent to stand trial, and they outlined a treatment and assessment plan. In response to this letter, the trial court scheduled a competency hearing. On November 1, 2000, MTMHI wrote a follow-up letter to the trial court stating that the Defendant met the standard for commitment as a result of a mental illness. On December 13, 2000, the trial court appointed Attorney Virginia Lee Story as guardian ad litem over the Defendant's affairs.

On January 26, 2001, the trial court held a competency hearing. After hearing testimony from employees of MTMHI, the trial court found the Defendant incompetent to stand trial because of a mental illness as outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-301(b)(1)(A). The court ordered the Defendant committed to the custody of MTMHI for treatment and directed a competency re-evaluation at least every six months. On August 7, 2001, Defendant's guardian ad litem filed a motion for judicial review on Defendant's behalf protesting the involuntary administration of medication. On September 18, 2001, following a hearing, the trial court ordered the continued administration of medicine to the Defendant.

On January 10, 2002, MTMHI informed the trial court that the Defendant remained incompetent to stand trial. On May 6, 2002, MTMHI wrote the court a letter stating that the Defendant's condition had improved sufficiently so that he was competent to stand trial and assist in his defense. MTMHI also informed the court that the Defendant no longer met the standard for commitment. On May 23, 2002, MTMHI informed the trial court that "[t]hings have changed rather suddenly over the past four days" and that it would be a mistake to transfer the Defendant to the custody of the TDOC because his "psychiatric condition had rapidly and significantly deteriorated." On July 1, 2002, MTMHI informed the court that the Defendant showed improvement since the events described in the May 23rd letter and stated that the Defendant was competent to stand trial and no longer met the standards for commitment at MTMHI. On July 3, 2002, the trial court granted Defendant's ex parte motion for funds for an independent psychiatric evaluation. On August 14, 2002, the trial court replaced Attorney Overton with Attorney Hershell Koger as lead counsel for the Defendant.

Dr. Keith A. Caruso, the expert retained by defense counsel, evaluated the Defendant and concluded that he remained incompetent to stand trial due to Continuous Undifferentiated Schizophrenia. In a letter to counsel dated August 16, 2002, Dr. Caruso stated that the Defendant intended to dismiss counsel and refuse taking any further medication. Dr. Caruso informed counsel that the Defendant was not only incompetent to stand trial but also incompetent to make his own treatment decisions. MTMHI reported to the trial court on August 29, 2002, that the Defendant remained competent to stand trial but stated that his competence was contingent upon continued treatment. MTMHI expressed concern about the Defendant's statements that he intended to refuse to take any more medication.

On September 9, 2002, the trial court continued the scheduled competency hearing until March 19, 2003. In the interim, Judge Donald P. Harris, who presided over the case after the granting of post-conviction relief, was replaced by Judge Russ Heldman. On December 30, 2002, the trial court set the competency hearing for April 1, 2003. On March 10, 2003, MTMHI updated the trial court that the Defendant was competent to stand trial and assist with his defense. MTMHI again reiterated that Defendant's continued competence relied upon treatment, and it believed that the Defendant could effectively be treated at the DeBerry Special Needs Facility.

On April 2 and 3, 2003, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether the Defendant was competent to stand trial. Following the testimony of the various witnesses, the trial court found the Defendant competent to stand trial under the standards set forth in State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2000), and the trial court set a trial date of October 15, 2003. On April 15, 2003, the trial court denied Defendant's motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal to this Court. Also on April 15, 2003, the trial court relieved Attorney Story as the Defendant's guardian ad litem.

On or about May 12, 2003, the Defendant filed a pro se motion requesting the termination of representation by counsel and the termination of his involuntary medication. After the Defendant filed his pro se motions, his counsel filed numerous pretrial motions on his behalf. Following a hearing on Defendant's pro se motions on June 10, 2003, the court granted the Defendant permission to represent himself. Having found that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, on June 16, 2003, the trial court entered an order relieving counsel from further representation in this capital case. Furthermore, the court struck from the record the many pretrial motions filed by counsel after May 12, 2003. The court, however, denied Defendant's request to terminate his medications. On July 15, 2003, Attorneys Koger and Appman filed a motion for a rehearing on the trial court's decision to allow the Defendant to represent himself and to continue the Defendant's forced medication. On July 16, 2003, the trial court filed an order responding to counsel's motion. Initially, the court reiterated the fact that it had previously granted the Defendant's request to represent himself and stated that counsel no longer had standing to file the motions. The court then...

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