State v. Taylor
Decision Date | 31 December 2002 |
Docket Number | No. COA01-942.,COA01-942. |
Citation | 574 S.E.2d 58,155 NC App. 251 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Donald Frederick TAYLOR. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General A. Danielle Marquis, for the State.
James R. Parish, Fayetteville, for defendant.
Donald Frederick Taylor (defendant) appeals his conviction of second-degree murder. For the reasons herein, we find no error.
At trial, the State's evidence tended to show that on 15 July 1998, defendant called a 911 operator to report that his live-in girlfriend, Dorothy Taylor (victim, no relation to defendant), had shot herself. When a paramedic arrived, he observed the victim lying on her back in the kitchen with an apparent gun shot wound to the back of the neck and a substantial amount of blood coming from the wound. A semi-automatic pistol was discovered on the floor beside the victim. Defendant told the paramedic that he and the victim were arguing, that she received a phone call, and, shortly thereafter, shot herself.
When Deputy Marvin Sapp of the Cumberland County Sheriff's Department arrived at the scene, he observed defendant, who seemed extremely calm, coming out of the bathroom drying his hands. Defendant told the deputy that the victim came home from work and laid across the bed while defendant was talking on the phone. Defendant ended the telephone conversation, took a shower, and then left the bedroom to make another phone call. According to defendant, after he finished the second call, the victim dialed *69 on the phone and discovered that defendant had been talking to another woman. The couple then argued. Defendant went back to the bedroom, took his gun from his holster and laid it on the bed as he got ready for work as a security officer. When he turned around, the gun was missing. Shortly thereafter, defendant heard a gun shot and saw the victim fall to the kitchen floor.
The victim was transported by ambulance to Cape Fear Valley Hospital, where it was determined that she had suffered a gunshot wound, with the bullet entering from the left and exiting on the right of her posterior neck. As a result, the victim's spinal cord was bruised beyond recovery, leaving her a quadriplegic. Noting the absence of any markings of burning, stippling, or tattooing, which are typical for close contact gunshot wounds, the treating physician determined that the victim's wound was not a contact wound. The doctor further determined that the victim could not have inflicted this injury on herself since she could not possibly have held the gun at a distance to prevent any burning, stippling, or tattooing of any kind.
On 8 August 1998, defendant was charged with felonious assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. As a result of complications from the gunshot wound, the victim died on 2 February 1999; on the same day defendant was charged with second-degree murder.
Prior to trial, the State moved to disqualify defendant's attorney, James Walen, from representing defendant contending that a conflict of interest existed since Walen had previously represented the victim in a divorce action. Hearings were conducted based on the State's motion on 24 and 26 October 2000. The court order, entered 19 January 2001, concluded that there was an "actual and substantial" conflict of interest and disqualified Walen and all members of his firm from representing defendant. The court appointed another attorney to represent defendant.
On 28 March 2001, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a minimum term of 141 months and a maximum term of 179 months in prison. From this conviction, defendant appeals.
By his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to counsel by disqualifying his retained counsel. We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment and §§ 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution guarantees a defendant's right to counsel in a criminal prosecution. State v. Shores, 102 N.C.App. 473, 402 S.E.2d 162 (1991). This right includes the right to retain an attorney of the defendant's choice. State v. Yelton, 87 N.C.App. 554, 361 S.E.2d 753 (1987). However, this right is not absolute. "The essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to insure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). As noted by this Court in State v. Shores, 102 N.C.App. at 475, 402 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting Id. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140), "courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards...." In this regard, the right of a defendant to have an attorney of his own choosing must be balanced against the court's interest of conducting a fair and unbiased legal proceeding. State v. Bruton, 344 N.C. 381, 474 S.E.2d 336 (1996).
When a party challenges an attorney's representation contending that a conflict of interest exists, "a hearing should be conducted, `to determine whether there exists such a conflict of interest that the defendant will be prevented from receiving advice and assistance sufficient to afford him the quality of representation guaranteed by the sixth amendment.'" State v. James, 111 N.C.App. 785, 791, 433 S.E.2d 755, 758 (1993) (quoting U.S. v. Cataldo, 625 F.Supp. 1255, 1257 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (citation omitted)). If it is shown that "an actual conflict or the potential for conflict exists, the presumption in favor of an accused's counsel of choice will be overcome." Shores, 102 N.C.App. at 475, 402 S.E.2d at 163.
It is well settled that "[t]he trial court must be given substantial latitude in granting or denying a motion for attorney disqualification." Id. To that end, the findings of the trial court are binding upon appeal if they are supported by any competent evidence, and the court's ruling may be disturbed only where there is a manifest abuse of discretion or if it is based on an error of law. State v. Hardison, 143 N.C.App. 114, 545 S.E.2d 233 (2001).
In the case sub judice, hearings were conducted on the State's motion that Walen be disqualified due to conflict of interest. After extensive discussion with and questioning of counsel for defendant and the State, as well as briefing the issue by both parties, the trial court made the following pertinent findings:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State Carolina v. Carter
...is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss a second-degree murder charge for insufficient evidence. State v. Taylor, 155 N.C.App. 251, 266, 574 S.E.2d 58, 68 (2002). The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of malice in a homicide with a deadly weapon is ......
-
State v. Norris
...the trial court imposed a presumptive range sentence. See e.g. Campbell, 133 N.C.App. at 542, 515 S.E.2d at 739; State v. Taylor, 155 N.C.App. 251, 267, 574 S.E.2d 58, 69 (2002). In State v. Streeter, this Court specifically rejected the defendant's argument that the imposition of a presump......
-
State v. Street, No. COA07-213 (N.C. App. 11/20/2007)
...and paid by the State. These findings are presumed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. State v. Taylor, 155 N.C. App. 251, 574 S.E.2d 58 (2002). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint substitute counsel. See State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178......
-
State v. Bruton
...and that it was done with malice." State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160, 322 S.E.2d 370, 388 (1984); see also State v. Taylor, 155 N.C.App. 251, 266, 574 S.E.2d 58, 68 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 65, 579 S.E.2d 572 Noting that the knife used in the offense was not the cause of Ms. Carter'......