State v. Taylor
Decision Date | 05 June 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 20170321,20170321 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Joshua Ryan TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Casey W. Moen, Assistant State’s Attorney, Wahpeton, North Dakota, for plaintiff and appellee.
Joshua R. Taylor, self-represented, Wahpeton, North Dakota, defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1] Joshua Taylor appealed from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of refusing to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. Taylor argues the district court erred in denying his requested jury instruction and his motion to dismiss. We affirm.
[¶ 2] According to the arresting officer, in the early morning hours of February 16, 2017, he observed Taylor driving a vehicle that failed to stop at a stop sign. The officer testified he initiated a traffic stop that resulted in Taylor’s refusal to submit to an onsite preliminary breath test and in a subsequent arrest and refusal to submit to an Intoxilyzer test at a law enforcement center. The State charged Taylor with refusal to submit to a chemical test under
[¶ 3] Throughout these proceedings, Taylor has represented himself and has maintained that a video from the arresting officer’s patrol vehicle would establish he stopped at the stop sign. This record does not include a written request for discovery by Taylor, but in his appellate brief he claims he requested the audio and video recordings from the state’s attorney’s office and was ultimately told the materials were unrecoverable. In response to a district court inquiry about the status of discovery at a pretrial dispositional conference, Taylor indicated "[i]t sounds like what I was waiting on is unrecoverable," and he moved to dismiss the charge for "lack of evidence." He argued the arresting officer did not have a valid reason for the initial traffic stop and, as a result, the officer’s subsequent requests for an onsite screening test and a chemical test were invalid.
[¶ 4] The State responded that Taylor’s argument referred to the fact that a video camera in the officer’s patrol vehicle "wasn’t operational" at the time of the stop, but the officer’s testimony at trial would be sufficient evidence of driving under the influence and the basis for the stop. The State argued that "just because the video camera wasn’t operational doesn’t mean that the officer’s word and his testimony isn’t evidence." The district court denied Taylor’s motion to dismiss.
[¶ 5] Taylor thereafter requested a jury instruction under N.D.C.C. § 39–20–14(1), which authorizes a law enforcement officer to request an onsite screening test if the officer "has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation ... and in conjunction with the violation ... the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the individual’s body contains alcohol." Immediately before the jury trial, the district court denied Taylor’s requested jury instruction after an extensive colloquy:
[¶ 6] The district court thereafter provided the jury with preliminary instructions, including an instruction on the essential elements of the charge of refusing a chemical test:
On February 16, 2017, in Richland County, North Dakota, the Defendant, Joshua Ryan Taylor, drove a vehicle on a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use; and the Defendant, Joshua Ryan Taylor, refused to submit to a chemical test, or tests, of his blood, breath, or urine to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of other drugs, or combination of alcohol and drugs, in his blood, breath, or urine, at the direction of a law enforcement officer.
[¶ 7] At trial, the arresting officer testified about the initial traffic stop and Taylor’s refusal to submit to an onsite preliminary breath test and to a subsequent Intoxilyzer test. After the State rested, Taylor moved to "suppress anything else about the stop sign." The district court stated a motion to suppress was inappropriate at that stage of the proceeding, but treated his request as a motion for acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 and denied the motion. Taylor did not testify on his behalf but called a passenger in his vehicle and the arresting officer to testify about the events leading up to the initial traffic stop. The court thereafter denied Taylor’s motion for "summary dismissal," stating the ...
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