State v. Taylor

Decision Date23 September 1977
Docket NumberNo. 46545,46545
Citation258 N.W.2d 615
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Hilliard TAYLOR, a.k.a. Hilliard Taylor, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A victim's past criminal record of convictions for simple assault and disorderly conduct are not admissible as evidence of the defendant's reasonable apprehension of danger on the issue of self-defense.

2. Oral statements made by the defendant to friends and the police after the shooting incident do not satisfy the requirements of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and were inadmissible.

3. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit into evidence the entire contents of a stenographic statement of the defendant's version of the facts taken by police; in denying a defense motion for a continuance; or in its instructions to the jury.

4. There is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty of murder in the third degree.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Rosalie E. Wahl, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, William B. Randall, County Atty., Steven C. DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard before KELLY, TODD, and PLUNKETT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

TODD, Justice.

Robert Hilliard Taylor was convicted by a jury of murder in the third degree. Taylor based his defense at trial upon the claim that he had acted in self-defense. During the proceedings, the trial court refused to permit Taylor to introduce oral statements made by him to friends and the police, to introduce a stenographic statement of his version of the facts, or to introduce the victim's past criminal record of convictions. We affirm.

On June 17, 1975, after running several errands, Taylor purchased a bottle of wine and returned to the rooming house into which he had recently moved at 825 Dayton Avenue in St. Paul. The house is a large two-story residence owned by Dutch and Mary Sutton who rented rooms in the house to several individuals. Upon returning home, Taylor began talking and drinking with Mildred Smith, his girlfriend, and with the Suttons and several other residents of the rooming house.

At approximately 7:45 p.m., Taylor went out to purchase another bottle of wine. When he returned home, William Barnes, another tenant, was seated at the dining room table with the group. Taylor left the house again at 9 p.m. to pick up a bottle of pain pills prescribed for his back condition. Upon arriving at the drug store, he found it was closed so he walked to his sister's house at 1005 Iglehart and obtained a ride back to the rooming house.

It was approximately 9:30 p.m. when Taylor returned home. By this time Barnes had already retired for the evening to his room on the second floor to "sleep it off." At about 11 p.m., India Smith, Mildred's daughter, arrived at the house and almost immediately engaged in a noisy argument with her mother in the hallway directly beneath Barnes' room. Shortly after the argument commenced, Taylor went upstairs to place Mildred's purse in his room and began washing out a shirt in the bathroom directly across from his room.

The noise generated by the argument in the lower hallway evidently awakened Barnes, who came out of his room and told the Smiths to be quiet. As the argument increased in its intensity, Barnes and Mildred began to exchange insults and threats. Finally, Taylor stepped into the hallway and told Barnes to go back in his room since it was an argument between mother and daughter. Taylor returned to the bathroom but the insults and threats between Barnes and the Smiths continued to be exchanged. Taylor again stepped out into the hallway and told Barnes that it was up to the Suttons, as owners of the house, to stop the argument. In response to this suggestion, Barnes informed Taylor that he would "kick his ass" if he did not "shut up."

Taylor then crossed the hallway and returned to his room. According to his testimony, 1 as he started to leave his room he saw Barnes walking down the hall brandishing a knife. He further testified that he asked Barnes to forget about the whole matter but Barnes replied, "I'm going to teach you a lesson about running your mouth." Taylor ran into his bedroom and armed himself with a pistol which was in Mildred's purse. He testified that he stepped back into the hall, asked Barnes to stop, and then fired one shot at Barnes which struck him in the chest area. Mildred and India Smith both testified that they heard Taylor scream, "Man, don't grab me" and then a gunshot.

Taylor then proceeded to walk past Barnes and down the staircase, exclaiming: "I shot the man. I shot the man." He attempted to give the pistol to Mary Sutton who refused to take it. Taylor then left the house without a shirt, stating that he did not intend to run from the police.

Barnes also came down the stairs, went into the dining room, and then fell to the floor dead. Taylor stopped at a friend's house to borrow a shirt and then proceeded to his sister's house. The St. Paul police had already stopped by the sister's house and had advised her that it would be in Taylor's best interests to give himself up. Shortly after Taylor arrived at his sister's home, the police department was telephoned and informed that Taylor would be surrendering himself. After he surrendered himself at the police station and turned over the weapon used in the shooting, Taylor made an oral statement to the police about the incident. 2 At approximately 10 a.m. the following morning, a stenographic statement of Taylor's version of the facts was taken and signed by him.

The subsequent police investigation of the matter revealed several informative facts. Barnes was a very large man, approximately 6 feet, 6 inches, and weighing in excess of 250 pounds. At the time of his death, Barnes' blood alcohol content was measured at .24 percent. Taylor was a smaller man, standing 6 feet and weighing between 160 and 170 pounds. He also had experienced severe problems with his back which required him to undergo three back operations in 1968 and 1969.

The officers investigating the scene of the shooting traced a trail of blood from the dining room to the landing on the second floor at the top of the staircase. A bone-handled knife was ultimately found inside Barnes' room on top of the door molding which was approximately 71/2 feet from the floor. The knife was tested for fingerprints by the police crime laboratory unit with negative results. The officer performing the fingerprint tests testified, however, that because the knife was bone handled, Barnes could have held it without leaving a discoverable fingerprint.

Taylor was charged with both murder in the second degree and murder in the third degree. The jury found Taylor guilty of murder in the third degree. After affording him his right of allocution, the trial court sentenced him for a period of 0 to 25 years' imprisonment. Taylor appeals from the judgment of conviction entered pursuant thereto.

The following issues were presented on appeal:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the victim's criminal record which included convictions for simple assault and disorderly conduct, offered on the issue of self-defense as evidence of Taylor's reasonable apprehension of danger.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the oral statements made by Taylor to friends and the police shortly after the shooting incident.

(3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the entire contents of a stenographic statement of Taylor's version of the facts taken by the police the morning after the shooting incident.

(4) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defense motion made at the close of the state's case for a 1/2-day continuance.

(5) Whether the jury instructions on the issue of self-defense were adequate.

(6) Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury determination of Taylor's guilt of murder in the third degree.

1. Taylor contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to admit into evidence Barnes' criminal record. He maintains that such evidence would show a pattern of aggressive and assaultive behavior, going to the issue of who was the aggressor in the incident, as well as to the merit of Taylor's claim of reasonable apprehensions of serious bodily harm. The particular crimes for which Barnes had been convicted were simple assault and drunk and disorderly conduct. After examining the record in chambers, the trial court determined not to allow the proffered exhibit in evidence.

This court has held in several recent decisions that the legal excuse of self-defense has four requirements. In State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 253, 170 N.W.2d 104, 112 (1969), citing State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 368, 373, 152 N.W.2d 529, 532 (1967), the elements of self-defense were enumerated as follows:

" 'It is a general rule that the legal excuse of self-defense is available only to those who act honestly and in good faith. The rule requires (1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the slayer; (2) the actual and honest belief of the slayer that he was in imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony and it was necessary to take the action he did; (3) the existence of reasonable grounds for such belief; and (4) the duty of the slayer to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible.' "

In an earlier decision, State v. Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, 104 N.W.2d 650 (1960), this court addressed the issue of the admissibility of evidence of a specific criminal conviction of the victim to bolster the defendant's claim of self-defense in a murder case. We held that evidence of a victim's reputation for violence is admissible for certain purposes but evidence of a specific act of violence is not. We stated:

"The defendant also contends that the trial court...

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