State v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 30 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 67105-2.,67105-2. |
| Citation | 140 Wash.2d 229,996 P.2d 571 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Cassandra Lynn TAYLOR, Respondent. |
John Ladenburg, Pierce County Prosecutor, Michael Lee Sommerfeld, Deputy, Tacoma, for Petitioner.
Dept. of Assigned Counsel, Lise Ellner, Tacoma, for Respondent.
Petitioner State of Washington seeks review of a decision by the Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversing an order of the Pierce County Superior Court which affirmed a Pierce County District Court conviction of Respondent Cassandra Lynn Taylor and denial by the District Court of her motion to dismiss the charge of assault in the fourth degree. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the charging document was defective because the essential element of "intent" could not be implied in the complaint charging Respondent with assault in the fourth degree inasmuch as she moved to dismiss the charge before trial. We granted review. We reverse.
The question presented in this case is whether a criminal complaint charging assault in the fourth degree is constitutionally sufficient, under a strict standard of construction, if the complaint does not explicitly allege the essential element of "intent."
On April 28, 1995, Respondent Cassandra Lynn Taylor and William Ide, Jr. engaged in an argument and physical altercation. Respondent was later arrested at her residence and taken into custody.
On April 28, 1995 at approximately 7:45 p.m., Kyle W. Ide, the two-year-old son of William Ide, Jr. and Yvonne Caceres, was standing on the patio of their next door neighbor, Respondent Cassandra Lynn Taylor. Because the child had chickenpox, Respondent in loud harsh words demanded that the "diseased" child be taken away from her property which was immediately adjacent to the child's mother's residence in a four plex apartment. In an angry verbal exchange, Mr. Ide called Respondent a "black bitch." She then pushed him from her patio as he held his son in his arms. Mr. Ide testified that she then struck him in the face with her fist and kicked him. In her testimony, Respondent denied kicking and striking him, but stated that he first struck her. He denied it. Witnesses testified in support of his version.
Pierce County Deputy Sheriff Darrell Shuey responded to a 911 call after the incident. He interviewed Mr. Ide, Ms. Caceres, other witnesses, and Respondent Taylor. He determined Respondent was the "primary aggressor" and arrested her at her apartment.1
On May 1, 1995, the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney filed a criminal complaint in Pierce County District Court Number One charging Respondent Cassandra Lynn Taylor with one count of assault in the fourth degree in violation of RCW 9A.36.041. The complaint read:2
On June 1, 1995, Respondent filed a Notice of Special Defense under Criminal Rule of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CrRLJ) 4.7, claiming "Defense of self, person and/or property."4 On July 19, 1995, before the Honorable John A. McCarthy, Respondent prior to voir dire made an oral motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was constitutionally defective.5 Specifically, Respondent claimed the complaint was insufficient because it did not explicitly allege "intent," an essential element of the crime of assault in the fourth degree. The Prosecuting Attorney asserted the charging language was sufficient and chose not to amend the complaint. The motion to dismiss was denied prior to trial.6 On July 25, 1995, after a three-day jury trial, Respondent was found "guilty" of assault in the fourth degree.7
Respondent appealed her conviction to the Pierce County Superior Court on July 27, 1995.8 On July 12, 1996, the Honorable Rosanne Buckner affirmed Respondent's conviction of assault in the fourth degree, stating 9 On July 26, 1996, Respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, Division II.10 Commissioner Donald G. Meath granted discretionary review under Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 2.3(d) on November 15, 1996.11 On July 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversed Respondent's conviction upon concluding the complaint charging her with assault in the fourth degree was defective. In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals, the Honorable J. Dean Morgan writing, concluded that "an allegation of intent will not be implied from an allegation of assault when a court is applying a standard of strict construction."12
Respondent State of Washington then sought review by this Court, which was granted on February 2, 1999.13 The case proceeded to oral argument on June 8, 1999, but the Court14 on November 4, 1999 ordered a rehearing.15 The case is now before the Court upon the rehearing which occurred on February 15, 2000.
Petitioner State of Washington contends the trial court properly denied Respondent Cassandra Lynn Taylor's motion to dismiss the charge of assault in the fourth degree because the complaint as written contained all the essential elements of the crime. Petitioner argues the term "assault" is commonly understood as an intentional act and cites the decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, in State v. Chaten16 as authority for its position. Respondent, to the contrary, asserts the analysis by the Court of Appeals, Division Two, in this case is a better statement of the law. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, concluded the charging document is constitutionally defective because the essential element of "intent" is not expressly alleged in the complaint; and since the sufficiency of the complaint was challenged prior to trial, the word "assault" must be strictly construed in favor of invalidating the charge against Respondent. The court granted her motion to dismiss without prejudice.
We granted review because there is a conflict between decisions of Divisions One and Two on this issue.17
"[A] charging document is constitutionally adequate only if all essential elements of a crime, statutory and non-statutory, are included in the document so as to apprise the accused of the charges against [the accused] and to allow the [accused] to prepare a defense."18 However, "[m]erely citing ... the proper statute and naming the offense is insufficient to charge a crime unless the name of the offense apprises the defendant of all of the essential elements of the crime."19 The charging document need not state the statutory elements of the offense in the precise language employed in the statute, but may "use words conveying the same meaning and import as the statutory language."20
The rule that a charging document must include all essential elements of a crime is grounded in the constitutional requirement that defendants be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, in addition to due process concerns regarding notice.21 The rule is based upon state and federal constitutional law and court rule.22 Washington Constitution, article 1, section 22 (amendment 10) provides in pertinent part that "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against [the accused], ..." United States Constitution, Amendment 6 provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; ..." CrR 2.1(a)(1) provides in part that "the ... information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."
The "primary goal" of the "essential elements rule" is to give a defendant notice of the nature of the crime charged so the defendant would be able to prepare to defend against the charge.23 The rule ensures that the defendant would be apprised "with reasonable certainty" of the nature of the crime charged.24 "[C]harging instruments which fail to set forth the essential elements of a crime in such a way that the defendant is notified of both the illegal conduct and the crime with which [the defendant] is charged are constitutionally defective, and require dismissal."25 The remedy for an insufficient charging document is reversal and dismissal of the charges without prejudice to the State.26
A common acceptable definition of "assault" is that stated in Black's Law Dictionary: "An intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward [the] person of another, under such circumstances as create well-founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with apparent present ability to execute attempt, if not prevented."27
The standard of review for evaluating the sufficiency of a charging document is determined by the time at which the motion challenging its sufficiency is made. When a challenge is made for the first time after verdict, the charging documents must be construed liberally in favor of validity.28 Under the liberal standard of construction, a court has "considerable leeway to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the charging document."29...
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...101, 106, 982 P.2d 1187 (1999). This court first deferred Borrero's petition for review pending a decision in State v. Taylor, 140 Wash.2d 229, 996 P.2d 571 (2000). The petition was then granted, and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration in light of State v. McCart......
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