State v. Teague, C.A. No. 08C-09-065 JAP (Del. Super. 4/3/2009)
| Decision Date | 03 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 08C-09-065 JAP. |
| Parties | THE STATE OF DELAWARE, UPON THE RELATION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Plaintiff, v. RONALD C. TEAGUE and MILDRED TEAGUE, 0.0498 ACRES of land, more or less, as a Permanent Taking and 0.023 ACRES of Land, more or less, as a Temporary Construction Easement; situate in New Castle Hundred; New Castle County, Delaware; WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, PREFERRED FINANCIAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; and UNKNOWN OTHERS, Defendants |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Michael W. Arrington, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware — Attorney for Plaintiffs Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, Hockessin, Delaware — Attorney for Defendants Ronald and Mildred Teague live on almost an acre of land located on the western side of Bear-Christiana Rd. (more commonly known as Route 7) near where it intersects with Delaware Route 273 in Christiana. DelDOT has instituted condemnation proceedings to obtain a small portion of the Teagues' property as part of a project to improve Route 7. Presently before the Court is the State's application for an order of possession and the Teagues' motion to dismiss. For the reasons which follow, DelDOT's application is GRANTED and the Teagues' motion is DENIED.
In addition to the Teague's home, there is a building on the parcel which Mr. Teague uses to operate his business, Christiana Auto Parts. The State seeks to condemn 2,171 square feet, amounting to less than six percent of the Teague parcel, located on the front of the Teague parcel for use connected with a redesign and renovation of Route 7. Neither of the buildings on the Teague parcel are located on the portion to be condemned. There are, however, four oak trees, asphalt paving and a sign advertising the presence of Christiana Auto Parts on the portion subject to condemnation, and the State's offer includes compensation for those items.
The heart of the controversy seems not to be the value of the land taken from the Teagues, but rather the redesign of Route 7. Currently, Mr. Teague's customers coming from the south make a left turn on Route 7 directly into Christiana Auto Parts.1 The redesigned Route 7 includes a four foot wide median divider in front of the Teagues property, which will make it impossible for northbound drivers to make a left hand turn directly into Christiana Auto Parts. Instead they will be required to travel 700 feet farther north, make a U-turn at the intersection with Route 273 (which will be controlled by a traffic light) and drive back south to the store entrance. Mr. Teague contends that the large majority of his customers use northbound Route 7 to approach his store and that his business will be ruined if they cannot turn directly into the premises.
The overwhelming evidence at the trial demonstrated it was not feasible for DelDOT to provide the Teagues with a dedicated left hand turn for at least two reasons. First, redesigned Route 7 will have two lanes of traffic in both directions, thus forcing northbound drivers attempting to turn left into the Teagues' property to cross two lanes of southbound traffic. According to the plaintiff's witnesses, this creates a danger not only for the Teagues' customers but also for the motorists heading southbound on Route 7. Second, a dedicated turn lane for the Teague property would dangerously shorten the northbound left turn lanes planned for Route 7 where it intersects with Route 273. The northbound left turn lane approaching Route 273 needs to be long enough to accommodate stopped vehicles waiting to make a left turn onto Route 273 and provide sufficient space behind those stopped vehicles for drivers entering the left turn lane to decelerate and stop. It is unrebutted that it would be impossible to construct a turn lane sufficiently long if there were a dedicated turn lane for the Teagues.
The Teagues raise several objections to the State's motion for an order of possession. They contend that:
1. The State did not proceed by motion as required by the rules of this Court when it sought an order of possession.
2. The State has not established any public necessity for the Teagues' property in order to construct a road project within a reasonable time.2
3. The State did not make a good faith offer as required by the Real Property Acquisition Act because it did not take into account the rezoning of the parcel to a commercial zone.
4. The State has used the wrong valuation method in determining the compensation to offer the Teagues and therefore have violated its statutory duty to make a good faith offer.3
5. The State did not describe the public use in the manner required by the RPAA.
6. The State did not afford the owners an opportunity to meet with the appraiser at the site as required by the RPAA.
The General Assembly imposed on DelDOT the duty to establish a "permanent system of state highways along the route or routes of travel as will accommodate the greatest needs of the people of this State."4 To this end, DelDOT is empowered to "lay out, open, widen, straighten ... reconstruct and maintain any state highway."5 DelDOT is authorized to exercise the State's power of eminent domain in order to accomplish this.6
DelDOT's authority to exercise the State's power of eminent domain is not without its limits, however. In 1972 the General Assembly enacted the Real Property Acquisition Act7 in order that the State could secure funding8 under the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.9 The RPAA's purpose, as described by the Superior Court is:
"to encourage and expedite real property acquisitions by agreements with owners, to assure consistent treatment of property owners, to promote public confidence in land acquisition practices, and to avoid litigation and thereby relieve congestion in the courts."10
The primary means of accomplishing the Act's goals is its emphasis on acquiring real property through negotiation.11
The RPAA sets out fifteen guidelines which, at first blush, might appear to be mandatory requirements imposed upon the governmental agency seeking to acquire real property.12 In a scholarly opinion, however, then President Judge Ridgley concluded that these guidelines are neither mandatory nor jurisdictional and, in appropriate cases, the acquiring agency may still condemn property despite its failure to strictly comply with those guidelines.13 This Court concluded in City of Dover v. Cartanza14 that if the acquiring agency has deviated from those guidelines:
I conclude that the RPAA guidelines are directory rather than mandatory. Therefore, noncompliance may in certain circumstances be excused. Noncompliance is not a jurisdictional defect requiring automatic dismissal whenever it is raised. It is instead a defense or objection to the taking which shall be deemed waived if not presented.
If noncompliance exists, then the agency must demonstrate a valid excuse for its failure to follow the RPAA's policies. Excuses include the agency's good faith efforts to comply with the policies or a showing that compliance would have been futile.15
Cases following Cartanza have reiterated the necessity of the non-complying agency showing a good faith mistake or futility in compliance.16
The Court believes there is a further exception which excuses the failure to strictly comply with section 9505. When the departure from the guidelines does not frustrate the purpose of the Act and has no discernable impact on the course of the negotiations, the Court will excuse the agency's failure to strictly comply. The traditional remedy for an agency's failure to adhere to section 9505's guidelines is to dismiss the condemnation suit without prejudice with leave for the agency to begin the acquisition process anew.17 The Cartanza court concluded that 18 In cases where there has been a material departure from the guidelines which could have adversely affected the negotiation process, this remedy makes sense. That remedy, however, is too extreme in instances where the Court is satisfied that the departure from the guidelines had no impact on the negotiations. In such cases, requiring the agency to start over would be fruitless because, after the meaningless departure from the guidelines is corrected, the same negotiation impasse will invariably result. It is well settled that the law will not require the performance of a useless act,19 and this Court is unwilling to require an acquiring agency to undertake such a useless task in these instances. Consequently, if this Court is satisfied that the departure from the RPAA guidelines had no impact on the negotiations and did not otherwise frustrate the purpose of the RPAA, it will excuse that departure.
The exception to the RPAA guidelines recognized here is similar to the familiar harmless error rule. The United States Supreme Court has observed that harmless error rules "serve a useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result in any way."20 The harmless error rule is frequently applied in both civil and criminal litigation and indeed it is imbedded in the rules of the courts of this state.21 This Court can see no justification for carving the harmless error doctrine out of our jurisprudence when it comes to application of the RPAA.
Finally, this is not a marked extension, if any extension at all, of the rule announced in Cartanza. As mentioned previously, then President Judge Ridgley wrote in that case th...
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