State v. Teal

• Decision Date: 21 January 1918
• Docket Number: 9859.
• Citation: 95 S.E. 69,108 S.C. 455
• Parties: STATE v. TEAL.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

95 S.E. 69

108 S.C. 455

STATE v. TEAL.

No. 9859.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 21, 1918

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Greenville County Mendel L. Smith, Judge.

W. A Teal was convicted of seduction, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The Court instructed as follows:

First in determining what elements enter into the offense, it is necessary to consult the enactment which relates to the offense. So far as applicable to this case it is made a misdemeanor by express enactment of the General Assembly of this state, passed in the year 1905, for a male person over the age of 16 years, by any means of deception and promise of marriage, to seduce any unmarried woman provided, no conviction can be had of any person so charged upon the uncorroborated testimony of the woman upon whom the seduction is charged; and, provided further, that no conviction can be had if it be proved on the trial of the case that at the time of the alleged offense or seduction that the woman upon whom it is alleged was lewd or unchaste.

To this indictment the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty and under our system of law his innocence is presumed; that presumption remains with him in the course of the trial and entitles him to an acquittal at every stage of the trial until it has been removed by testimony which shall satisfy the jury beyond all reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

Under the fundamental law and policy of this state, which is constructed upon the principles of English liberty, no man is called upon to establish his innocence in a criminal case. He, therefore, has the right to remain silent and require that his guilt be established by the state, charging him beyond a reasonable doubt before he can be convicted with a penalty of any kind for a public wrong. You must, therefore, not in this case, as one of the distinguished counsel for the state has stated, draw any inference hostile to the accused because he did not take the stand and testify in his own behalf. It is also a principle of criminal jurisprudence that no statement, or admission, or confession, is to be taken against one on trial for a criminal charge, unless the same is freely and voluntarily made; that is to say, made without duress, threats, inducements, or anything surrounding him at the time which would disturb the voluntary and free character of his utterance. Under the practice in this state the preliminary question as to the competency of such testimony is addressed to the court, but the jury have the right, and it is error not to accord them that right, to hear every word of testimony which is presented to the court in passing upon that question, and even though the court rules that such testimony is competent it is entirely within the province of the jury on that testimony, or anything which may appear in the case bearing upon the question, to conclude that such statement was not freely and voluntarily made, and, if so, they must disregard every consideration of it. If they conclude, however, that a statement offered in evidence as one of the accused's was freely and voluntarily made, it is still their province and their province alone, to accord to it that weight to which they deem it entitled, but they are not required to consider it at all even under those circumstances, but just as they view it and the weight which they conclude should be given to it. In other words, the credibility of the witnesses who testify in the case is solely for the determination of the jury, and they are to give to the testimony in any cause that weight to which they deem it is entitled.

The court will now endeavor to give you an analysis so far as it is pertinent to the issues involved in this case of the section of the Criminal Code under which this indictment is preferred.

First. In order to obtain a conviction it is necessary for the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the party charged is a male person over the age of 16 years.

Second. That the woman upon whom the seduction is charged was at the time an unmarried woman.

Third. A promise of marriage. The promise of marriage need not be shown by any particular form of words. It is entirely sufficient if the language used by the accused was such as to imply the promise and it was so understood and accepted by the woman. If the jury can infer beyond all reasonable doubt from the facts and circumstances disclosed by the testimony that such language was used to the woman as indicating the intent and purpose and promise of the accused to marry her, and it was so accepted and understood by her, that is sufficient. The promise of marriage need not be made at the time of the alleged seduction, it may have been made before that time. It is only necessary that it should be the inducing cause of the intercourse referred to--that it sustains to the accomplishment of result the relation of cause to effect; that the woman relied upon it and was induced by it to part with her virtue, and the inducement was so strong that without the promise of marriage she would not have yielded her virtue. It may be absolute and unconditional. The reason of that principle is well stated by a court in one of our states, and this court will adopt the language of that court in giving to you the reason of that requirement, which is as follows: "The object of the prosecution is not to punish illicit intercourse, but the seducer, who by means of a promise of marriage destroys the chastity of an unmarried female of previous chaste character, and who thus draws her aside from the path of virtue and rectitude, and then fails and refuses to fulfill his promise. But when the seduction is accomplished by means of a promise of marriage, to be performed only upon the condition that the intercourse results in pregnancy, no promise of the woman can be implied from such yielding." Now, the court used the word "when" because that is the word which is used in this quotation, but in delivering to you that instruction it is going to omit the use of the word "when" and substitute the word "if," so that you will understand that the instruction is given to you in a hypothetical way. So it will read this way: "If the seduction is accomplished by means of a promise of marriage, to be performed only upon the condition that the intercourse results in pregnancy, no promise of the woman can be implied from such yielding."

Fourth. There must be sexual intercourse. Mere illicit sexual intercourse is not sufficient. If the woman yields to the man willfully or to gratify her lust, or of passion, or a spirit of sexual curiosity, such an act of intercourse would not be sufficient to constitute the crime of seduction as recognized under the law of this state.

Fifth. There must not only be a promise of marriage, sustaining to sexual intercourse the relation of cause to effect, but the sexual intercourse must be the result of deception and a promise to marry, to use the language here. Now, to use the language of our Supreme Court in part: "The means of deception need not be other than the mental attitude of the seducer when he makes the promise of marriage, by which he induces the woman to surrender her virtue, without intending to fulfill his promise, and thereby deceives her, then his conduct is in violation of the statute, and is punishable thereunder." Those are the three elements; promise of marriage, sexual intercourse as the result of deception, and promise of marriage, which may be of the character just referred to in the extract taken from a decision of our Supreme Court.

Sixth. No conviction can be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix. Corroboration, to use the language of our Supreme Court upon this question, is anything which tends to strengthen, add to, add weight, or credulity, or that which makes more certain. Corroboration is thus defined by our court. To what elements of the offense must it relate in order to obtain a conviction? There must be corroboration of the promise of marriage, of the sexual intercourse, and of the deception. The court did not make this law, nor can the jury change it. The purpose of the enactment is that no conviction shall be had which rests upon the credibility and testimony of the woman alone. Now, corroboration need not be by direct or positive testimony, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of the jury. If circumstances are established by some testimony other than that of the woman, they are entirely sufficient if you so regard them and they bring to the mind of the jury conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. If, therefore, in a given case a letter purporting to be written by the accused rests solely upon the testimony of the prosecutrix it should not be considered by the jury. If there are any other facts or circumstances in the case, and that is solely for their determination, which strengthen or add weight or credulity to the testimony of the prosecutrix, then that would be sufficient, and which is for the determination of the jury; but that should not result in a verdict of guilty unless they establish that conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. It is for you to say if there are facts and circumstances other than the testimony of the prosecutrix which corroborate her in the material elements referred to. If you so find, and you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt thereof, if all the other elements of this offense are also established, it would be your duty to convict the defendant.

Seventh. No conviction shall be had if it be proved on the trial that the woman was at the time of the alleged offense lewd and unchaste. The word "chastity" has been much considered and discussed by the courts generally throughout the country, but the decisions are generally agreed upon this fact: That chastity means...