State v. Teddy L. Mosley

• Decision Date: 18 July 2001
• Docket Number: 00CA2739,01-LW-2977
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TEDDY L. MOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2001-Ohio-2524

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TEDDY L. MOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant

No. 00CA2739

01-LW-2977 (4th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District Scioto

July 18, 2001

R Tracy Hoover and Marie Moraleja Hoover, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellant.

Lynn Alan Grimshaw, Prosecuting Attorney, and R. Randolph Rumble Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellee.

OPINION

Harsha J.

Teddy Mosley appeals his conviction and sentence in the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas for three counts of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated vehicular assault. He assigns the following errors:

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE PROSECUTOR FAILING TO DISCLOSE SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose substantial material exculpatory evidence which had it be been disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered prior to trial.

The trial court erred when it denied Defendant's motion for a new trial summarily without disclosing its reasons and without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS.

Finding no merit in any of appellant's assigned errors, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I.

On the evening of October 30, 1999, a Mercury Cougar owned by appellant crossed the center line on State Route 348 in Scioto County and was struck on the passenger side by a Ford Aerostar mini-van driven by Pam Griffith. Angel Spradlin, Randy Mosley, Jr., Craig Fitzpatrick, and appellant were all occupants of the Cougar. Spradlin, Mosley and Fitzpatrick died as a result of the collision; appellant was seriously injured. Pam Griffith and her son, Brandon, were also seriously injured in the collision.

Appellant was charged with three counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, three counts of involuntary manslaughter, and two counts of aggravated vehicular assault. His defenses at trial were: (1) that he was not driving the vehicle, and (2) the collision was a result of Charlotte Blanton, who was following the appellant, striking the rear of the Cougar with her Toyota 4-Runner, thus forcing him into the oncoming vehicle. A summary of the trial testimony is attached as an appendix.

The jury found appellant not guilty of the three counts of aggravated vehicular homicide. However, the jury found appellant guilty of three counts of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated vehicular assault. The jury also found that appellant was not under the influence of alcohol while operating the motor vehicle. Appellant was sentenced to a total of twelve years incarceration. Following the trial, appellant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and improper conduct by the prosecutor. The court denied this motion and appellant timely appealed.

II.

In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial because the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. Specifically, appellant maintains that the prosecutor did not turn over the names of Jennifer Reed and James Compton, two emergency personnel involved with the accident, whose testimony would have aided the defense. Appellant contends that the prosecutor was aware of, or should have been aware of, Ms. Reed and Mr. Compton's testimony. He also contends that the Ohio State Highway Patrol investigators should have been aware of the names of the emergency personnel and other witnesses at the scene. Appellant argues that the prosecutor is deemed to have the knowledge that the state patrolmen, firefighters, and EMTs had. Appellant also argues that the state failed to disclose the identity of April Scarberry. In her affidavit, Ms. Scarberry states that she informed a state highway patrolman at the scene that Charlotte Blanton was involved in the accident but he did not believe her.

Implicit within the Fifth Amendment guarantee that the government shall not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, is the guarantee to criminal defendants of a fair trial. This guarantee imposes upon the prosecution a duty to reveal to the defense evidence tending to exculpate the defendant. Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194; United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 96 S.Ct. 2392.

The state's suppression of exculpatory evidence violates the defendant's due process rights irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. State v. Johnston (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 48, paragraph four of the syllabus. However, unless the defendant can demonstrate that the evidence the state suppressed was material, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial. Id. Evidence is deemed material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Johnston at paragraph five of the syllabus, following United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 105 S.Ct. 3375. "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id., citing Bagley, supra, and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987), 480 U.S. 39, 57, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 107 S.Ct. 989. This standard of materiality applies regardless of whether the defense requests the evidence specifically, generally, or not at all. Id. at paragraph five of the syllabus. "The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." State v. Jackson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 33.

First, we consider the affidavits of Ms. Reed and Mr. Compton. Both stated that they were emergency personnel on the scene, that appellant was in the back seat of the Cougar, and that he was not the driver. Though Ms. Reed indicates that she informed her colleagues of her observations, neither Ms. Reed nor Mr. Compton states in their affidavits that they ever informed the prosecutor or the patrol. The police are considered part of the state's "prosecutorial machinery," and a police officer's knowledge of exculpatory information must, for purposes of discovery, be imputed to the state. State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 78, quoting State v. Tomblin (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 17, 18. Appellant asserts that, similarly, the knowledge of EMTs and firefighters must be imputed to the prosecutor. However, appellant has cited no case law to support this position and we see no rationale for expanding the definition of the "prosecutorial machinery" to include these people. The EMTs and firefighters involved in this case were not gathering evidence, attempting to solve a crime, or prosecuting appellant. In essence, their nexus with the state is too remote to impute their knowledge to the prosecution. Though it is preferable that EMTs, firefighters, and other emergency personnel provide the prosecutor with evidence that is pertinent to a criminal prosecution, their failure to do so does not affect a defendant's due process rights as does a police officer's failure to make such information known. The function of the emergency personnel was to save lives and they are involved in this case only to the same extent as other lay witnesses. Therefore, since there is no evidence that the prosecutor or investigators knew of the existence of these witnesses, appellant's due process rights were not violated by the state's failure to provide this information to the defense.

Appellant also argues that the police should have known of the existence of other witnesses to the accident. Appellant argues that the patrolmen failed to collect witnesses' names at the scene of the accident and failed to determine which emergency personnel responded to the scene. As a result, appellant did not learn the identities of several important witnesses. The patrolmen testified at trial that they were attempting to save as many lives as possible at the time of the accident and were not yet concerned with investigating the accident. Therefore, they asked non-emergency personnel to leave the scene. The collection of such information may have been helpful to both the state and the defense; however, we cannot quibble with the patrolmen's reasons for failing to take such action. More importantly, however, Brady applies only to the failure of the prosecution or law enforcement officers to disclose information they possess. It was not intended to punish the state for its failure to conduct a thorough investigation. Sloppy investigation does not inure a benefit to the state, but rather carries the risk of damage to the state's case. Appellant has not referred this Court to any case law that holds the state should be penalized for failing to disclose information that it possibly could have, but did not, obtain. Moreover, defense counsel was free to question the patrolmen regarding their failure to gather such information and, in fact, did so. Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the patrol's actions.

Appellant also argues that his due process rights were violated by the state's failure to notify him of April Scarberry's identity and statements to police. In her affidavit, Ms. Scarberry states that she heard the car accident and ran to the scene. When she arrived, Beth Mosley and Charlotte Blanton, the...