State v. Terrazas
| Decision Date | 07 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | 12482-7-III,Nos. 12483-5-II,s. 12483-5-II |
| Citation | 863 P.2d 75,71 Wn.App. 873 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Juan Carlos TERRAZAS, Respondent. STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Jack SCOTTY, Respondent. Division 3 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Duane R. Knittle, Deputy Prosecutor, Yakima, for appellant.
Glen P. Warren, Ricky L. Hoffman, Yakima, for respondents.
The State appeals the dismissal of its cases against Juan Terrazas and Scott Jack. 1 The trial court dismissed both cases after granting the defendants' motions to suppress evidence seized in a search incident to a traffic stop. We affirm.
In the early morning hours of February 28, 1992, Washington State Patrol Trooper John Berends followed a black Z-28 Camaro 2 to 3 miles on Interstate 82 noticing the Camaro cross the lane divider three times. When the Camaro crossed the divider line for a fourth time, Trooper Berends suspected the driver was intoxicated. He activated his emergency lights; the Camaro pulled onto the shoulder of the road; Trooper Berends parked behind the Camaro.
Approaching the car, the trooper noticed there were two passengers in addition to the driver, one in the front seat and one in the backseat. The passenger in the backseat had his hands beneath the blanket which covered his lap. Due to his training and experience, Trooper Berends was aware the concealed hands could have held a weapon. Trooper Berends positioned himself so he could watch the backseat passenger. Trooper Berends told the driver why he had been stopped and asked for a driver's license. The driver stated that he did not have a license. Concerned for his safety because he could not see the rear seat passenger's hands, Trooper Berends asked the driver to step out of the car. The trooper then escorted the driver to a point near his patrol car. Trooper Berends asked the driver his name and birth date. The driver identified himself as Juan Sandoval. Trooper Berends suspected the driver had given a false name, and patted down the driver looking for weapons or a wallet with identification. He found neither. The driver stated he had no identification. Trooper Berends concluded the driver was not intoxicated, but arrested him for driving without a license and placed him in the backseat of the patrol car. Before arresting the driver, Trooper Berends did not ask any questions regarding his residence, his ties to the community, or his reason for being in that particular location. The trooper did not ask his dispatcher to run a computer check on the name Juan Sandoval or the vehicle before the arrest. The trooper did not offer the driver the opportunity to sign a citation to appear in court, because he suspected the driver was using a false name.
Trooper Berends decided to search the Camaro's passenger compartment for weapons. He returned to the Camaro and asked the passengers to step outside to enable him to watch them more closely. Trooper James Brown, a back-up officer, arrived on the scene and agreed to watch the passengers. Having previously stopped motorists who denied having any identification, Trooper Berends suspected the driver may have had some identification in the car. He also wanted to check for narcotics. A loaded .357 magnum pistol was immediately found in the backseat, positioned so the backseat passenger could quickly draw and fire. Trooper Berends then removed the keys from the ignition so that he could open the hatchback to check for more weapons. Upon opening the hatchback, Trooper Berends discovered a brick of white powdery substance covered in aluminum foil which was wrapped in three plastic bags. Trooper Berends suspected the substance was cocaine. A field test confirmed that suspicion.
At all times during the contact with the trooper, the defendants appeared calm and answered all of the trooper's questions. At no time did the trooper detect any furtive movements or activity by either the driver or the passengers that suggested a problem or ongoing criminal activity. Trooper Berends testified that the night was cold, and the location was dark. He also stated there was very little traffic at that time.
The driver was ultimately identified as Juan Terrazas. The backseat passenger was identified as Scott Jack. Both Mr. Terrazas and Mr. Jack were charged with possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, with intent to deliver and with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to suppress the State's evidence on the grounds the search was illegal. The cases were then dismissed.
The State contends the search incident to Mr. Terrazas' custodial arrest was valid, and the evidence acquired should not be suppressed. Mr. Terrazas acknowledges if his arrest was valid, then a search incident to that arrest would also be valid. The crucial issue is whether custodial arrest of Mr. Terrazas was proper.
Although State v. Reding, 119 Wash.2d 685, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992) involved reckless driving, a more serious violation, the Supreme Court discussed the evolution of the law regarding custodial arrests for minor traffic offenses. The court begins its discussion with its holding in State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978). Reding, 119 Wash.2d at 688, 835 P.2d 1019. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d at 50, 578 P.2d 527, prohibited custodial arrests for minor traffic violations unless the officer had "other reasonable grounds apart from the minor traffic violation itself." The court noted that the year after Hehman was decided the Legislature decriminalized most traffic offenses and amended RCW 46.64.015 and RCW 10.31.100. Reding, 119 Wash.2d at 688-89, 835 P.2d 1019. The intent of the Legislature in making these amendments was to codify the court's ruling in Hehman. Reding, at 690, 835 P.2d 1019.
RCW 46.64.015 and RCW 10.31.100 now control when an officer may make a custodial arrest for traffic violations. RCW 46.64.015 governs the issuance of citations:
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of the traffic laws or regulations which is punishable as a misdemeanor or by imposition of a fine, the arresting officer may serve upon him or her a traffic citation and notice to appear in court.... The detention arising from an arrest under this section may not be for a period of time longer than is reasonably necessary to issue and serve a citation and notice, except that the time limitation does not apply under any of the following circumstances:
(1) Where the arrested person refuses to sign a written promise to appear in court as required by the citation and notice provisions of this section;
(2) Where the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the arrested person has committed any of the offenses enumerated in RCW 10.31.100(3), as now or hereinafter amended;
(3) Where the arrested person is a nonresident and is being detained for a hearing under RCW 46.64.035.
RCW 10.31.100 addresses when an officer may make an arrest without a warrant:
A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant for committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor only when the offense is committed in the presence of the officer, except as provided in subsections (1) through (8) of this section.
....
(3) Any police officer having probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a violation of any of the following traffic laws shall have the authority to arrest the person:
Driving without a license is not among the traffic violations listed in RCW 10.31.100(3).
Under these statutes, custodial arrests for traffic violations are limited to situations involving:
3. Nonresident arrestees under RCW 46.64.015(3).
However, courts have followed the Hehman exception and allowed custodial arrest for minor traffic offenses when there are "other reasonable grounds" in addition to a minor traffic violation. In Reding, at 695, 835 P.2d 1019, the court stated: "[T]he only time additional grounds are necessary for an arrest to be valid is when a minor traffic offense has been committed." The court cites as examples State v. Barajas, 57 Wash.App. 556, 789 P.2d 321, review denied, 115 Wash.2d 1006, 795 P.2d 1157 (1990) () and State v. Watson, 56 Wash.App. 665, 784 P.2d 1294, review denied...
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